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ABSTRACT 
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Committee Chair: Glenn Harrison 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Risk Management and Insurance 
 
Participation in networks inevitably involves risk. However, the study of networks has, 
perhaps surprisingly, not had much to say about network risk in the sense that most economists 
would use the term ‘risk.’ No consensus has even emerged on what such a model would 
constitute. Network risk appears to be present in the world, whether in the financial sector, in 
transportation, or with regards to interpersonal connections, and yet we have few tools for 
modeling it. The primary contribution of this thesis is a formal notion of network risk, and a 
set of tools for measuring it.  
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Introduction 
Participation in networks inevitably involves risk. However, the study of networks has, 
perhaps surprisingly, not had much to say about network risk in the sense that most economists 
would use the term ‘risk.’ No consensus has even emerged on what such a model would 
constitute. Network risk appears to be present in the world, whether in the financial sector, in 
transportation, or with regards to interpersonal connections, and yet we have few tools for 
modeling it. Most notably, there does not yet exist a counterpart to the familiar risk premium, 
the difference between the expected value (EV) of a lottery and its certainty equivalent (CE), 
the certain amount of money that would make an agent indifferent to holding the lottery. The 
concept of the network risk premium (NRP), and its measurement, is the primary contribution 
of this thesis.  
Our model of network risk is based on the insight that network problems naturally give 
rise to lotteries. The network generates payoffs for its members based on an allocation rule, 
which determines the payoffs for each node in the network based on the structure of the 
network graph. Network risk comes in three forms: assignment risk, in which an agent making 
decisions over networks does not know which node she will be assigned to; structural risk, 
which is associated with the severance or formation of links; and valuation risk, which relates 
to the value generated by a network to be allocated to each of its members in a given network. 
In general all these forms of network risk can be present in field networks.  
We assume that allocation rules are anonymous, so that they depend only an agent’s 
position in the network. We make this assumption so that each node in a symmetric network 
implies the same lottery. In the absence of structural and valuation risk, each node in a 
symmetric network receives the same non-stochastic payoff.  It is a standard practice in 
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decision theory to consider the CE as a degenerate lottery, so that the lottery is being compared 
to another lottery (comparing, as it were, apples to apples). Under the same reasoning, we may 
identify a symmetric network with a non-stochastic payoff of !	at each node with the scalar 
outcome !. This is one way to define the network CE: a symmetric network with non-stochastic 
payoffs such that an agent is indifferent between it and the risky network.   
The strength of the networks-as-lotteries approach is that it is applicable to any system 
with a network structure, has generality regarding the risk attitudes of the agents in the network, 
takes account of the network structure in calculating risk premia, and evaluates risk to the 
individual and to the network using concepts familiar to economists. Prior literature on network 
risk has treated it mechanistically, using graph-theoretic metrics in lieu of concepts familiar to 
economists.  
The layout of this thesis is as follows. The first chapter reviews the literature and relevant 
concepts concerning networks and risk. The second chapter introduces a taxonomy of network 
risk and defines the NRP.  The third chapter models risk management in networks using the 
real-world traffic network of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, looking at a number of comparative 
statics. A fourth chapter concludes.  
 3 
Chapter 1: Risk and Networks 
1.1 Introduction 
In the past twenty years there has been substantial progress in the theory of networks. 
Influential theoretical studies include Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal 
(2000).1 There has similarly been a substantial increase in the use of network theory in applied 
and empirical studies. However, few studies address the question of network risk explicitly, or 
focus on situations involving non-strategic risk. Consequently, there have been few studies that 
explicitly model risk-averse agents. However, as will be shown here, many of the ideas in the 
literature may be integrated with a familiar notion of network risk.   
The primary focus of the present chapter will be on risk associated with network 
allocations, such as allocation according to the Myerson rule (explained below). The literature 
reveals a crucial connection: that allocation rules are commonly associated with centrality 
measures (also explained below). For example, the Myerson value and betweenness centrality 
(González-Arangūena et al., 2017). Allocations based on centrality measures give high payoffs 
to nodes at the core of the network and low payoffs to those at the periphery. This observation 
is related to extremal measures2 (Kets et al., 2011) and to systemic risk. This may be modelled 
in terms of the failure of a crucial node, represented as the removal of links between that node 
and the rest of the network. By considering network allocations as lotteries, we may apply 
familiar risk-theoretic methods to characterize these network-theoretic concepts, including 
centrality and stability. 
 
1 Olaizola and Valenciano (2018) provides a model that merges these two basic models and incorporates them as 
extreme cases. 
2 This will be described in detail in Chapter 1.3.4. 
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1.2 Literature Review: Risk Theory 
We consider risk represented by payoffs in a network setting, with those payoffs being 
determined by an allocation rule. The allocation rule may either be exogenously given or a set 
of rules underpinning an endogenous process. The network graph may be chosen in various 
ways. Examples of network graph selection processes include voting, random dictator games 
or binary choices. In this context, probability weighting may be important, so a review of 
models such as Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) is useful.  
1.2.1 Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity 
Before beginning a discussion of risk, a distinction must be made between three terms: 
risk, uncertainty, ambiguity. We define a situation involving risk as one in which decisions are 
made as if there is a well-defined objective probability of some event occurring. We define a 
situation involving uncertainty as one in which decisions are made as if there is a well-defined 
subjective probability distribution. If it can be replaced by the weighted average, then we have 
a situation of subjective risk, but not subjective uncertainty. We define a situation involving 
ambiguity as one in which decisions are made as if there does not exist a well-defined 
subjective probability distribution.3 Our interest here will be solely in situations involving risk.  
1.2.2 Lotteries 
Lotteries are ordered pairs of payoffs and probabilities, with the probabilities adding up 
to one. The objects of choice under risk are elements of #$ , the space of lotteries with % 
 
3 One can also consider, to borrow the phrasing of Donald Rumsfeld, risk to involve “known knowns,” uncertainty 
to involve “known unknowns,” and ambiguity to involve “unknown unknowns.” 
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outcomes (not necessarily distinct) in [0,)]. A simple lottery + = {(/0, !0), 2 = 1,…%}, 
with !6 ≤ !8 ≤ ⋯ ≤ !$, assigns probability /0 to outcome !0	in [0,)], where ∑ /0
$
0;6 = 1.  
A compound lottery is a mixture <=	 +	(1 − <)@ , where +	 and @  are lotteries, 
interpreted as follows. First, the lottery to be played is determined, with probability < that + is 
chosen and (1 − <)	that @ is chosen. Then the chosen lottery, + or @, is played. 
1.2.3 Risk Aversion 
The center of the discussion of risk theory for most of the last century has been the 
phenomenon of risk aversion: the observation that for a given lottery, the expected value (EV) 
of the lottery is normally greater than an agent’s valuation of the lottery, also called the 
certainty equivalent (CE). This difference is called the risk premium. The notion of risk 
aversion has been discussed since the 18th century, in Bernoulli’s (1954)4 discussion of the ‘St. 
Petersburg paradox,’ which involves a game in which a fair coin is repeatedly tossed, with the 
stakes beginning at two ducats5 and doubling each time the coin comes up heads. The paradox 
arises from the fact that the game has an infinite expected payoff, and yet “any fairly reasonable 
man would sell his chance [to play the game], with great pleasure, for twenty ducats” (Bernoulli, 
1954, p.31). Bernoulli (1954) proposed a logarithmic utility function, for which the CE for the 
St Petersburg game is finite, to explain this apparent paradox. Any sufficiently concave utility 
function will yield a finite CE and therefore resolve the paradox. However, the assumption of 
a concave utility function is not necessary. Alternative explanations may arise from probability 
weighting models such as RDU, discussed below. Analysis of the St Petersburg paradox led to 
a general consensus that (risk-averse) people will take some smaller amount with certainty 
 
4 The original publication was from 1738, but the English translation was not published until 1954. 
5 A European gold coin used between the 13th and 20th centuries.  
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rather than a lottery; that is, that the risk premium exists. Opinions differ, however, on exactly 
how the risk premium is composed.  
1.2.4 Expected Utility 
The standard approach to modelling of choice under risk begins with a set of axioms and 
a representation theorem. The axioms may be defended as being normatively compelling, or as 
being behaviorally descriptive, or as being both. A representation theorem states that if 
preferences satisfy the axioms, there exists a function A on #$ such that for any + and @, + ≿
@ implies A(+) ≥ A(@), and vice versa.    
The standard representation of preferences under risk is the expected utility theory (EUT) 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). For general lotteries, + ∈ ℝF, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) propose a set of axioms, with a standard representation being 
EU1) Completeness: For any two +, @, either + ≿ @ or @ ≿ + or both. 
EU2) Transitivity: For any +, @ and G, + ≿ @ and @ ≿ G implies + ≿ G.  
EU3) Continuity: For any +, @ and G, if + ≿ @ ≿ G, then there exists < ∈ [0,1] such that 
<+ + (1 − <)@~G. 
EU4) Independence: for any +, @, and G, and any < ∈ (0,1), + ≿ @	if and only if	 
<+ + (1 − <)G ≿ <@ + (1 − <)G. (1) 
Theorem (von Neumann and Morgenstern): The following are equivalent: 
• Preferences satisfy axioms EU1 to EU4. 
• There exists a utility function J, unique up to affine transformation, and such that + ≿
@	if and only if	KL(+) ≥ KL(@), where KL(+) = ∑ MNJ(!N)
$
O;N . 
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These axioms are consistency requirements rather than rules governing which 
preferences agents should hold. The most relevant of the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
axioms for our discussion is the Independence Axiom.  
1.2.5 Criticisms of EUT 
Criticisms of the EU axioms begins with Allais (1954), who offered a counter-example 
known as the ‘Allais paradox’ or ‘Allais problem.’ The Allais problem involves prizes ! =
0, P = 100	million francs, and Q = 500	million francs. Allais proposed two choices, first 
between S = (P, 1) and T = (!, P, Q; 0.01,0.89,0.1), and then between X = (!, P; 0.89,0.11) 
and Y = !, Q; 0.9,0.1) . Most subjects preferred S  to T  and X	 to Y  when asked to make a 
hypothetical choice, which violates the independence axiom because of the common 
consequence effect. However, the Allais paradox often disappears behaviorally when subjects 
are offered a real choice instead of a hypothetical choice (Conlisk, 1989; Harrison, 1994; Fan, 
2002) 
The original Allais criticisms, even though based on behavioral responses to hypothetical 
choices, were largely ignored until the development of alternatives to and generalizations of 
EUT beginning with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Segal (1990) 
divides the critics of the independence axiom into several categories: those who “tried to weaken 
it” (Quiggin (1982), Chew (1983), Dekel (1986), Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991)), those who 
tried “to replace it with other axioms” (Yaari (1987), Röell (1987)), or those who tried “to 
abandon it completely” (Machina, 1982).  
In response to criticisms levelled at the independence axiom, Segal (1988, 1989, 1990, 
1992) refined the notion of independence into three logically independent axioms, the 
reduction of compound lotteries (ROCL) axiom, the compound independence axiom, and the 
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mixture independence axiom. ROCL was first formally stated by Samuelson (1952), being 
satisfied if, for example, a two-stage lottery is equally as attractive as the one-stage lottery 
yielding the same prizes with the corresponding multiplied, or actuarially equivalent, 
probabilities. Formally, for any + = {(/6, !6), … . (/Z, !Z)}, @ = {(M6, P6, … . M[, P[)}	and < ∈
[0,1], 
<=	 +	(1 − <)@	~	\(</6, +6), … , (</Z, +Z), ](1 − <)M6, P6^, … , ](1 − <)M[, P[^_ (2) 
ROCL is implicit in the standard formulation of EUT and in most generalizations. It has, 
however, been subject to theoretical criticism (Segal, 1990), and experimental evidence is 
mixed. For example, Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout (2015) found that subjects did 
not violate ROCL when presented with one and only one choice, but that there were significant 
violations when individuals were presented with many choices and a single choice is selected 
for payment. 
The compound independence axiom states that, for given simple lotteries +, @, and G, 
and compound lotteries S, giving simple lottery + with probability α and simple lottery G with 
probability 1 − <, and T, giving simple lottery @ with probability α and simple lottery G with 
probability 1 − <, S is strictly preferred to T if and only if + is strictly preferred to @ for all 
< ∈ (0,1). Hence the common element in compound lotteries S and T, simple lottery G, has 
no effect on the preferences of S with respect to T. Nothing in this axiom says anything about 
whether agents obey ROCL when expressing preferences over S and T.  
Finally, the mixture independence axiom states that + is strictly preferred to @ if and only 
if the actuarially-equivalent simple lottery of <+ + (1 − <)G  is strictly preferred to the 
actuarially-equivalent simple lottery of <@ + (1 − <)G. So the mixture independence axiom 
combines ROCL with the compound independence axiom construction with common prize G 
and common probability (1 − <)  for that prize. Henceforth, when referring just to “the 
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independence axiom,” we follow common usage by implicitly referring to the mixture 
independence axiom.  
1.2.6 Subjective EUT (SEU) 
Savage (1972) offered a different normative basis for the independence axiom, based on 
the ‘sure thing’ principle. Savage presented the ‘sure thing’ principle in the context of decision-
making under risk or uncertainty, where subjective probabilities of states of nature are derived 
from preferences over acts.6 These arguments are applicable to the case of objectively known 
probabilities, assuming that any two states with equal probability may be treated 
interchangeably.  
It is under subjective probability that ROCL becomes particularly important, since 
individuals do not generally have subjective probabilities but rather subjective belief 
distributions. ROCL explains how subjects reduce these distributions to subjective 
probabilities. SEU assumes ROCL, and can be summarized as follows: there exists a subjective 
probability distribution and a utility function such that observed choices can be characterized 
as maximizing SEU. 
1.2.7 Alternatives to EUT 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) presented the model of Prospect Theory (PT), in which 
they sought to encompass a range of empirically observed phenomena, most notably 
probability weighting and reference point effect. The value function in PT was defined in terms 
of deviations from a ‘reference’ level of wealth. In this version of PT, decision-making could 
 
6 The sure thing principle provides a basis for comparing compound lotteries L1 and L2, where the first stage is 
the same for L1 and L2. Suppose that, for every possible outcome of the first stage lottery, the conditional lottery 
associated with L1 is preferred to the conditional lottery associated with L2. Then the sure thing principle requires 
that L1 should be preferred to L2. 
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be divided into two phases: the editing phase and the evaluation phase. In the editing phase, 
subjects perform a preliminary analysis of the prospects, typically leading to a simpler 
representation. The function of this phase is to organize and reformulate the options to simplify 
the subsequent evaluation. Some forms of editing include the coalescence of probabilities 
associated with identical outcomes and “the scanning of offered prospects to detect dominated 
alternatives, which are rejected without further evaluation.” (p.275). Kahneman and Tversky 
note (1979, p.284) that this process rules out direct violations of dominance, but admits indirect 
violations (i.e., intransitivities.) 
 These indirect violations of dominance, due to the fact that probability weights did not 
sum to one, gave rise to RDU. Quiggin (1981, 1982) proposed an approach to probability 
weighting in which the probability weights depended on the rank-order of the outcomes. The 
central point was that arguments for overweighting of low-probability events were mainly 
applicable to low-probability extreme events (the motivating examples being winning the 
lottery and having one’s house burn down). The contribution of Quiggin (1981, 1982) was to 
apply probability weighting to the cumulative probability distribution rather than to individual 
probabilities. For the discrete case, the functional form may be written as 
a(b) = cd0(b)J(!0)
$
0;6
	 (3) 
where b is a vector of probabilities and !6 ≤ !8 ≤ ⋯ ≤ !$.  
The ‘dual model’ of Yaari (1987), developed further by Röell (1987), exploited a number 
of formal symmetries between EUT and a special case of RDU in which the utility function is 
linear. The linearity of the utility function implied that, in the dual model, risk attitudes are 
entirely divorced from declining marginal utility of wealth. Dual theory therefore demonstrates 
clearly why concave utility is not necessary for there to be a risk premium, as noted earlier in 
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the discussion of the St Petersburg paradox. Of course, this point is also implied by RDU, 
which nests dual theory and EUT as special cases. 
Chew (1983) used a weighting function based on outcomes, rather than on probabilities. 
The motivation for weighted utility theory was primarily technical rather than intuitive. 
Weighted utility satisfies the property of betweenness, which is a natural weakening of the 
‘linear-in-probabilities’ character of EUT. Betweenness requires that if b ≻ b′, then b ≻ hb +
(1 − h)b′ for all h ∈ (0,1], which is true if and only if the common consequence G	in the 
(mixture) independence axiom is in turn a simple lottery defined over + and @.  
Gul (1991) developed a model of Disappointment Theory, drawing on the same intuition 
as the Loomes and Sugden (1982) model of Regret Theory. Gul’s idea was to define elation 
and disappointment for a prospect b relative to a CE i with utility A, which is itself implicitly 
defined by preferences. Disappointment outcomes (those worse than the CE) are evaluated with 
a utility function J(!)	while elation outcomes are evaluated with a weighted utility function 
j(k)lmn
6lm
, for some parameter o.  Loomes and Sugden (1982) proposed that decision-makers 
decide between prospects based on state-contingent payoffs, and minimize the regret that arises 
if their choice leads to a low payoff when an alternative choice would have led to a much higher 
payoff. 
A central assumption of the EUT model, shared with RDU, is ‘probabilistic 
sophistication’ (Machina and Schmeidler, 1995). Informally, this is the idea that any prospect 
can be represented by a probability distribution over outcomes, and that any two prospects with 
the same probability distribution over outcomes are indifferent. This idea was challenged by 
Ellsberg (1961), who proposed a variety of counterexamples. The simplest is the ‘two-urn’ 
problem. Consider two urns filled with 100 balls, each of which is a black ball or a white ball. 
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One urn has 50 white balls and 50 black balls, while the composition of the other is unknown.  
A ball is to be drawn from each. 
Ellsberg suggests that a decision-maker might strictly prefer a bet on a white ball being 
drawn from the first urn, rather than a bet on a white ball being drawn from the second urn, but 
might also strictly prefer a bet on a black ball being drawn from the first urn, rather than a bet 
on a black ball being drawn from the second urn. It is easy to see that no assumption about the 
proportions of black and white balls in the second urn is consistent with these preferences under 
EUT (or SEU). The absence of subjective probabilities may also be described in terms of a 
violation of ROCL. Segal (1990) shows that if RDU is interpreted as a violation of ROCL, it 
may be consistent with Ellsberg (1961). 
The standard interpretation of this counterexample is that agents may not have well-
defined subjective probabilities over the distribution of balls in the second urn. Since Ellsberg 
(1961) is entitled ‘Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms,’ the absence of well-defined 
subjective probabilities is generally referred to as ‘ambiguity.’  This is arguably a misreading. 
Ellsberg (1961) does not refer to ambiguity as a property of subjective probabilities, but as a 
property of the information on which those probabilities are based. 
1.2.8 Why non-EUT models matter 
Quiggin (2013) notes two reasons that non-EUT models may be of interest in the analysis 
of economic decisions under risk. Quiggin’s first reason is that non-EUT models may provide 
explanations of observed market behavior inconsistent with the EUT axioms: for example, a 
rational person buying a lottery ticket while holding an insurance policy (implying risk loving 
and risk aversion respectively) cannot be explained by EUT, but can be explained by RDU. 
The literature on experimental results has shown that many, if not most, participants, when 
faced with monetary risk attitude elicitation choices, exhibit behavior that is better explained 
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by RDU models than EUT. For example, Harrison and Ng (2016) had just under half of all 
participants satisfying EUT preferences, with the remainder satisfying various RDU models.7  
In addition, as mentioned above, EUT relies on behavioral assumptions such as ROCL. 
The validity of these assumptions has been questioned in the theoretical literature (Segal, 1990) 
and in the experimental literature (Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout, 2013; Harrison 
and Ng, 2016). As it happens, the standard derivation of RDU assumes ROCL, but an 
alternative formulation by Segal (1990) does not. 
1.2.9 The Risk Premium 
The risk premium has two components – the EV and the CE. The EV of a lottery p is the 
weighted sum of payoffs, where the weights are the probabilities of each payoff. An agent’s 
CE, meanwhile, is the certain amount that she would be willing to accept in exchange for her 
chance to play p. It is standard practice in decision theory to consider the CE as both a monetary 
amount q	and as a degenerate lottery that gives q with certainty. We will use a similar practice 
in defining the network certainty equivalent (NCE). The risk premium is simply the difference 
between the EV and the CE: 
rs ≡ Ka − XK (4) 
 
 
7 Quiggin’s second reason for the relevance of non-EUT models concerns the robustness of results derived under 
the assumption of EUT preferences. Quiggin (2013, p.724) notes that “[the] robustness of EU comparative static 
results under rank-dependent preferences reflects the fact that RDEU [Rank-Dependent Expected Utility] may be 
interpreted as maximizing Expected Utility with respect to a transformed cumulative distribution function… if 
the transformation preserves a partial ordering such as first- or second-order stochastic dominance, then any EU 
results concerning that ordering will carry over to the RDEU context.” RDU preserves first-order stochastic 
dominance if and only if the transformation is increasing, while it preserves second-order stochastic dominance 
if and only if the transformation function is concave. Notably, this excludes so-called ‘S-shaped’ weighting 
functions.   
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1.3 Literature Review: Network Concepts 
1.3.1 Introduction 
While the field of network economics can be said to have its roots in Myerson (1977) 
and Aumann and Myerson (1988), the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) model is the first to 
characterize networks as they are currently understood in the wider economics literature. In 
their model players gain benefits not only from the direct links that they form, but also from 
the indirect links that follow. However, they only pay costs for the direct links. Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996) formed the basis of most of the studies of economic networks over the last 
two decades. Jackson (2014, p.3) notes that  
as economists endeavor to build better models of human behavior, they cannot 
ignore that humans are fundamentally a social species with interaction patterns that 
shape their behaviors… the full network of relationships - how dense it is, whether 
some groups are segregated, who sits in central positions - affects how information 
spreads and how people behave.  
Given the rise of social media such as Facebook, much of the recent study of networks 
in economics has centered around social network analysis.8 Other studies have focused on 
applying social network analysis tools to various real-world problems.9  
One of the main applications of network theory has been in modelling trade networks.10 
Another application, originating with the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) Co-Author model, 
concerns networks to facilitate collaboration and coordination (de Andrade and Rêgo, 2017; 
 
8 Johnson and Gilles (2003), Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006), Bloch and Dutta (2009), Currarini, 
Jackson and Pin (2009), Golub and Jackson (2010), Fisher and Wooders (2017), Iijima and Kamada (2017), Zhang 
(2017) and Xu (2018). 
9 Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), Cai, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2015), Jackson, Rogers and Zenou (2017) and de 
Andrade and Rêgo (2018). 
10 Kranton and Minehart (2001), Wang and Watts (2006), Furusawa and Konishi (2007), Chaney (2014), Wang 
(2017) and Kotowski and Leister (2018).  
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Roketskiy, 2018). In addition, there has been increased interest in networks in the field of 
macroeconomics (Chaney, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2012).  
1.3.2 Terminology 
We consider a network of % nodes. Let {q2} denote a link between node 2 and node q. 
We let v$denote the set of all network graphs with % nodes, and v denote the set of all network 
graphs. A network graph w	is a set of links.  
A distinction must be drawn between networks of agents (what we refer to as networks 
hereafter) and Bayesian belief networks. Both use graphs to depict relationships. In a Bayesian 
belief network, nodes represent variables (either observable or unobservable) and a link 
denotes a direct causal dependency.11 The term ‘network’ as more commonly used in network 
economics, and in this thesis, refers to a model in which a node represents an agent and a link 
represents some sort of relationship between the agents (for example, sharing of information, 
or co-authorship). Generally speaking, the purpose of a Bayesian network is to ‘map out’ causal 
influence, so that two variables that are not connected are conditionally independent, while an 
economic network illustrates the relationship between agents.   
Define a path connecting two nodes 26  and 2x	 as a set of distinct nodes 
\26, 28, … 2xy6, 2x_ such that z{2628}, {282{}, … , \2xy62x_| ⊆ w. A network is connected if for 
any m and n there exists a path between them.  
A component of w is a maximal connected subgraph. That is, a set of nodes that have 
connections only to other nodes within the set. Let X(w) denote the set of all components of w.  
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.47) formally define individual utility u as follows:  
 
11 Bayesian belief networks are directed and acyclic, since otherwise an event could be causal to itself. 
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J: {w|wÄw$} → ℝ (5)	
The widely-cited Connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.49) further 
specifies 
JO(w) = dOO +cÇ
ÉÑÖ
xÜO
dOx − c iOx
x:Ox∈á
(6)	
where dOx denotes the ‘intrinsic value’ of individual j to individual i; iOx	denotes the cost to i 
of link ij; âOx is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j,
12 and Ç “captures the 
idea that the value that i derives from being connected to j is proportional to the proximity of j 
to i” (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996, p.49).  
An automorphism of w, denoted ä:% → % is a permutation (that is, a rearrangement of 
the elements) of % such that 
{q2} ∈ w ⇔ {ä(q)ä(2)} ∈ ä(w). (7) 
With the standard abuse of notation, we will use ä(w) to denote the graph arising from 
the permutation. We define an asymmetric graph as a graph for which there are no non-trivial 
automorphisms. 
We next show several standard network graphs. Figure 1.1 shows the path graph, Figure 
1.2 shows the cycle graph, also called the ring graph. Figure 1.3 shows the star graph. Figure 
1.4 shows the spoke-and-wheel graph. Figure 1.5 shows the complete graph.  
The cycle graph and the complete graph satisfy symmetry. The complete graph 
minimizes distance between nodes. The path graph has the greatest single distance between 
two nodes. The star graph and the spoke-and-wheel graph demonstrate the popular concept of 
 
12 âOx is commonly referred to as the geodesic distance between i and j.  
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core nodes and peripheral nodes (Borgatti and Everett, 1999). The significance of these graphs 
in terms of risk analysis will be developed later.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Path graph 
 
Figure 1.2: Cycle Graph 
 
Figure 1.3: Star graph 
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Figure 1.4: Spoke-and-wheel graph 
 
Figure 1.5: Complete graph 
A graph is said to be undirected if the link between m and n is the same link as the link 
between n and m, while a graph is said to be directed if these are distinct links. An edge is a 
connection between two nodes. In an undirected graph, an edge is an unordered pair, while in 
a directed graph, an edge is an ordered pair. Formally, for an undirected graph, 
{q2} ∈ w ⇔ {2q} ∈ w (8)	
Equivalently, a graph is undirected if the adjacency matrix, for which the q2th entry is 1 
if {q2} ∈ w and 0 otherwise, with diagonals taking a value of 0, is symmetric. Figure 1.6 
shows the adjacency matrix for the graph shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.7 shows the 
adjacency matrix for the graph shown in Figure 1.3:  
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⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
 
Figure 1.6: Adjacency Matrix for Cycle Graph 
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
 
Figure 1.7: Adjacency Matrix for Star Graph 
1.3.3 Value Functions 
 Jackson (2010, p.419) describes a value function as a function that captures “the 
productive value of a society” and that is “directly determined by the network structure.” 
Formally, a value function is defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.47) as a function 
A: {w|w ⊂ w$} → ℝ where, as before, w  is a given network graph and w$  is the set of all 
possible network graphs. The set of all value functions is denoted as a. The most common 
form of value function is the sum of the utility of all agents in the network. Value functions 
can have several properties, which we discuss below. Most of the definitions in this subsection 
and the following subsection are adapted from Jackson (2005b) and Jackson (2010).  
Recall that a component is a maximally-connected subgraph, and that X(w) is the set of 
components. 
Definition 1.1: A value function A is component additive if ∑ A(ℎ) = A(w)ïÎñ(á) . 
Component additivity means that, in this setting, the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. 
Its significance in modeling is that (Jackson, 2010, p.419) “externalities across components 
[are ruled out] but externalities within components [are allowed].”  
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Definition 1.2: A value function A	is anonymous if, for any permutation wp of w, A(wp) =
A(w).  
A permutation of w means that the architecture of w remains the same, but the players 
are re-labeled. Anonymity requires that personal productive differences have no role at all in 
determining the value of the network, and (Jackson, 2010, p.419) “the critical productive 
determinant [is] social structure.” The assumption of anonymity may be problematic when 
agents with heterogeneous risk preferences face network risk.  
A basic value function is a value function that satisfies Aá(w
ó) = ò 1				if	w ⊂ w′
0				otherwise
 . Any 
value function A can be written as a linear combination of basic value functions in a unique 
way. Under basic value functions, the players involved in w are all vital to the functioning of 
any network graph, since no value is generated without all the players in w being present, while 
no other players contribute in any way.  
Consider the following notion of a value function, based on the Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996, p.49) Connections model: 
A(w) =cÇÉ¢£	§0• − ih
0,•
(9) 
where Ç ∈ (0,1) is a discounting factor that “captures the idea that the value that n derives from 
being connected to m is proportional to the proximity of n to m,” â0• is the number of links in 
the shortest path between node 2	and node q, §0• denotes the intrinsic value of a connection 
between 2 and q, i	is a scalar, and h is the number of links in w. 
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1.3.4 Allocation Rules 
An allocation is a modification of the notion of an imputation used in cooperative game 
theory. In fully cooperative games, imputations are distributions of the payoff of the grand 
coalition that are individually rational. 
An allocation rule is a function !: v$ → + ⊆ ℝl
$. That is, it maps from the set of network 
graphs of size % to the set of allocations, which is a subset of ℝl
$. Rather than being dependent 
solely on the total value generated, as an imputation rule is, an allocation rule depends also 
upon the structure of the network graph.  
Allocation rules are not discussed heavily in the network literature. Generally, discussion 
has been limited to the properties of allocation rules, such as component balance and equal 
bargaining power, defined below. The actual role they play has gradually been reduced, to the 
point where Bloch and Jackson (2007, p.87, footnote 9) “do not distinguish between a value 
function and an allocation rule.” It is possible that the conflation of value functions and 
allocation rules resulted from the convention of using the sum of individual utilities as the value 
function: a natural allocation arising from this value function is to set each player’s allocation 
equal to her utility. 
When allocation rules have been characterized separately from value functions in the 
network literature, the allocation rule has typically been the result of an optimization problem, 
usually the maximization of the sum of individual utilities. One issue with this approach is that 
it implicitly requires the presence of some central authority figure that makes the necessary 
calculations and dispenses the allocations, or else it requires one to make implausible 
assumptions on how this allocation might have been arrived at in a decentralized manner. 
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Terminology of Allocation Rules  
An allocation ¶(w, A) = {!6(w, A), … , !$(w, A)} is feasible if, given the network w	and 
the value function A(w), 
c!0(w, A) ≤ A(w)
$
0;6
. (10) 
An allocation rule is anonymous if an agent’s allocation depends only upon their position 
in the network, rather than on any personal characteristics. That is, for any node 2 in w and any 
permutation of the agents of w, ä(w), !0(w, A) = !0(ä(w), A). 
Jackson (2005b) reviews additional characteristics of allocation rules and value functions. 
We use the Jackson (2005b) definitions. An allocation rule ! is component balanced if for any 
component additive value function A, w ∈ ß,  and wó ∈ X(w) , ∑ !0(w, A) = A(w
ó)0∈$(á®) . 
Component balance requires that if a value function is component additive, then the value 
generated by any component should be allocated to the players in that component.  
An allocation rule satisfies equal bargaining power if for any component additive A and 
w ∈ ß , !0(w, A) − !0(w − {2q}, A) = !•(w, A) − !•(w − {2q}, A) . That is, if the link 
between 2 and q is removed, 2 and q have the same reduction in their allocation.  
An allocation rule ¶ is a flexible network rule if ¶(w, A) = ¶(w$, A©) for all A and all 
efficient w , where A© = max
≠®⊂≠
A(w′)  is the monotonic cover of the value function A , the 
maximum value over possible networks that could be formed using the given set of links. 
Flexibility means that (Jackson, 2005b, p.139) “the allocation only depends on the monotonic 
cover of the value function” and that “the allocation is being decided upon when the network 
is formed or can still be changed.”  
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An allocation rule is additive if for any two value functions A and A′, and for any scalars 
Æ ≥ 0, Ø ≥ 0, ¶(w, ÆA + ØAó) = Æ¶(w, A) + Ø¶(w, Aó).  Jackson (2005b, p.139) defines 
additivity as “a consistency or decomposition condition… [the] way in which value is allocated 
may be broken down so that one may separately allocate the value on different parts of the 
value function and then sum up.”  
An allocation rule is weakly additive if for any monotonic A and A′, and for any scalars 
Æ ≥ 0, Ø ≥ 0,	 ¶(w, ÆA + ØAó) = Æ¶(w, A) + Ø¶(w, Aó) and 2) if ÆA − ØAó is monotonic, then 
(w, ÆA − ØAó) = Æ¶(w, A) − Ø¶(w, Aó) . Under weak additivity, the additive separability 
described above also applies relative to monotonic covers, which is important if the network is 
flexible, as described above.  
An allocation rule satisfies equal treatment of vital players if Aá is a basic value function 
(as defined above) for some w, then !0]w, Aá^ = ∞
6
0(á)
	if	2 ∈ %(w)
0			otherwise
. Recall that under a basic 
value function, no value is generated without the complete set of players in %(w), and no other 
players contribute anything; equal treatment of vital players means that the players in %(w) get 
an equal amount while players not in %(w) get nothing.  
Finally, an allocation rule is proportional if for each 2 and A, either !0(w, A) = 0 for all 
w, or for any w and wósuch that A(wó) ≠ 0, 
k¢(á,n)
k¢(á®,n)
=
n(á)
n(á®)
. That is, either an agent receives an 
allocation of zero in all network graphs, or the agent’s share of the value of the network remains 
constant across all network graphs.  
The Myerson Value 
In one of the earliest studies of networks, Myerson (1977) used the Shapley value in 
illustrating a ‘fair’ allocation of the value of the network graph. The basic idea underlying the 
Shapley value is to consider a random series of coalitions of agents, where each agent who 
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joins an expanded coalition is promised its marginal contribution to the value of the new 
coalition. After considering all possible coalitions of agents, the value is calculated as the 
average of the marginal contributions over all such promises.  In a network context, this is 
referred to as the Myerson value.  
The Myerson value is discussed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.65) as a modification 
of the Shapley value to determine allocation in a network. The Myerson value is normatively 
based on a notion of fairness due to Myerson (1977, p.227). This method is easily adapted to 
our model. Using our notation, the formula for the Myerson value is given in Jackson (2010, 
p.422) as 
!O
≤≥(w, A) = c ]A(w|¥∪O) − A(w|¥)^ ∂
#∏! (2 − #∏ − 1)!
2!
∫
¥⊂$\{O}
(11)	
where !O(w, A)  is the Myerson allocation to agent 	º	 under network graph w  and value 
function	A, ∏ is a subset of the set of players %, #∏ is the number of players in ∏, and w|¥ =
{ºΩ ∈ w|º ∈ ∏, Ω ∈ ∏}. As with the Shapley value, the Myerson value reflects the change in the 
overall value of each sub-network added by agent º. The second term on the right side of (11) 
is combinatorial, reflecting the fact that each given subset may form in different orders. 
Fernández et al. (2002) and Skibski et al (2014) discuss algorithmic methods of calculating the 
Myerson value. Michalak et al (2013) develop exact analytical formulae for Shapley value-
based centrality.  
It is a simple matter to think of alternative network configurations as alternative 
coalitions of agents, and the translation of the Shapley value is then immediate to network 
valuation.  Indeed, the Shapley value has been proposed as formally equivalent to the welfare 
function underlying the Nash (1950) bargaining solution (Kar and Sen (2014)). Closer to this 
thesis, Powers (2007) has used the Shapley value as the basis for risk allocation across members 
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of a portfolio faced by non-homogeneous loss distributions, building on earlier proposals by 
Mango (1997). 
Player-Based Flexible Network Allocation Rules 
Jackson (2005b, p.141) gives the following definition of a (proportional) player-based 
flexible network allocation rule: 
																		!0
æø¿$(w, A) =
A(w)
A©(w$)
c (
¥⊂${0}
A©(w¥∪0) − A©(w¥))	
#∏! (% − #∏ − 1)!
%!
																	(12) 
This allocation rule is similar to the Myerson allocation rule but violates equal bargaining 
power and component balance, both of which Jackson criticizes (2005b, p.135-138). 13 
Theorem 3 of Jackson (2005b) shows that an allocation rule satisfies equal treatment of vital 
players, weak additivity, and is a flexible network and proportional rule if and only if it is 
¶æø¿$. 
Wicksellian Allocation 
Another example of an allocation rule, and one not previously used in the network 
literature, is based on Smith (1977) and inspired by Wicksell (1896). The Wicksellian approach, 
as we shall call it, is a behavioral characterization rather than a mathematical characterization: 
the allocation is determined through a bidding process. Hence, the Wicksellian approach does 
not require a central figure to determine the allocation, although it does implicitly assume that 
 
13 On the subject of equal bargaining power, Jackson (2005b) uses two examples: one example in which the most 
critical player in a network receives the same payoff as another, less critical player, where she should receive 
more; and another example in which three equally critical players receive different allocations, where they should 
receive the same amount. On the subject of component balance, Jackson (2005b, p.138) notes that “[The] 
argument behind component balance is that it makes sure that components of a network receive their due value 
which prevents their members from wanting to walk away and reallocate their value among themselves… 
[however] if one uses this type of argument to justify component balance then it is logical to worry about all 
[emphasis added] coalitional deviations, not just those of components.” Jackson (2005b) thus argues that “the 
argument motivating component balance should actually be a core property.”  
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some form of agent processes the bids using some rule to arrive at an allocation. Suppose that 
the agents of the network, given a graph w	with optimal production capacity !̅, determine 
through a reverse auction whether or not to trade.14 The default position is autarky – each agent 
produces the final good using the inputs available to her at her node. Each agent submits an 
ask ÆO stating how much she wishes to take from the total production of the final good, should 
trade in the network occur. Once the sum of bids exactly equals the total production !̅,	we have 
equilibrium.  
Agents submit bids to maximize their private benefit, subject to the bids submitted by 
other agents. An agent may veto by submitting a bid such that the total sum of bids exceeds the 
total amount of the final good available. No agent will ask for less of the final good than she 
could make by herself (that is, using the inputs and technology present at her node before trade). 
Lemma (Smith): If trading yields a larger rent to the collective than autarky, then there exists 
an ask ÆO
∗
 for each º	such that trade will occur and no º∗ will be made worse off. That is, given 
the ability of agents to veto, no agent can be made worse off, and at least one will be made 
strictly better off, by dividing the surplus rent. Formally, let ÆO denote the allocation an agent 
has under autarky. If 
cÆO < !̅
0
O;6	
	 (13)	 
then for each º there exists ƒO > 0 such that ÆO
∗ = ÆO + ƒO and 
cÆO
∗
0
O;6	
= !̅	 (14) 
 
14 That is, an auction where a buyer requests a good or service, and sellers bid for the lowest price.  
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As an example, we modify the example used by Smith (1977, p.1129) based upon 
Tideman and Tullock (1976). Suppose we have the network graph shown in Figure 1.8:  
 
Figure 1.8: A three-person ‘line’ network 
Suppose also that the initial endowments of the input are (0,40,0). Agent 2 can produce 
60 units of the final good using her endowment and technology. However, if trade occurs, she 
will send all of her endowment of the input to nodes 1 and 3, both of which produce more 
efficiently. The total production of the final good in the network is now 70, with 30 units being 
produced at node 1 and 40 units being produced at node 3. In order to satisfy her veto condition, 
agent 2 will ask for no less than 60 units of the private good, while agents 1 and 3 will ask no 
less than zero, since they received zero under autarky. The total rent gained by trade is 10 units, 
so voters can submit bids yielding an aggregate net benefit up to 10 without causing the vote 
to fail. For example, if we divide the surplus equally, the final allocation of the private good 
will be ∆3
6
{
, 63
6
{
, 3
6
{
« and all agents are strictly better off. Quoting directly from Smith (1977, 
p.1129), “there are an infinite number of imputations of the surplus, and each imputation 
represents a possible equilibrium outcome. Any particular equilibrium outcome may depend 
upon the strategic behavior of agents…[the] situation is analogous to the so-called 
indeterminacy in the classical bilateral bargaining problem.” 
1
2
3
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In order to make an improvement over autarky, and thus satisfy her veto condition, agent 
2 will ask for no less than 60 units of the private good, while agents 1 and 3 will ask no less 
than zero, since they received zero under autarky. 
Extremal Allocation 
Kets et al. (2011) propose an allocation rule based on the notion of Lorenz dominance. 
Lorenz dominance is defined as follows. Consider two allocations ! and P such that !6 ≤ !8 ≤
⋯ ≤ !0, P6 ≤ P8 ≤ ⋯ ≤ P0 
c!0 = cP0
$
0;6
$
0;6
(15) 
The allocation ! Lorenz dominates	P if, for each 2	 = 	1, … , %, 
c!O =cPO
0
O;6
0
O;6
(16) 
with strict inequality for some º, so that the cumulative income for the bottom 2 agents under 
!	 is always at least as much as the cumulative income for the bottom 2 agents under P, and 
strictly more in at least one case. An extremal allocation is a stable and feasible allocation ! 
such that there is no stable and feasible allocation P such that ! Lorenz dominates P. 
Bargaining in Networks 
Another method for determining allocations would be to rely entirely on a multilateral 
bargaining approach, such as that of Rausser and Simon (1991), Pinto and Harrison (2003) or 
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Lee (2018).15 The network setting lends itself particularly well to this bargaining approach, 
since the disagreement point is clearly defined by autarky, in which no two nodes are connected.  
In the study of bargaining in networks specifically, most models use Manea (2011) as 
their theoretical basis. Manea (2011) extends on the Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) model of 
bargaining in stationary markets, exploring the influence of the network structure on market 
outcomes, studying an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network 
are randomly matched to bargain. The main result is the characterization of limit equilibrium 
payoffs in the network bargaining game. 
Auction-Based Allocations 
McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1989) performed experiments where natural gas was 
divided amongst participants in a simplified gas transmission network using an auction 
mechanism. The found that (p.283) “where alternative pipeline transportation paths have 
comparable costs, and capacity is adequate, gas pipeline networks using Gas Auction Net [the 
mechanism they designed] yield substantially competitive outcomes.” 
Grether, Isaac and Plott (1981) studied the allocation of landing spots at airports, coming 
to the conclusion that one-price sealed bid auctions with aftermarkets would be the most 
efficient way of allocating spots. Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982) studied the same problem, 
instead using a combinatorial auction approach, in which agents can place bids on packages of 
landing slots, rather than bidding on each slot individually and participating in an after-market 
to reduce surpluses and fill deficits.  They argue (p.403) that Grether, Isaac and Plott’s approach 
was limited by two disadvantages: “[individual] airlines may experience capital losses and 
 
15 That is, a game in which a randomly-selected player proposes a coalition of players and an outcome vector, 
and the members of the coalition that was proposed decide whether or not to accept the outcomes that were 
proposed. 
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gains in the process of trading in the after market…an airline with an excess of A slots and a 
deficiency of B slots may discover in the after market that the going price of B slots is 
unprofitably high, while excess A slots can be sold only at a loss” and “[it] costs resources to 
trade in the after market… the cost of participating in the combined primary-after market 
mechanism is increased.”  
1.3.5 Centrality Measures 
Centrality measures have been widely studied, beginning in the field of sociology. 
Jackson (2010, p.37) characterizes a number of different centrality measures, categorizing them 
into four main groups: 
1. degree - how connected a node is; 
2. closeness - how easily a node can reach other nodes; 
3. betweenness - how important a node is in terms of connecting other nodes; and 
4. neighbors’ characteristics - how important, central, or influential a node's 
neighbors are. 
Degree Centrality 
The degree centrality of node 2, denoted X0
»  is the simplest form of centrality. It is 
simply a node’s degree divided by its maximum possible degree, namely 
X0
» =
…0(w)
2 − 1
(17) 
where …0(w) denotes the degree of node 2. Jackson (2010, p.38) notes that “degree centrality 
clearly misses many of the interesting aspects of a network.”  
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Closeness Centrality 
The closeness centrality of node 2, denoted X0
», measures how close node 2	is to the 
other nodes in the network. Jackson (2010) notes two forms of closeness centrality. The first 
is just the inverse of the average distance between node 2 and any other node q: 
X0
» =
(% − 1)
∑ ℓ(q, 2)•Ü0
(18) 
where ℓ(q, 2) denotes the length of the shortest path between q and 2.  
Another closeness-based centrality measure is (Jackson, 2010, p.39) decay centrality:  
X0
ÀÃÕŒœ = c Çℓ(•,0)
•Ü0
(19) 
where, as in the value function for the Connections model, Ç ∈ (0,1) is a decay parameter, and 
ℓ(q, 2) is set to infinity if q and 2	are not connected in w.  
Betweenness Centrality 
The measure of betweenness centrality is a generalization by White and Borgatti (1994) 
of the Freeman (1977, 1978, 1980) geodesic centrality measures for the case of directed graphs. 
The betweenness centrality of a node 2 is how many shortest paths between two other nodes 
in the network pass through 2. Jackson (2010, p.39) defines the betweenness centrality of node 
2, which we denote X0
ø, as 
X0
ø = c
s$(ºΩ)
s(ºΩ)
(% − 1)(% − 2)
2OÜx:0∉{O,x}
(20) 
where %	is the number of nodes in the network, s0(ºΩ) is the number of shortest paths between 
º and Ω that 2 lies on, and s(ºΩ) is the total number of shortest paths between º and Ω.  
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Bonacich Centrality 
Bonacich (1972) defined the eigenvector centrality of a graph w, denoted by an adjacency 
matrix S, as the vector ¶ that is the eigenvector corresponding to S’s largest eigenvalue h, so 
that 
S¶ = h¶ (21) 
or, alternatively, 
h!0 = c S0•!•
$
•;6
. (22) 
Bonacich (2007) makes a case for the use of eigenvector centrality as a centrality measure, 
noting that (p.563) “[it] can be used with valued or signed graphs; [it] can be used for negatively 
connected exchange networks; [it allows] for variations in the degree to which status is 
transmitted from position to position.” 
Bonacich (1987) defines a general ‘family’ of centrality measures, indexed by the 
function i0(<0, o) where <0 is the degree of node 2 and o “reflects the degree to which an 
individual’s status is a function of the statuses of those with which to whom he or she is 
connected.” The parameter o can be either positive or negative. A positive o arises in models 
such as communications networks, where being connected to well-connected individuals is 
beneficial; a negative o arises in models such as bargaining networks, where it is beneficial to 
be connected to individuals who have few other options. If o = 0 , “i0(<0, o)  is simply 
proportional to the degree of individual 2.”  
Other Centrality Measures 
Cook et al. (1983) noted that contemporary point-centrality measures were not applicable 
to negatively-connected networks (that is, “if exchange in one relation is contingent on 
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nonexchange in the other.”) They developed a measure based on vulnerability, or the effect on 
the network when a node was removed.  
Talamàs and Tamuz (2017) propose a measure of centrality called cycle centrality, based 
on the notion of k-cycles. A k-cycle is a walk (a set of ordered nodes) of length k that leads 
from a node back to itself. Cycle centrality is simply a weighted sum of k-cycles.  
Rêgo and dos Santos (2019) extended the Co-Author model of Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996) to include pair-specific link strength, suggesting that the agent’s utility proposed in their 
study could be used as a new centrality measure.  
Centrality Measures and Allocation Rules 
Some measures of centrality have been shown to correspond directly to allocation rules. 
For example, the Myerson value, corresponds to the measure of betweenness centrality (Kim, 
2012). Similarly, Google’s PageRank algorithm, and the RankDex algorithm (Li, 1998) on 
which it is based, are based on variants of eigenvector centrality. 
1.3.6 Characterization of Risk and Welfare in the Literature 
The Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) Connections model has been the basis of most 
subsequent models of network theory. Since the Connections model uses linear utility, this 
means that models of non-linear utility are rare. In the particular case of the Connections model, 
non-linearity could enter the model in the concept of intrinsic value, but the concept of intrinsic 
value has not been given any structure in any of the studies to date. The almost-exclusive use 
of linear utility functions makes the study of risk attitudes in networks impossible using EUT, 
and severely limited in generalizations such as RDU.  
One of the surprising features of the network literature as a whole is that there are very 
few studies that even consider non-linear utility functions. Nor is there any consideration of 
network welfare beyond weighted utilitarian measures. To establish this remarkable ‘state of 
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the art,’ a review of 14 influential studies is appropriate. There are several studies that formally 
allow non-linear utility, but do not consider risk or discuss the implications for risk premia of 
allowing non-linear utility16 (Goyal and Joshi (2006), Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009) and 
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015), Ghosh and Kundu (2019)). Only a few studies include 
‘average’ measures beyond weighted or unweighted sums.  
Review of Characterizations of Risk and Welfare in the Network Literature 
This review of the contributions to the network literature asks four questions. First, is a 
utility function specified? Second, given that a utility function is specified, is it linear or non-
linear? Third, is a method of evaluating social welfare discussed? Fourth, given that a method 
of evaluating social welfare is discussed, is it additive (that is, utilitarian) or non-additive? 
Myerson (1977) 
1) No. Myerson (1977) uses the allocation of wealth (p.226), but does not specify a utility 
function. Notions of stability are based on wealth levels rather than utility. 
2) Since stability derives directly from wealth rather than utility, the utility function is 
implicitly linear. 
3) Social welfare is not explicitly discussed, although notions related to it are. 
Specifically, fairness and the Shapley value are described in the network setting. 
4) An example of a socially fair division of the production of a network (based upon the 
Shapley value) is examined (p.227-228). 
 
 
16 We refer solely to non-linear utility since none of the literature considers probability weighting. In general, we 
require both in order to have a complete RDU characterization of risk preferences.  
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Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) 
1) Yes, in two specific models: the Connections and Co-Author models. 
2) Both the Connections and Co-Author models are deliberately agnostic with regard to 
the form of the utility function. For the Connections model, the utility function u is (p.49) 
JO(w) = dOO +cÇ
ÉÑÖ
xÜO
dOx − c iOx
x:Ox∈á
(23)
 
where dOx denotes the intrinsic value of individual j to individual i; iOx	denotes the cost to i of 
link ij; âOx is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j and	δ “captures the idea 
that the value that i derives from being connected to j is proportional to the proximity of j to i.” 
The term “Ω: ºΩ ∈ w” in the second summation denotes the set of all other agents j that i is linked 
to. Non-linearity could enter the model through the concept of intrinsic value, but no such 
structure, or indeed any structure, is proposed. In the Co-Author model, the utility function is 
(p.56) 
JO(w) = c dO]2O, Ω, 2x^ − i(2O)
x:Ox∈á
(24)
 
where 2O and 2x	are the number of projects that i and j are respectively involved in, dO is the 
utility derived by i from direct contact with j given 2O  and 2x ; and c(2O ) is the cost of 
maintaining 2O  links. A specific form is given as (p.56) 
JO(w) = “
c ”
1
2O
+
1
2x
−
1
2O2x
‘
x:Ox∈á
= 1 + ’1 +
1
2O
÷ c
1
2x
, 2O ≠ 0
x:Ox∈á
0, 2O = 0
(25) 
3) Yes. 
4) Although the general case does not explicitly rule out non-additive social welfare, it 
is not specifically modeled. In both specific cases, social welfare v is treated as additive (p.47):  
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A(w) =cJO(w) (26) 
Section 2.2 of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) uses the following phrase: “in some 
applications the value will be an aggregate of individual utilities or productions.” (p.47) This 
implies that non-additive welfare functions are contemplated but not considered further.  
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) 
1) No specific utility functions are used. Allocation rules are used (p.325), with the idea 
that allocation rules are chosen or designed and that value functions are exogenous (p.328). 
2) The closest thing to a specific utility function is the payoff function (p.326) 
◊O
ÿ(Ÿ) = @O]A, w(Ÿ)^ (27) 
where ⁄ = (A, @)	captures the value function v and the allocation rule Y; s is the matrix of each 
player’s strategies, and g(s) is the network graph formed by each player i playing the strategy 
si. Hence, ºΩ ∈ w if Ω ∈ ŸO and º ∈ Ÿx; that is, the link ºΩ	is a part of the graph if and only if Ω is 
part of º’s strategy set, and vice versa.  
3) The value of a graph is described as a function A ∶ 	ß	 → ℝ, where G is the set of all 
networks. It is described as “the total ‘output’ produced by agents in N when they are 
‘organized’ according to a particular graph.” (p.325) 
4) A specific example of a value function is used (Example 4.14, p.336) but values are 
simply assigned and no functional form is mentioned. 
Bala and Goyal (2000) 
1) No specific functional form is mentioned. A general payoff function is used (p.1190): 
‹O(w) = › ∆fiO(w), fiO
À(w)« (28) 
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where fiO(w) is the number of agents observed by agent i; and fiO
À(w) is the number of agents 
with whom i has formed links.	fiO(w) corresponds to the benefits and fiO
À(w) corresponds to the 
costs of the network. ‹ is later (p.1190) simplified to 
‹O(w) = fiO(w) − fiO
À(w)i (29) 
Just as with Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), non-linearity could enter the model in either	fiO(w) 
or	fiO
À(w); but no such model is described. 
2) Since no non-linear function is specified, the utility functions used are implicitly linear. 
3) Social welfare is not mentioned. Efficiency is mentioned (Proposition 5.5, p.1220), 
but no measure of efficiency is given. Instead, the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) measure is 
alluded to, because it was used to prove the efficiency of the star network structure. 
4) The Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) additive measure of welfare is implicitly used. 
Jackson and Watts (2002) 
1) A utility function is specified. 
2) The ‘Trading Example’ in Section 3 (p.274) uses the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
for a two-good endowment economy: 
L	(!, P) = 	!P	 (30) 
where x and y are goods. Each agent has an endowment of either (1,0) or (0,1), with equal 
probability, realized after the network is in place. The expected utility of connecting with 
another player (not accounting for link cost) is thus 
6
fl
, as there is a 
6
8
	probability that the two 
will have different endowments (in which case they will trade to an allocation of ∆
6
8
,
6
8
« for a 
utility of 
6
‡
) and a 
6
8
 probability that the two will have the same endowment and so will have 
utility 0. The expected utility of connecting to two other players is 
6
·
 and the expected utility of 
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connecting to three other players is 
{
6·
. Jackson and Watts (2002, p. 275) note that “the expected 
utility of a player is strictly increasing and concave in the number of other players that she is 
directly or indirectly connected to.”  
3) The discussion of social welfare is identical to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). 
4) Following Jackson and Wolinsky, the social welfare function is the sum of individual 
utilities (p.271): 
A =cJO (31) 
Kranton and Minehart (2002) 
1) No. Agents have a ‘valuation’ of the good being traded. Valuations are independently 
and identically distributed on [0; 1) with continuous distribution F. The ‘economic surplus’ 
from a trade is determined by this valuation and the price of the good. 
2) No specific utility function is used. 
3) Social welfare is discussed (Section II, p.492), and there are “welfare gains when 
buyers share the productive capacity of sellers.” This is called “economies of sharing.” 
4) A social welfare function is described and referred to as the “net economic surplus.” 
The functional form is (p.492) 
‚(ß) ≡ „(ß) − iccwOx
¥̅
O;6
ø‰
O;6
(32) 
where ‚(ß) is net economic surplus, „	(ß) is maximal gross surplus (the highest possible 
surplus from exchange given the link pattern ß), T‰  is the number of buyers and ∏̅ is the number 
of sellers. Network formation is studied when productive capacity is costly and the set of sellers 
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that invest in capacity is endogenous. This appears to be as close to risky production as one 
can find in the network literature.  
Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2006) 
1) Just as with Bala and Goyal (2000), a payoff function is used with non-specified 
benefit and cost functions. 
2) The functional form used is 
‹O(w) = c aO,x
x:Ox∈á
− c iO,x
x:Ox∈á
(33)
 
3) Social welfare is modeled. Notably, they “follow the convention in this literature and 
focus on the sum of payoffs of all players” (p.358). 
4) The social welfare function is additive (p.358): 
‚(w) =c‹O(w)
0
O;6
(34) 
where g is the network graph. 
Belleflamme and Bloch (2004) 
1) This model deals with networks of firms rather than individuals, so profit functions 
are used instead of utility functions. 
2) Several specific profit functions are used (Section 3.2, p.399-401), such as their 
Example 1, a Cournot oligopoly with iso-elastic inverse demand function: 
/(2) = <2
6yÂ
Â (2 + <)y
6lÂ
Â (35) 
where 2 is the number of firms on the market and < is a parameter describing the convexity or 
concavity of the demand curve (if α	= 	1, demand is linear, implying risk neutrality; if 0	 <
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	<	 < 1, demand is convex, implying risk-loving preferences; and if α	> 	1; demand is concave, 
implying risk aversion.) 
3) Social welfare is discussed, but no explicit model is used. 
4) No explicit model is used, but there is a property that social surplus is increasing in 
the number of active firms on the market. 
Bloch and Jackson (2007) 
1) No precise utility function is used. Utility is given by a function JO: ß → ℝl.	Notably, 
this appears to be the first model which (p.87, footnote 9) “[does] not distinguish between a 
value function and an allocation rule. Instead [the] primitive is the set of individual values for 
every network.”  
2) As no non-linear function is specified, the utility functions used are implicitly linear. 
3) Social welfare is discussed in the context of efficiency (p.88). 
4) An additive utility function is used: “a network g is efficient relative to [a utility 
function] J if it maximizes∑ JO(w)O ” where g is a network graph (p.88). 
Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) 
This is the same model as Jackson and Watts (2002), with the expansion being the 
incorporation of strong stability. The utility and welfare specifications are changed. 
Goyal and Joshi (2006) 
1) Several different utility functions are specified. 
2) At least one (Equation 17, p.334) is non-linear: 
/O(w) = ÁËO(w) + c
1
ËN(w)
N∈$Ñ(á)
(36) 
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where ËO(w) denotes the number of links that individual º has in network graph w and %O(w)	is 
the set of all players with whom º has a link. 
3) Social welfare is not discussed. The words “social welfare” are mentioned, but they 
denote the utility of an individual agent  where the agent in question is a country (Example 4.3, 
p.333). 
4) No social welfare function is used. 
Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009) 
Some exposition is necessary here, as this study does not work in the typical network 
setting. Agents are treated as a mass based upon ‘type,’ rather than as individuals. The main 
context of the model is based on the composition of friendship groups by type. The study fits 
more into the search and matching literature than it does to networks, but network concepts are 
discussed. In particular, the motivating empirical example is network-based rather than 
matching-based. Instead of the strategy being about which links to form or sever, the decision 
variable for agents in this model is (p.1015) ‘time spent in the matching process,’ but the payoff 
depends upon ‘number of friends’ and ‘composition of friendship group,’ both of which are 
used in network analysis. 
1) Several different utility functions are used. Agents have utility based on their number 
of same-type and different-type friends, and these numbers are denoted ŸO and …O	respectively 
for agent i. 
2) A non-linear utility function is discussed (Section 4.5, p.1018) 
L	(Ÿ, …) = 	 (Ÿ	 + 	⁄…)Â	 (37) 
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where Ÿ is the number of same-type friends, … is the number of different-type friends, γ is a 
weighting parameter, and α reflects returns to scale of friendship groups. However, risk 
attitudes are not discussed, since there is no risk in the model.  
3) Social welfare is calculated, and a parametric example is discussed (section 9, p.1031.) 
4) The social welfare function in question is additive. Proposition 8 (p.1030) uses 
“aggregate (or average) utility” as a measure of social welfare. Notably, the authors say that 
“[a]t the same time that we emphasize a need for a foundational model for a welfare analysis, 
we also emphasize that our model is too simplistic to provide a welfare analysis that we can 
rely upon. In particular, our model misses many important aspects of the benefits of diversity... 
as mixtures only enter preferences in direct friendships.” (p.1029-1030). 
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015) 
1) Utility functions are used. 
2) (Section 2) Consumers have quadratic utility that exhibits network effects. For a given 
profile of consumption ¶ = (!O, ¶yO)	and price	MO, the utility of consumer º who benefits from 
interacting with a finite set of consumers %O is (p.6) 
JO(!O, ¶yO, MO) = !O +
1
2
!O
8 + ⁄ c !O!x − MO!O
x∈$Ñ
(38) 
where ⁄ > 0	 is the positive network externalities coefficient. A consumer’s out-degree is 
defined as the number of other agents that the consumer in question observes directly; a 
consumer’s in-degree is the number of agents that directly observe that consumer (p.6). The 
expected utility for a consumer with out-degree Í is (p.7) 
JO(!O, ¶yO, MO, Í) = (1 − MO)!O +
1
2
!O
8 + ⁄!OÍS(¶yO) (39) 
where S(¶yO) ≜ KÏ!x|Ω ∈ %OÌ is the average consumption across samples of consumers. 
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3) Social welfare is discussed (p.16), and consumer surplus is also described (p.17). 
4) The expression for consumer surplus is (Section 4.2, p.17) 
X∏ =cc„(Ó)s(Í)[!∗(Í, Ó)]
N∈»Ô∈»
(40) 
where Í is the out-degree, Ó is the in-degree, and „() and s() are the marginal probability 
distributions of out-degrees and in-degrees, respectively. 
Ghosh and Kundu (2019) 
1) An agent’s benefit function is specified as Ø]O£ÒÚ^, where O£ÒÚ is the maximum 
effort amongst º’s neighbors in the network, put towards the provision of a public 
good. 
2) The benefit function is specified as: Øó > 0, Øóó < 0, Ø(0) = 0, Øó(0) > i, where i is 
the cost of a unit of effort. Hence, benefit is strictly increasing and strictly concave, 
implying risk aversion. However, no specific functional forms are used.  
3) Social welfare is discussed. 
4) Social welfare is given by ‚(Û;Ù) = ∑ LO(Û; Ù)O∈$ , where Û is the vector of efforts, 
Ù is the set of agents, and LO is the utility for agent º. The social welfare function is 
thus utilitarian.  
1.3.7 Defining Network Risk and Network Welfare 
One of the problems facing the study of network risk is that there are few settled 
definitions of exactly what network risk constitutes. Gong and Page (2016, p.3) offer a 
definition of systemic risk in a financial network setting, based upon equilibrium dynamics of 
network formation. However, their approach does not discuss the risk premium of the agents 
involved and is heavily tailored towards its application to shadow banks.  
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There are numerous parallels to the concept of network risk in finance and economics. 
Network risk can refer both to the risk to an individual agent of being connected in a network, 
as well as the risk to the network as a whole arising from risk realizations of an individual agent. 
In finance this distinction parallels the distinction between systemic risk and systematic risk, 
and we follow that terminology here. We can generally define systemic risk as the contribution 
of one agent to the overall risk of the system and define systematic risk as the contribution of 
overall risk of the system to the risk of an individual agent.17  
Benoit, Colliard, Hurlin and Pérignon (2013) survey the literature on systemic risk. They 
begin by discussing the relationship between systemic risk and systematic risk. They define 
three broad classes of mechanisms generating systemic risk: systemic risk-taking mechanisms, 
contagion mechanisms, and amplification mechanisms. Systemic risk-taking refers to financial 
institutions taking bets that are both large and correlated. Contagion refers to losses spilling 
over from one part of the financial system to another. Amplification refers to small shocks 
having large impacts.  
Benoit et al (2013) also discuss regulatory approaches to managing systemic risk. They 
discuss the measurement of systemic risk, finding that many of the popular measures of 
systemic risk can be shown to be variations on transformations of the systematic risk of 
individual firms. Moreover, rankings of companies based on these measures of systemic risk 
turn out to be highly correlated with familiar measures of systematic risk (see also Guntay and 
Kopiec (2014)).  
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) prove the existence of a clearing payment vector. A clearing 
payment vector is a specification of payments made by each of the nodes in the financial system 
 
17 Systematic risk is also referred to as undiversifiable risk and is commonly measured by the ‘beta’ of the firm. 
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which satisfies criteria of limited liability (total payments never exceed available cash flow), 
absolute priority (stockholders receive no value until the node is able to pay off its liabilities), 
and proportionality (if default occurs, claimant nodes are paid in proportion to the size of their 
nominal claim on firm assets). A clearing payment vector is similar to the notion of an 
allocation rule with transfers, as modelled by Bloch and Jackson (2007).  
However, none of these measures of systemic risk take into account the structure of the 
network that connects the agents, other than through empirical measures of correlation. This is 
not a criticism of measures that are intended to provide a reduced form quantification of 
systemic risk, but does mean that these measures provide relatively little insight into the 
economic effects of different networks or normative guidance for the structural regulation of 
networks.  
On the other hand, there is a rich literature on the effects of financial architecture on 
‘contagion’ arising from counterparty risk.18 However, virtually all of this literature appears to 
focus on the behavior of risk neutral agents (see, for example, Chen, Cummins, Viswanathan 
and Weiss (2014)). The effects of alternative network structures are considered, but there is no 
evaluation of the valuation of the risk at the level of the individual agent or any interesting 
normative measures of the valuation of the risk of a system as a whole.  
Acemoglu, Malekian and Ozdaglar (2016) model “cascading failures due to an 
exogenous or endogenous attack depending on the profile of security investments by the agents.” 
A significant departure from prior literature is the modeling of such failures on non-symmetric 
networks; Acemoglu, Malekian and Ozdaglar (2016) “investigate the impact of the structure 
 
18  See, for example, Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), Haldane and May (2011), 
Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), Lucchetta and De Nicoló (2012), Elliott, Golub and 
Jackson (2014) and Elull et al. (2018)  
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of the network on security investments and the likelihood of contagion in a general, asymmetric 
network.”  
In the model of Acemoglu, Malekian and Ozdaglar (2016), an attacker exposes one of 
the agents to an infection according to a probability vector Φ = (ˆ6,… , ˆ$) , where ˆ0 
denotes the probability of the attacker attacking agent 2. Before the attack is realized, each 
agent 2 invests in a security level ˜0 ∈ [0,1] to decrease the chance of getting infected. This 
level ˜0 can be interpreted as the probability that agent 2	is immune to the infection. Given 
network w, security profile ¯ = (˜6, … , ˜$) and attack decision Φ, the probability of node 
2	being infected is denoted by ˘0(w, ¯,Φ). The utility of agent 2, denoted as J0, is given by 
J0(w, ¯,Φ) = A0]1 − ˘0(w, ¯,Φ)^ − i0(˜0) (41) 
where A0  is the value agent 2	derives from being uninfected and i0(˜0) is a continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex function representing the cost agent 
2	incurs for investing in security level ˜0	. Dziubiński and Goyal (2017) model a similar game.  
Liu et al. (2017) use balance sheet data to present an agent-based approach to modeling 
the US interbank lending market. They examine the impact that endogenous network formation, 
through individual bank performance objectives, has on contagion. However, in the Liu et al. 
(2017) model, banks are risk-neutral and can only lend to each other. Erol (2018) characterizes 
strongly stable networks under general threshold contagion, asking what kind of networks are 
formed when agents anticipate the possibility of contagion. They define the concept of network 
hazard: when second-order counterparty risk is eliminated as a by-product of intervention, so 
banks no longer concern themselves with the counterparties of their counterparties. As a result, 
the network is more vulnerable to contagion.   
 47 
“Too Interconnected To Fail”   
One of the key concepts during and after the global financial crisis of 2007/8 was the 
concept of firms being ‘too big to fail.’ Bernanke (2010) defined ‘too big to fail’ as follows: 
“A too-big-to-fail firm is one whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, and critical 
functions are such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of the 
financial system and the economy would face severe adverse consequences.” In the wake of 
the crisis, the notion of interconnectedness has increased in prominence, to the point where 
some studies (Chan-Lau, 2010) use the term “too connected to fail.” 
The other concept arising out of the financial crisis is that of ‘systemically important 
financial institutions’ (SIFIs). No universally-accepted formal definition of SIFIs has yet arisen. 
Given that one goal of the thesis is to create a definition of network risk, one might define a 
SIFI to be a financial institution whose existence in the network significantly reduces the 
network risk premium compared to what it would be if that institution were removed.  
Eling and Pankoke (2016) review the literature on systemic risk, finding no agreement 
on a definition of the term, other than “that it involves uncertainty about the occurrence of a 
specific event.” They identify three important elements: the risk of an event, the impact of the 
event, and the causality of the event. Eling and Pankoke (2016, p.252) argue that a definition 
of systemic risk should be judged against the following criteria: 
1. Risk of an event: The definition should address the dysfunction of financial services.19  
2. The definition should include that the event must cause a substantial negative impact on 
the real economy.  
 
19 Eling and Pankoke (2016) focus mainly on the financial sector, but their criteria can be readily adapted to a 
non-financial setting.  
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3. The negative impact must be a definite consequence of the occurring event. 
Eling and Pankoke (2016, p.277) argue that “the currently most important research can be 
sorted into three types: the definition of systemic risk; systemic risk measures; and the 
regulation of systemic risk in the financial services industry.” 
1.3.8 Network Formation and Stability 
Although the process of network formation has been studied heavily in the literature on 
networks (see, for example, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), and Galeotti, 
Goyal and Kamphorst (2006)), few studies have explicitly detailed the actual mechanism by 
which a network graph is formed. Jackson and Watts (2002) and Watts (2001) are among the 
few that start from an empty network and show all the steps in the formation of networks; most 
others simply describe the conditions for stability. A comprehensive review of the literature 
surrounding network formation has been undertaken by Jackson (2005a). He describes three 
key questions in the literature on network formation. They are: 
i) How are such network relationships important in determining the outcome of 
economic interaction? 
ii) How can we predict which networks are likely to form when individuals have 
the discretion to choose their connections? 
iii) How efficient are the networks that form and how does that depend on the way 
that the value of a network is allocated among the individuals? 
Jackson also notes a survey of the social network literature in the field of sociology by 
Wasserman and Faust (1994).  
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is the first in a line of literature focusing on various notions 
of stability. The notion of stability corresponds to a Nash equilibrium concept in non-
cooperative game theory. A summary of equilibrium concepts in network formation games has 
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already been produced by Bloch and Jackson (2006). However, their focus is on the 
mechanisms of the concepts; the focus here is on the intuition behind the concepts. Bloch and 
Jackson (2006, p.309, footnote 7) mention a proposed taxonomy of the three classes of network 
solutions: ‘network-based’ stability concepts, ‘game-based’ stability concepts, and ‘hybrid’ 
stability concepts. For each of these classes, there also exists a modification to incorporate the 
idea of transfers. We adopt this taxonomy, and discuss each of the three classes in turn.  
Network-based stability concepts 
Bloch and Jackson (2006, p.309) define network-based stability concepts as those which 
work “directly with the networks involved, [seeing] if some players could gain from some 
change in the links that they are involved with.” The example given of a network-based stability 
concept is the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) notion of pairwise stability. That is the notion that 
if a link is not in the network, it is because either of the two agents involved in the link are 
made better off by forming it; and if a link is in the network, it is because neither of the two 
agents are made better off by severing it.  
Jackson (2008, p.156) describes pairwise stability as “natural and easy to work with [but] 
there are limitations.” The key limitation is that pairwise stability considers only one link at a 
time. This does not, for example, cover the case where an individual is made worse off by 
severing any one of her links, but is made better off by simultaneously severing multiple links. 
Similarly, it does not cover the case where a pair of individuals is each made worse off if only 
one of them severs their link with a third individual, but both are made better off if they sever 
their links with that individual simultaneously.  
  The other major example of network-based stability is the notion of strong stability. 
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) were the first to consider this notion, but the Jackson and van 
den Nouweland (2005) formulation falls more into the category of network-based stability. 
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This formulation uses the concepts of coalitional deviation and obtainability: that is, the idea 
that an alternative network is ‘obtainable… via deviations by [a coalition] ∏’ (Jackson and van 
den Nouweland, 2005, p.425) if  
i) a link being in the alternative network but not in the status quo network 
implies that the two players involved are in the deviating coalition ∏  
ii) a link being in the status quo network but not in the alternative network 
implies that at least one of the players involved in the link is in the deviating 
coalition. 
Game-based stability concepts 
 Myerson (1997, p.448) proposes a game in which “each player independently writes 
down a list of the players with whom he wants to form a link, and… the graph [contains] a link 
for every pair of players who have named each other.”20 In this context, network formation 
takes place as the outcome of a set of strategy spaces. This leads to the consideration of stability 
in terms of Nash equilibrium: Bloch and Jackson (2006, p.309) define a network w as Nash 
stable with respect to a profile of utility functions J  if there exists a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium that supports w.  
 The Dutta and Mutuswami (1997, p.323) model of network stability uses a game-based 
stability notion. They define a graph to be “strongly stable (respectively weakly stable) if it 
corresponds to a strong Nash equilibrium (respectively coalition-proof Nash equilibrium) of 
the link formation game.”21 
 
20 Myerson proposes this game relatively informally and in the context of fair allocations. The first formal model 
of this game is due to Qin (1996, p.220). 
21 Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005, p.426) note that their definition of strong stability “is slightly stronger 
than that originally introduced by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997)” since it “allows for a deviation to be valid if 
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Hybrid stability concepts 
 Jackson and Bloch (2006, p.309) argue that Nash stability is “too weak a concept for 
modeling network formation when links are bilateral,” noting that the empty network is always 
a Nash network. A stronger concept is that of pairwise Nash equilibrium, defined by the 
following two criteria: 
i) Given the strategy space of the other players, each player cannot be made 
strictly better off by deviating. 
ii) There exists no pair of agents such that, for at least one of the two agents º and 
Ω, the payoff from the strategy profile Ÿ is strictly greater with the addition of 
link ºΩ than the payoff without link ºΩ. 
As with the game-based stability concept, a network is defined as pairwise Nash stable 
if there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium that supports it. The concept is first mentioned by 
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.25), applied by Goyal and Joshi (2006, p.324) and Belleflame 
and Bloch (2004, p.396) and formally studied by Calvó-Armengol and Ilkılıç (2009, p.56-57), 
and Gilles and Sarangi (2005, p.4).     
Bloch and Jackson (2006, p.312) characterize pairwise Nash equilibria as the intersection 
of pairwise stable and Nash equilibria for a matching game. They also note that there may exist 
utility functions such that there are no pairwise Nash equilibria, even when there are pairwise 
stable graphs, and graphs supported by Nash equilibria.  
 
some members are strictly better off and others are weakly better off” while the Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) 
definition requires all members to be better off. 
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Stability notions in games with transfers 
Although Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.66) is the first study to consider transfers 
between players as a part of a stability notion, the concept was first specifically studied by 
Bloch and Jackson (2007). In brief, the stability notion is expanded to the idea that one of the 
two parties involved in a link can compensate the other through a side payment. In the Jackson 
and Wolinsky (1996) model, a graph w is pairwise stable allowing for side payments if 
i) The removal of a link ºΩ does not strictly decrease the payoff of either 
agent º	or agent Ω; and 
ii) The addition of a link ºΩ does not increase the combined payoffs of agent 
º and agent Ω. 
Intuitively, the second point states that (for example) if º	is made far better off by the 
addition of ºΩ	to the network graph w while Ω is made slightly worse off, º can compensate Ω to 
form the link, but if º is made only slightly better off while Ω is made far worse off, º cannot 
compensate Ω. 
The Bloch and Jackson (2007, p.89) model is game-based rather than network-based. In 
their game, players simultaneously announce a transfer for each possible link that they might 
form. If the transfer is positive, it represents the offer that the player makes to form the link. If 
the transfer is negative, it represents the demand that a player requests to form the link. A link 
is formed if the net transfer is non-negative. In equilibrium, net transfers converge to zero. 
The significance of this finding is that “the introduction of transfers can lead to 
differences in the set of stable networks from any stability notions that do not incorporate 
transfers… [it] neither refines nor enlarges the set of stable networks, but changes them in 
noncomparable ways.” (Bloch and Jackson, 2006, p.317).   
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Stability in Models of Network Risk 
The model discussed in this thesis does not make particular mention of stability, despite 
the prominence of stability in the network theory literature. It would be remiss to ignore it 
completely, though a slight modification of the notion of stability is necessary, given that we 
now work in a risky framework. First, we assume that a graph satisfies standard stability if  
• for all 2q ∈ w, J0(w) ≥ J0(w − 2q) and J•(w) ≥ J•(w − 2q), and 
• for all 2q ∉ w, if J0(w) < J0(w + 2q) then J•(w) > J•(w + 2q). 
Proposition: (informal for now) a graph that satisfies standard stability satisfies pairwise 
stability.  
Suppose now that the payoff associated with the graph, and thus the utility associated 
with the graph, is risky. There may then exist some 2 for whom J0(w) > J0(w − 2q) in one 
state of the world but J0(w) < J0(w − 2q) in another. In this case, 2 may not form some 
links that they may have formed under certainty. A new definition of stability uses individual 
CEs fi0: 
Definition 1.3: A graph satisfies stochastic stability if 
• for all 2q ∈ w, fi0(w) ≥ fi0(w − 2q) and fi•(w) ≥ fi•(w − 2q), and 
• for all 2q ∉ w, if	fi0(w) < fi0(w + 2q) then fi•(w) > fi•(w + 2q). 
That is, a link is formed if and only if it increases the CE of all individuals involved.22  
 
22 A measure of individual risk aversion similar to this, which we will call equivalent allocation, is discussed in 
Section 2.6.3.  
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Chapter 2: The Network Risk Premium 
2.1 Introduction 
Having surveyed the literature on networks and risk in Chapter 1, we turn attention to 
developing a parallel to the well-known risk premium and certainty equivalent (CE). The CE 
is defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1A: Given a lottery L, the certainty equivalent XK(p)	is the smallest non-
risky amount of money that an agent would be willing to accept in exchange for her chance to 
play L.  
Formally, 
Definition 2.1B: Given a lottery L, the certainty equivalent XK(p) solves 
XK(p) = inf{!|! ≿ p} (42) 
The risk premium is defined as follows: 
Definition 2.2: Given a lottery L with expected value Ka(p) and certainty equivalent 
XK(p), the risk premium of p is Ka(p) − XK(p).	 
A network risk premium is a tool for the cost-benefit analysis of risk management in 
networks. Given an exposure to network risk, the network risk premium is some measure of 
willingness to pay to mitigate the risk.  
In order to define the network risk premium, we first define network risk. As shown in 
Chapter 1, studies of network risk, in the sense that economists would use the term ‘risk,’ have 
been limited. Part of this may be because no single definition of ‘network risk’ pins down all 
the potential risks faced by a network. In Section 2.2 we offer a taxonomy of network risks.  
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A crucial insight in defining network risk is that networks can be used to represent 
lotteries. This insight means that we can draw on the considerable literature on lotteries in 
modelling risk in networks. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we show that any lottery can be represented 
as a network with an endogenous allocation rule. In Section 2.5, we define the network risk 
premium, and in Section 2.6 we outline several different approaches to evaluating it.  
2.2 A Taxonomy of Network Risks 
We suggest that most risks faced by networks can be divided into three categories: 
assignment risk, valuation risk, and structural risk.  
2.2.1 Assignment Risk 
Assignment risk is when the agents in the network do not know which node they will be 
assigned to. The payoff associated with each node is determined by an allocation rule. 
Assuming that there is one agent for each node in the network, assignment risk corresponds to 
a simple lottery with % equiprobable outcomes, where % is the number of nodes.  
In some contexts, such as that of the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) Co-Author model, it 
is natural to assume that each agent is associated with a unique node in the network. In this 
case assignment risk corresponds to a lottery with equiprobable outcomes. 
In other contexts, such as the transport networks of Chapter 3, there will be more agents 
than nodes and there will, in general, be different numbers of agents at different nodes. In this 
case the probability of receiving the outcome associated with a given node will be equal to the 
proportion of the population of agents who are located at that node. 
Assignment risk relates to the work of Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo and 
Yariv (2010), which discusses the issue of equilibrium selection in networks. They note (p.219) 
that “even the simplest games played on networks have multiple equilibria.” To take a simple 
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illustration, consider the model of Bala and Goyal (2000), in which the star network graph is 
the only stable network graph. Under anonymity, there are %	different equilibria, each with a 
different player of the set of % players in the center. In our model, the problem of multiplicity 
is solved by having the strategic choice (the selection of a network graph connecting the nodes) 
take place before the resolution of risk concerning which player occupies which node. This can 
be thought of as similar to Harsanyi’s (1955) veil of ignorance.  
In a symmetric graph, all players are equally central and so receive the same allocation 
under a centrality-based allocation rule. Examples of a symmetric graph include the empty 
graph, the ‘pairs’ graph (in which each player is linked with one and only one other player), 
the cycle graph and the complete graph. In a symmetric graph, assignment risk may still be 
present but is irrelevant. 
Assignment risk is useful for depicting networks as lotteries in an experimental setting. 
For our example, we assume that the lottery is being evaluated by a single agent behind a veil 
of ignorance. This agent has an equal probability of being assigned to each node in the network, 
and so faces the lottery ¶ = (!6, … , !$) where !0 is the payoff associated with node 2.  
2.2.2 Valuation Risk 
 Valuation risk pertains to risks regarding the parameters of the value function of the 
network as a whole. The value function calculates the value (usually measured in terms of 
money) generated by the network, which is subsequently distributed to the members of the 
network through the allocation rule. Valuation risk can be thought of as changes in the 
underlying environment. For example, in transportation networks, a valuation risk might be 
changes in weather conditions: rain might slow down traffic and increase travel time. In a 
financial network, valuation risk may be the result of a stochastic process for the value of 
financial assets.  
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Recall our earlier example of a value function: 
A(w) =cÇÉ¢£	§ − ih
0,•
(43) 
This gives rise to an allocation !(w) such that  
c!0(w)
0
= A(w) =cÇÉ¢£	§ − ih
0
(44) 
Valuation risk would, in this case, arise if one or more of Ç, §, or i were state-contingent. In 
the general case, the state of the world d  determines a trivariate random variable 
(Ç(w), §(d), i(d)), which in turn determines the state-contingent value of the graph A(w,d). 
To represent this, we may write  
A(w,d) =cÇ(d)	É¢£§(d) − i(d)h
0,•
(45) 
The allocation !(w,d) is now state-contingent, satisfying the requirement 
c!(w,d)
0
= A(w,d)	 (46) 
Hence, an agent at any node n faces a lottery with an outcome for each state of the world. 
In situations with valuation risk, the associated risk is solved after any strategic choices made 
by agents. Because of this, the amount to be divided between the nodes, that is, the payoff for 
the players, is also stochastic.  
In this representation, the allocation of agents to nodes is independent of the state of the 
world d. If agents face both assignment risk and valuation risk, a compound lottery arises. 
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2.2.3 Structural Risk 
 Structural risk pertains to risks associated with the severance or formation of particular 
links.23 Since the allocation rule generally depends on the network structure, changes to the 
network structure typically change the payoff at each node. The probability distribution over 
network structures, taking account of the links vulnerable to severance, corresponds to a simple 
lottery for each node in the network. 
Most models that have discussed network risk previously have pertained largely to 
structural risk. Structural risk could also be related to stability, in events where it is unknown 
whether or not the network graph will be stable. It is also the form of network risk that is 
perhaps the most intuitive. Consider, for example, an incident on March 30th, 2017, in which a 
fire underneath an overpass of the I-85 highway in Atlanta caused the collapse of a section of 
one of the busiest highways in North America. The collapse of the I-85 resulted in considerable 
traffic delays across the city of Atlanta, as traffic from the I-85 was diverted to other roads and 
congestion was increased. It is easy to see the congestion (and increased travel time) arising 
from the I-85 collapse as a potential welfare loss arising from a structural risk. 
Structural risk most directly affects the allocation rule, since the severance of a link may 
mean that a previously-central node becomes less central. Or, conversely, the addition of a link 
may adversely affect a node that was previously a critical path. Assuming a centrality-based 
allocation rule such as the Myerson allocation, the change in the structure of the network may 
drastically change the relative allocations. Consider two network graphs, the cycle and the line, 
shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2: 
 
23 It could also concern the removal of nodes; mechanically, this could be thought of as the severance of all links 
associated with that node. 
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Figure 2.1 Cycle Graph 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Line graph 
The severance of any single link in Figure 2.1 yields Figure 2.2. Conversely, a link being 
formed between the two end players of Figure 2.1 yields Figure 2.2. Assuming a centrality-
based allocation rule, in Figure 2.1 all nodes receive the same allocation; in Figure 2.2, the 
central players receive higher allocations while the outer players receive less. 
2.3 Primitives of the Model 
The sequence of events is assumed to be as follows: 
1. the group of agents makes a decision over the network graph from a set of 
alternative networks; 
2. assignment risk and structural risks are resolved; 
3. the state-contingent total value of the network is realized; and 
4. an allocation rule determines the state-contingent payoff at each node. 
We assume the following properties for the value function a(w): 
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V.1) Anonymity: For any automorphism ä, a(w) 	= 	a	]ä(w)^. 
V.2) Component additive: ∑ a(ℎ) = a(w).ï∈ñ(á)  
V.3) Superaddivity: For any connected graph w, and for any set of graphs Xó(w) whose 
union covers w, ∑ a(ℎ) = a(w).ï∈ñó(á)  
We assume that the network is governed by an anonymous allocation rule, so that any 
equally-central agents receive the same expected payoff. This assumption means that we have 
an additional constraint on feasible payoffs. Under the assumption of anonymity, it is not, for 
example, possible to have two different expected payoffs for an undirected graph with two 
nodes – there are only two configurations of the graph (one in which a link between the nodes 
is formed, and one in which it isn’t), both of which have the two nodes equally central. 
For each graph w, the outcome space is given in an % ×‚ payoff matrix +(w), where 
% is the number of agents and ‚ is the number of possible states of the world, incorporating 
the possible outcomes of structural and valuation risks. Graphs with no structural or valuation 
risks are called non-stochastic graphs. The set of all possible payoff matrices is denoted ¸ and 
the set of all network graphs is denoted v. 
The 2dth entry of +(w), denoted +0˝ ∈ (0,)], is the payoff for agent 2 in state d. In 
cases with assignment risk, agents take account of every entry of +(w)  in making their 
decisions over the network graph. In cases without assignment risk, an agent takes account 
only of the payoffs at her own node. 
Let the probability of each state of the world be /˝, with ∑ /˝ = 1
F
˝;6 .	Further, let the 
the /˝s be collected in a ‚ × 1 vector ˛. Then 
¶̌ = +˛ (47)
gives the vector ¶̌ of expected payoffs at each node, with the 2th entry of ¶̌, !̅0, denoting the 
expected payoff at node 2. Next, we denote the probability of being assigned to node 2 as M0, 
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where ∑ M0
$
0;6 = 1. We denote the vector of these probabilities as b. If there is only one agent 
assigned to each node, M0 =
6
$
 for all 2.  
We assume that individuals in the network have preferences that are complete, transitive, 
continuous and weakly monotonic. Further, we assume that the agents satisfy some model of 
preferences over risk; we are agnostic as to which model they satisfy (EUT, RDU, CPT, etc). 
This means that individuals have their own risk premium for the lottery associated with the 
network graph.  
2.4 Representing Networks as Lotteries 
  While the definition of lotteries as a set of ordered payoff-probability pairs is standard 
in theoretical economics, this representation is generally considered too abstract for use in an 
experimental setting. As a result, alternative representations of lotteries are often used. Perhaps 
the most commonly-used representation, as discussed by Harrison and Rutström (2008), is as 
a pie-chart, as shown in Figure 2.3:  
 
Figure 2.3 Typical Pie Graph to Represent a Lottery 
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When pie-charts are used, probabilities are usually shown as percentages. This gives rise 
to the practice of using two ten-sided dice as a physical method of resolving risks.24 In the 
above example, a roll between 1 and 50 will result in a prize of $5, a roll between 51 and 90 
will result in a prize of $10, and a roll between 90 and 100 (represented by a roll of zero on 
both dice) will result in a prize of $15. 
However, while pie-charts are one of the most common representation used in 
experiments, they are not the only representation. For example, Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Ng 
and Swarthout (2016) depict lotteries using a description of the physical process for resolving 
the risk. Their experimental screen depicts a number of colored dots, with each color 
representing a different payoff. The greater the number of dots of a particular color, the higher 
the probability of the participant receiving the associated payoff. Such a graph is shown in 
Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4: Dot Graph to Represent Probability 
We will show that network graphs can be used to represent lotteries. Recall that an 
allocation is a mapping A:	v$ → 	 [0,)]$, A(w) = + = [!6, . . . , !$]  with elements !0 ∈
	[0,)] denoting the payoff at node 2, such that 
 
24 It would be possible, for example, to represent probabilities in increments of 0.001, by using three ten-sided 
dice. 
 63 
	c !0
$
0;6
= a(w) (48) 
where a(w)	is the total value generated by the network. 
One question that arises is exactly which lotteries can be represented by networks. The 
short answer is any lottery: simply create a symmetric network of any size and introduce 
valuation risk, calibrating for the desired probability-payoff space. But this response is hardly 
novel, and does not require a network depiction: a single node would suffice, and then we 
simply have a conventional lottery! The more interesting question is what can be done using 
only assignment risk or structural risk, though the final answer remains “any lottery.” Our 
analysis will focus on assignment risk. 
To ensure that the set of payoffs is consistent with network theory, we begin by imposing 
two constraints:  
1) We assume an anonymous allocation rule, so that any equally-central nodes receive 
the same payoff.  
2) We assume that more-central nodes receive a strictly higher payoff than less-central 
nodes. 
Recall our definition of lotteries: a lottery + = {(/0, !0), 2 = 1, . . . , %}, with !6 ≤ 	!8 ≤
. . . ≤ !$, assigns probability /0 to outcome !0 in (0,)], where   ∑ /0 = 1
$
0;6 . We consider 
the case where /0 =
6
$
, and assume without loss of generality that !6 ≤ 	!8 ≤. . . ≤ 	 !$. 
Proposition 2.1: Any lotteries with probabilities in multiples of 6
$
 can be represented as a path 
graph of length 2%. 
Proof: By our first constraint, a lottery represented by a path graph of size 2% can have, at 
most, % outcomes, since every node has exactly one other node that is equally central. Taken 
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with our second constraint, a lottery represented by a path graph of size 2% must have exactly 
% outcomes, since more-central nodes must have a higher payoff than less-central nodes. 
In order to represent an arbitrary lottery, we assign a payoff of !6 to the outermost nodes, 
a payoff of !8 to the second-outermost nodes, and so on until we assign a payoff of !$ to the 
two innermost nodes. ∎ 
Now add an additional constraint.  
3) The allocation to a given node must be a proportion, based on a centrality measure, 
of a fixed value a.  
This additional constraint means that we must take a centrality measure that is normalized so 
that the shares add up to 1. This is a feature of eigenvector centrality. Our main theorem is the 
following: 
Theorem 2.1: Any lottery ¶ with rational probabilities and rational payoffs can be represented 
as a network graph w  with an allocation rule based on eigenvector centrality and a non-
stochastic value function that gives rise to an equivalent lottery ¶». 
In order to prove this theorem, we begin with the following lemma: 
Lemma 2.1: Any lottery with rational probabilities can be represented as a network with an 
arbitrary allocation rule. 
Proof: Suppose that we have a lottery with % payoffs, with each payoff !0 having a rational 
probability /0. Because the probabilities are rational, each /0 can be written as a fraction with 
a common denominator ". Hence, the lottery can be represented as a network with " nodes, 
with each payoff !0 being assigned to "/0 nodes. ∎ 
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Corollary 2.1: Any lottery +	that can be represented as a network of size " with an arbitrary 
allocation rule can be represented as a network of size <" with an arbitrary allocation rule, 
where < is a positive integer. 
Lemma 2.2: Any lottery + that can be represented as a network of size " can be represented 
as a network of size <", so long as the allocation rule satisfies component balance and the value 
function satisfies component additivity. 
Proof: This can be achieved by replicating the graph structure so that the network 
consists of two components, each of which is a network graph of size "  representing +.	∎ 
We can think, then, of an allocation as a vector ¶ of size <", such that the elements of ¶ 
sum to a(w). Without loss of generality, we can normalize a(w) to 1. Given this, the allocation 
is the vector of shares of the value for each node. 
Consider the notion of eigenvector centrality proposed by Bonacich (1972). The notion 
of eigenvector centrality begins with a network graph and leads to a set of eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues. Here, we begin with a vector ¶ and attempt to reverse-engineer a scalar and matrix 
for which ¶ is the eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue. 
Consider the share vector ¶6 = (0.2,0.3,0.5)
ó	.  This represents a lottery with three 
payoffs, arising with equal probability. It is not possible to represent ¶6 as a network graph, 
since no three-node networks have configurations with three different levels of centrality. 
However, instead consider the share vector ¶8 = (0.1,0.1,0.15,0.15,0.25,0.25)
ó. Note that this 
also represents a lottery with three equiprobable payoffs. Note further that if ¶6 divides a value 
of A and ¶8 divides a value of 2A, ¶6 and ¶8 represent the same underlying lottery. In such a 
case, we say that ¶6 and ¶8 are equivalent, and denote this as ¶6 ≡ ¶8. 
It is not possible to represent ¶6	as a network, but it is possible to represent ¶8  as a 
network. Consider the following adjacency matrix: 
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S =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
(49) 
which represents the network graph w, shown in Figure 2.5: 
 
Figure 2.5 The network graph associated with adjacency matrix A 
Multiplying S by ¶8 gives 
S¶8 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.1
0.1
0.15
0.15
0.25
0.25⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.3
0.3
0.45
0.45
0.75
0.75⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
= 3¶8 (50) 
So ¶8	is an eigenvector of S with eigenvalue 3. Using Mathematica’s EigenvectorCentrality 
command to resolve the out-centrality vector for w  does, indeed, yield ¶8 . We call ¶8	a 
decomposition of ¶6. 
Lemma 2.3: A lottery ¶ and its decompositions are equivalent. 
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The question now becomes how to represent any lottery ¶ as a network graph w with 
adjacency matrix S. The first step is the selection of eigenvalues. 
Claim 2.2: The smallest eigenvalue of S, denoted h, is the lowest common integer multiple of 
the two lowest unique shares, denoted !6 and !8, divided by !6. 
Begin by setting up the following system of equations: 
)¶ = )
)66 ⋯ )6$
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
)$6 ⋯ )$$
,)
!6
⋮
!$
, = h)
!6
⋮
!$
, (51) 
with the constraint that the entries of	) must all be integers, and the diagonal values are not 
equal to the maximum entry of the matrix (this is because of our constraint that the adjacency 
matrix must have diagonal values of 0).  
Proposition 2.2: A solution {), h} exists to the problem 
c)0•!•
$
•;6
	= h!0 (52) 
if the !0s are rational.  
Proof: Because the !0s are rational, there exists a lowest common denominator …. Multiplying 
by this denominator gives …¶  as a vector of integers. These integers must have a lowest 
common multiple, which we denote -. A solution for h exists at fi divided by the smallest 
number in …¶, !6. A solution exists if we construct ) such that for each 2 ≥ 2: 
)06 =
-
!6
(53) 
and 
)00 = h −
-
!6
(54) 
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with )60. =
/
k¢0
 for exactly one 2. and 0 for all other entries. This yields 
c)0•!• =
-
!6
!6 + ’h −
-
!0
÷ !0 = - + h!0 − - = h!0, 2 ≠ 1
$
•;6
(55) 
and  
c)6•!• =
-
!0.
!0. = - = h!6
$
•;6
∎(56) 
This solution is not always unique. To see this, consider our earlier example, ¶ =
(0.2,0.3,0.5). Applying the process we just described gives … = 10, …¶ = (2,3,5). The lowest 
common multiple of 2,3 and 5, -, is 30. This gives h = {1
8
= 15 and  
) = 2
0 0 6
15 15 0
15 0 9
3 (57) 
However, a solution also exists at h = 3, as we saw earlier. In this case, 
) = 2
0 2 0
2 0 1
2 2 1
3 (58) 
 Proposition 2.2 should therefore be considered as proof of the existence of a solution, 
rather than a normative guide to a solution. The maximum value of )0•, which we label <, is 
what we will refer to as the decomposition factor: it is the integer by which each of the !0s 
must be divided in order to create an adjacency matrix S  of size <% × <%  such that a 
decomposition ¶» of ¶ is an eigenvector of S.  
The entries of S are 1s and 0s, and the diagonals must all be 0s. Think of each row S0 of 
S as a set of % sections of size <, each corresponding to a different value of !0
». The qth such 
section will have a number of 1s equal to )0•. In order to maintain linear independence of the 
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rows, the 1s should be rotated from row to row if possible.25 The 2th row of S will thus sum 
to )06+. . . +)0$.  
We are now ready to prove our main result. Recall Theorem 2.1: 
Theorem 2.1: Any lottery ¶ with rational probabilities and rational payoffs can be represented 
as a network graph w  with an allocation rule based on eigenvector centrality and a non-
stochastic value function that gives rise to an equivalent lottery ¶». 
Proof: Deriving S as described above yields 
S¶» = 4
)66!6
» + ⋯+)6$!$
»
⋮
)$6!6
» + ⋯+)$$!$
»
5 = 4
h!6
»
⋮
h!$
»
5 = h 4
!6
»
⋮
!$
»
5 = h¶»	 (59) 
By Lemma 2.3, 
h¶» ≡ h¶	 (60) 
and  
S¶» ≡ S¶ (61) 
so 
S¶ = h¶. ∎(62) 
 
25 It will be possible so long as )0• ≠ <. 
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2.5 The Network Risk Premium 
2.5.1 Preferences in Networks 
Defining the risk premium at an individual level is straightforward,26 but not quite so 
straightforward for a network level. This is because preferences are easier to define at an 
individual level than at a network level. Unlike the individual case, where ‘preference’ can be 
taken as axiomatic, there is no generally-accepted preference relation in networks. Further, 
since this is a group preference problem, Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem applies. In this 
section, we consider various approaches to the determination of preferences over networks. 
These approaches lead to characterization of a network risk premium. 
The Network Certainty Equivalent (NCE) 
Formally, the NCE is a function q:v → ℝ. Its output is a scalar value !, which can be 
identified with a symmetric and non-stochastic network graph with payoff ! at each node. This 
identification is so that the CE can be directly compared to the network-as-lottery being 
evaluated.  
Suppose that there exists some preference relation ≿$  over v,  with associated 
indifference relation ~$ and strict preference relation ≻$.  
Definition 2.5: The NCE of a risky network graph w is a riskless network graph q(w)	with 
certain payoff ! at each node, such that w~$q(w). 
Definition 2.6: The CE of the lottery +(w) represented by w is a degenerate lottery Y]+(w)^ 
such that +(w)~$Y]+(w)^.  
 
26 At the most basic level. There are other forms of the risk premium for multivariate risks that are matrix-valued 
(see, for example, Duncan (1977) and Karni (1979)) but the term ‘risk premium,’ used colloquially, typically 
refers to the measure described above. 
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Lemma 2.4: The payoff of the degenerate lottery Y]+(w)^ is the certain payoff ! of each node 
of q(w).  
Proof: Assume that q(w)~$w . Then a matrix representation of q(w), +(q(w) , must be 
indifferent to a matrix representation of w, that is, +(w). +]q(w)^	is a vector with all values 
equal to !. Standard practice in decision theory allows us to identify this as a scalar !. By 
transitivity, !~+(w) . Strict monotonicity requires that +(w)  be indifferent to only one 
degenerate lottery; hence Y]+(w)^ = !. ∎ 
The NCE has the following properties: 
NCE1. For any ! ∈ ¸, q(!) = !. 
NCE2. Completeness: For any w, w′ ∈ v, either q(w) ≥ q(wó) or q(wó) ≥ q(w) or 
both. 
NCE3. Transitivity: For any w6, w8, w{  ∈ v , q(w6) ≥ q(w8),q(w8) ≥ q(w{)⟹
q(w6) ≥ q(w{). 
NCE4. Continuity: For any w ∈ v, the set {w|q(w) ≥ q(wó)} is closed.  
NCE5. Symmetry in %: For any automorphism ä:% → %, q]ä(w)^ = q(w). 
NCE6. Probabilistic sophistication: If two graphs face the same probability distribution, 
their CEs are equal. 
Theorem 2.2: The preference relation ≿$  satisfies A1 through A6 if and only if the NCE 
satisfies NC1 through NC6. 
Proof: The identification between w and +(w)	means that any results that apply to one apply 
to the other. We can use the von Neumann-Morgenstern results to say that Y]+(w)^ represents 
+(w). Lemma 2.4 shows that Y]+(w)^ = ! ≡ q(w). So, 
w ≿$ wó ⇔ +(w) ≿$ +(wó) ⇔ Y]+(w)^ ≥ Y]+(wó)^ ⇔ q(w) ≥ q(wó) (63) 
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Hence, the NCE represents the network preference ordering. ∎ 
The Network Expected Value (NEV) 
The NEV of network graph w, denoted fi(w), is the expected payoff for an agent in w. It 
is given by 
fi(w) = b¶̌ (64) 
In the case where there is only one agent assigned to each node, this is 
fi(w) =
1
%
c!.0 =
1
%
cc/˝+0˝
F
˝;6
.
$
0;6
$
0;6
(65) 
2.5.2 The Network Risk Premium 
With preferences by ‘the network’ over the set of graphs v  given, the network risk 
premium (NRP), denoted Π(w), is the difference between the NEV and the NCE: 
	Π(w) = fi(w) − q(w). (66) 
The NRP can also be solved as the ratio of the NEV to the NCE: 
Π(w) =
fi(w)
q(w)
	 (67) 
However, as mentioned, there is no universally-accepted method of assigning 
preferences in groups. Defining the network risk premium is a social choice problem, to which 
we consider three main approaches: 
• social welfare functions derived from axiomatic requirements; 
• voting procedures such as the Condorcet-Young method (practical but subject to 
the Arrow impossibility theorem/generalized Condorcet paradox); and 
• aggregating the willingness to pay of agents derived from observation of their 
risk preferences. 
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2.6 Estimating the NCE and NRP 
2.6.1 The Preference Approach 
The preference relation ≿$  over network graphs is assumed to have the following 
properties:  
A1. Completeness: For any w, w′ ∈ v, either w ≿$ w′	or w′ ≿$ w or both.  
A2. Transitivity: For any w6, w8, w{ ∈ v, w6 ≿$ w8, w8 ≿$ w{ ⟹ w6 ≿$ w{. 
A3. Continuity: For any w ∈ v, the set of all w′ ∈ v such that w′ ≿$ w is closed.  
A4. Strictly Increasing Monotonicity: For any w, w′ ∈ v, if w ≿ w′ for each 2 ∈ %, then 
	w ≿$ w′	 
A5. Symmetry in %: For any automorphism ä:% → %, ä(w)~w.  
and the following properties concerning preferences over payoff matrices: 
B1. Completeness: For any +(w), +(wó), either +(w) ≿$ +(wó)	or +(wó) ≿$ +(w) or 
both. 
B2.  Transitivity: For any +(w6), +(w8), +(w{) ∈ ¸,  
+(w6) ≿
$ +(w8), +(w8) ≿
$ +(w{)⟹ +(w6) ≿$ +(w{). 
B3. Continuity: For any +(w) ∈ ¸, the set {+(wó)|+(wó) ≿$ +(w)} is closed. 
B4. Strictly Increasing Monotonicity: For any +6, +8 ∈ ¸, +6 > +8 ⟹ +6 ≿$ +8. 
B5. Symmetry in %: Let ä:% → % be an automorphism. Define ä(+) as the matrix 
such that the ä]+8(0)^ = +0. Then for any + ∈ ¸, ä(+)~+. 
B6. Probabilistic sophistication in ‚: If the distribution of the outcome space is the 
same, the matrices are indifferent. 
Beyond these axioms, what constitutes an acceptable set of assumptions always depends 
on the problem being modelled.  
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The similarity of assumptions A1 through A5 and B1 through B6 to the expected utility 
axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is clear. In attempting to define the NCE 
axiomatically, it will be useful to establish an analogue to the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) utility function for collective preferences over risky networks. We suggest that social 
welfare functions may be able to fulfill this purpose. 
Boadway and Bruce (1984) note the limitations of using social welfare functions to 
represent social preference orderings. One of the more important issues is that of comparability 
of individual utility. Boadway and Bruce (1984, p. 144) define comparability as “the sense in 
which the real numbers attached to different households’ utility levels can be meaningfully 
compared.” Generally speaking, the higher the level of comparability, the more classes of 
social welfare orderings are permissible.  
Boadway and Bruce (1994, p.161) discuss absolute scale comparability, where “the 
invariance requirement is trivial” since “utility is measureable to an absolute scale.” They argue 
that absolute scale comparability is required for “the general Bergson-Samuelson form of the 
social welfare function.” Full comparability allows a social welfare function to depend on the 
utility differences both for and across individuals. 27 
Since our preference ordering concerns lotteries, we have a measure of individual utility 
that allows full comparability: that is, the individual CE. An ordering based on individual CEs 
is invariant to all monotonic transformations. This means that we are able to account not only 
for individual preferences over lotteries, but for the intensity of those preferences. 
 
27 Full comparability is sufficiently rare that Jehle and Reny (2000) do not mention it in their discussion of 
comparability. The focus in Jehle and Reny (2000) is on utility-level invariance, in which (p.280) “a social welfare 
function is permitted to depend only on the ordering of utility both for and across individuals” and utility-
difference invariance, where (p.281) “a social welfare function is permitted to depend only on the ordering 
[emphasis added] of utility differences both for and across individuals.” 
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Claim 2.2: Any social welfare function may be interpreted as a CE for risky choices and 
vice versa. 
Consider any vector of outcomes ¶	 = 	 (!6, … , !$) 	∈ 	+
$  and a function a:	+$ → ℝ 
representing ⪰$ in the sense that a(¶) ≥ 	a(¶ʹ) iff ¶	 ⪰$ 	¶ʹ.The vector ¶ may be interpreted 
as a possible allocation of outcomes to a group with N members, such that individual 2 receives 
!0. On this interpretation ⪰$ is a social welfare ordering and V is a social welfare function. 
Appropriate restrictions on ⪰$ ensure that V can be utilitarian, Rawlsian (Rawls, 1971) and so 
on.  Further, the ordering ⪰$ may be represented by an equal-allocation equivalent c where 
i(¶) is such that ¶	~	(i, … , i) 	∈ 	+$.  
The vector of outcomes x may also be considered as the set of prizes for a lottery with % 
equally likely outcomes. Now ⪰$ is a risk preference ordering and V is a function representing 
⪰$.  Any restriction on ⪰$ gives rise to the same conditions on V as in the social welfare 
interpretation.   
Let q0(w) denote the CE for individual 2 associated with network graph w. We denote 
the vector of individual CEs as q̌(w) . The network welfare function is denoted as 
;]q̌(w)^: ℝ$ → 	ℝ. The functional form of ; may vary, but we assume that ; is strictly 
increasing. Some forms include 
• Utilitarian: ;]q̌(w)^ = ∑ q0(w)$0;6  
• Cobb-Douglas: ;]q̌(w)^ = ∏ q0(w)=$0;6  
• Rawlsian: ;]q̌(w)^ = min
>
q0(w) 
• Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES):28  
 
28 Note that the utilitarian, Cobb-Douglas and Rawlsian forms are special cases of CES.  
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;]q̌(w)^ = (q6(w)? +⋯+q$(w)?)
6
= 
The NCE is the scalar q(w) such that  
;]q(w)^ = ;]q̌(w)^ (68) 
where, as before, we identify q(w) with the vector with all entries equal to q(w). The NEV is 
simply the expected payoff for an agent in the network.  
As before, the NRP, denoted Π(w), is the difference between the NEV and the NCE: 
	Π(w) = fi(w) − q(w) (69) 
or the ratio of the NEV to the NCE: 
Π(w) =
fi(w)
q(w)
	 (70) 
2.6.2 The Voting Approach 
A simple preference relation would be the following: if a majority of the members of the 
network prefer w to w′, then w ≿$ w′. However, this approach can lead to cyclical preferences, 
the absence of which may be considered too strong an assumption.  
Consider the following example from the supplementary material of Harrison and 
McDaniel (2008), with three candidates and ten voters, with the vote matrix shown in Table 
2.1. 
Candidate A B C 
A - 3 8 
B 7 - 1 
C 2 9 - 
Table 2.1: Vote distribution 
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Here, 3 voters prefer Candidate A to Candidate B, 8 voters prefer Candidate A to Candidate C, 
and 1 voter prefers Candidate B to Candidate C. Simple pairwise majority preference would 
yield S ≿$ X and T ≿$ S, but X ≿$ T.  
Young (1988) suggested a method of determining a social ranking, which is an extension 
of ideas going back to Condorcet. In the method of Young (1988), each agent gives a complete 
ranking of the alternatives, and given these rankings, the maximum-likelihood acyclic ranking 
is selected as the social ranking. Using the example from Table 2.1, there are six possible 
rankings: 
1. S ≿$ T ≿$ X 
2. S ≿$ X ≿$ T 
3. T ≿$ S ≿$ X 
4. T ≿$ X ≿$ S 
5. X ≿$ S ≿$ T 
6. X ≿$ T ≿$ S 
We can determine how many voters would vote for each of the six rankings by adding 
up the votes in Table 2.1. There can be a maximum of twenty votes for each of the six rankings. 
This is because there are ten voters and two comparisons in each ranking. The ranking which 
receives the most votes is the one that most voters would support. In this example, 3 voters 
prefer S to T , and 1 voter prefers T  to X . Therefore, Ranking 1 is supported by 4 voters. 
Meanwhile, 8 voters prefer S	 to X , and 9  voters prefer X  to T . Therefore, Ranking 2 is 
supported by 17 voters. By the same method we determine that 3 voters support Ranking 3, 15 
voters support Ranking 4, 16 voters support Ranking 5, and 5 voters support Ranking 6. Hence, 
the ranking that receives the most support is Ranking 2. 
 A limitation of this method is that one graph may be ranked higher than another by the 
Condorcet-Young method yet lose to the lower-ranked graph in a direct pairwise election. The 
existence of a Condorcet cycle implies that, for any ordering ≿$ there must exist two network 
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graphs S and T such that S ≿$ T but a majority of members of the network prefer T to S. To 
see this suppose there exists a cycle in which B wins a majority vote over A, A over C and C 
over B. Consistency of the preference ordering with the observed majority vote requires 
S ≿$ X, X ≿$ T and transitivity now implies S ≿$ T contrary to the observed majority vote. 
With an appropriate relabelling, the same is true for any ≿$. A strength of this method is that 
it has been shown experimentally to be behaviorally strategy-resistant if not strategy-proof 
(Harrison and McDaniel, 2008). Further, it can be argued that Condorcet cycles do not arise 
often enough in practice to invalidate the assumption that participants may be ordered in terms 
of risk aversion29 and therefore require the application of the procedure of Young (1988) for 
resolving cycles.  
The Network Risk Premium 
This approach has limitations when defining the NCE. The NCE for a graph w could be 
defined as the symmetric and non-risky graph q(w) such that q(w)	would be ranked the same 
as w. However, this definition does not yield a unique NCE. Consider a network with two nodes. 
There are only two possible network graphs: the graph in which the nodes are not linked, 
denoted w1,   and the graph in which the nodes are linked, denoted w6 . Without loss of 
generality, normalize the payoffs to 0 and 1, respectively, and suppose that w6	is subject to 
structural risk. The NCE of w1 is 0, since it is symmetric and non-risky. If we define the NCE 
of w6	as “the symmetric and non-risky graph that is ranked the same,” this requires only that 
q(w)	be ranked above w1 . However, literally every symmetric and non-risky graph with 
positive payoffs satisfies this definition! 
 
29 This is an adaptation of the assumptions of Black (1948) that candidates can be ordered on a left-to-right axis, 
and that voters prefer candidates closest to their own position on the axis. 
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Defining the NCE using this approach, then, gives an interval estimate rather than a point 
estimate. This interval becomes narrower as the number of possible network configurations 
(equivalently, the number of nodes in the network) increases.  
The advantage of this approach to estimating the NRP over the other methods is the low 
information requirement. Using a social welfare function requires strong assumptions (viz., the 
functional form of the social welfare function and the preferences that underly it) and, typically, 
information about individual CEs. Using aggregations of individual WTP, as discussed in the 
next section, requires similar information. Using a voting-based method requires only 
knowledge of individual agents’ ordinal preferences over the network graphs.  
2.6.3 The WTP Elicitation Approach 
Suppose that the members of the network w , faced with a risk, are offered a risk 
management measure to offset that risk, so that each member receives their EV. The maximum 
price that the members of the network would be willing to pay for this risk management 
measure is the true network risk premium. However, both “willing to” and “pay” require 
assumptions if they are to be put into practice.  
Under this approach, every member of the network pays some amount to offset the risk. 
One approach is to deduct money directly from the ex post allocations of each agent. Under 
this approach, further questions of equity arise: should all agents pay equally, or should those 
who benefit more pay more? 
Another approach would be to take the cost of the risk management measure out of the 
total value of the network before it is allocated amongst the members. Whether this approach 
would approximate a flat, proportional or progressive tax depends on the allocation rule.  
If a simple majority of agents voting in favor of the risk management measure is 
sufficient for the network to be collectively considered “willing to pay,” the NRP is the price 
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that makes the median voter exactly indifferent. However, identifying the median voter is non-
trivial. The median voter theorem assumes that all voters can be arranged in order of a single 
criterion. However, in the absence of restrictions on preferences there is no general measure of 
‘more risk averse.’ For any given lottery, and any two agents, the agent with the lower risk 
premium may be regarded as more risk averse. A ranking of risk aversion requires that one 
agent should have a lower CE for every lottery. This will be true if, for example, both agents 
have CRRA (or CARA) and one has a higher coefficient of relative (or absolute) risk aversion. 
Different underlying preferences would require different voting schemes. An intuitive 
example is that a network might be considered ‘willing to pay $!’ if a majority of its members 
were willing to pay $!. However, if the underlying preference relation ≿$ satisfied Leontief 
preferences,30 the requirement of a simple majority would (potentially) underestimate the NRP. 
Instead, the network would be willing to pay $! only in the case of unanimity.  
A measure for an individual’s willingness to pay for a risk management measure is 
simply taking the difference between the individual’s CE with and without the risk 
management measure. This measure was used by Harrison and Ng (2016) to evaluate the 
welfare gain from insurance.  
This measure is similar to the classical measure of equivalent variation: given a 
prospective change in prices, the equivalent variation is the change in wealth, at current prices, 
that would have the same effect on consumer welfare as the price change. The similarity can 
be noted by substituting the word ‘probability’ for the word ‘price.’ As a result, we call this 
measure of willingness to pay for risk management the equivalent allocation, since “equivalent”  
here refers to the CE.  
 
30 These preferences would be represented by a Rawlsian social welfare function, as discussed above. 
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The equivalent allocation, like equivalent variation, is a tool of comparison. Let w. denote 
the graph w with a risk management measure in place. Formally, we define the equivalent 
allocation for agent 2	facing risky network graph w	as follows: 
⁄0(w., w) = q0(w.) − q0(w) (71) 
The network risk premium in this approach is, in effect, a measure of the welfare 
generated by the removal of the risk from the network. An initial measure of the network risk 
premium Π(w) would then simply be the aggregate equivalent allocation comparing w and w.. 
That is: 
Π(w) = c⁄0(w., w)
$
0;6
(72) 
One could use almost any conventional measure of aggregate welfare from the welfare 
economics literature. Note that many of these measures are special cases of the CES welfare 
function: 
Π(w) = )c⁄0(w., w)A
$
0;6
,
6
A
(73)	 
where B ∈ (0,1) is a parameter representing elasticity of substitution. Note, however, that the 
use of CES welfare functions is not possible if some agents are made better off by the presence 
of risk; this is a (perhaps surprisingly) common occurrence in the case of structural risk.31  
 
31 In the case of transport networks, this tends to apply to agents with adjacent origin and destination nodes, with 
the link between their origin and destination being a popular thoroughfare to other links. If these other links are 
removed, traffic along the thoroughfare link is reduced, and the payoff of the agents still using it is increased. In 
simpler cases, as we will show in the next section, this can simply be the result of an agent becoming more central.  
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2.6.4 Worked Examples 
We now demonstrate a series of simple worked examples of the preference/social welfare 
approach, ahead of the more complex worked example in Chapter 3. All of these examples are 
solved in Mathematica, using code shown in Appendix 2.A. Suppose that we have the graph 
shown in Figure 2.6: 
 
Figure 2.6: The baseline network graph with node numbers 
Further suppose that we use the Myerson allocation, found using the 
BetweennessCentrality command in Mathematica, and that the value function of any 
component32 is  
A(w) =cÇÉ¢£	§ − ih
0,•
(74) 
 
32
 In this case, there is only one component and it coincides with the full network.  
1
2
3
4
5
6
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Letting Ç = 0.5, § = 5,	and i = 1, this gives the network a value of 21. The allocations 
are shown in Figure 2.7: 
 
Figure 2.7: The baseline network graph with allocations 
In the following examples we denote the payoff at node º as !O. Further suppose that there 
are six individuals in the network, with CRRA utility functions of the form:  
J(!) = C
!6y=
1 − D
, D ≠ 1
log(!), 		D = 1
	 (75) 
where the D values are −0.1, 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. We use a CES network welfare function 
of the form 
; = Gcq0(w)
$
0;6
A
H
6
A
(76) 
where B = 0.5 is the elasticity of substitution. The NCE is the certain scalar amount that yields 
the same network welfare:  
2.91667
4.66667
2.91667
8.16667
1.16667
1.16667
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Gcq(w)
$
0;6
A
H
6
A
= (%q(w)A)
6
A = %
6
Aq(w) = ;]q̌(w)^ (77) 
so that  
q(w) =
;]q̌(w)^
%
6
A
	 . (78) 
 We solve the NRP as the ratio of the NEV to the NCE. We choose this rather than the 
difference because it is a better measure of the relative welfare loss imposed by each risk type.  
Example 1: Assignment Risk Only 
The expected utility for individual 2 is  
KL0(w) =c
1
%
J0(!O)
$
O;6
(79) 
where J0(∙) is the utility function for individual 2. The CE for individual 2	is  
q0(w) = J0
y6(KL0). (80) 
The CEs are (3.577, 3.461, 3.423, 3.269, 3.118, 2.970) . The network welfare is 
118.787. The NCE is thus equal to 
66fl.
·
J
K.L
= 3.299. The NEV is 
86
·
= 3.5, so the NRP is  
Π(w) =
3.5
3.299
= 1.061 (81) 
Example 2: Structural Risk Only 
Suppose that {14}, the link between Node 1 and Node 4, is vulnerable. If it is severed, 
then the graph and its allocations are 
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Figure 2.8: One link severed 
Note that the allocations to Nodes 1 and 4 have decreased significantly, but the allocation 
to the other nodes (aside from Node 3, which has decreased slightly) have increased. The value 
generated by this network is 20.75, a slight decrease in overall value.  
Next, suppose that {14} is severed with probability 0.5. The vector of CEs is 
(2.373, 4.859, 2.609, 3.086, 0.797, 0.065). The network welfare is 38.319, with the NCE 
being solved at q(w) = 1.898. The NEV is fi(w) =
1.M(86)l1.M(81.NM)
·
= 3.479. The NRP is 
thus 
Π(w) =
3.479
1.898
= 1.833 (82) 
Example 3: Structural Risk and Assignment Risk 
Assume the same risk as before. The second state of the world thus uses the same network 
graph as Example 2:  
1.48214
5.92857
2.96429
4.44643
4.44643
1.48214
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Figure 2.9: One link severed, assignment risk 
The expected utility for each agent is as follows: 
KL0(w)c /˝c
1
%
J0(!0˝)
$
0;6
F
˝;6
(83) 
 As before, the CE for individual 2	is the inverse of individual 2’s utility function 
evaluated at KL0(w). The vector of CEs is (3.53812, 3.44955, 3.41986, 3.30055, 3.18106,	 
3.06236), and the network welfare is 119.636. The NCE is thus 3.323, and the NEV is 3.479. 
The NRP is thus 
Π(w) =
3.479
3.323
= 1.047. (84) 
Note that this is lower than the risk premium in both Example 1 and Example 2. The 
network welfare is slightly lower than Example 1 and significantly higher than Example 2. 
This may be because Agent 6, who is the most risk-averse member of the network, is assigned 
in Example 2 to Node 6, which has a low and still-risky payoff. However, in Examples 1 and 
3, Agent 6 has an equal probability of being assigned to each node.   
 
1.48214
5.92857
2.96429
4.44643
4.44643
1.48214
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Example 4: Valuation Risk and Assignment Risk 
Suppose now that the value of § is state-contingent, so that it takes the value § = 5 with 
probability 0.5 and § = 3 with probability 0.5. The effect of this is to decrease the value of the 
network in the lower-§ state, with a(w|§ = 3) = 28, down from 51. As before, the expected 
utility for each agent is as follows: 
KL0(w)c /˝c
1
%
J0(!0˝)
$
0;6
F
˝;6
(85) 
where the ds now denote the different states of the world generated by the different §s. The 
new allocations are: 
 
Figure 2.10: Different Values  
The vector of CEs is (2.657, 2.547, 2.510, 2.366, 2.226, 2.092) , and the network 
welfare is 86.245. The NCE is 2.396, and the NEV is 2.583, yielding a NRP of  
Π(w) =
2.583
2.396
= 1.078. (86) 
 
1.38889
2.22222
1.38889
3.88889
0.555556
0.555556
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Example 5: Multiple Structural Risks 
 Suppose now that both {14} and {15} are vulnerable. If only {14} is severed, the graph 
is the same as in Example 2. If only {15} is severed, we have the following network graph: 
 
Figure 2.11: {15} severed 
If both {14} and {15} are severed, we have the following network graph: 
 
Figure 2.12: Two links severed 
 Assuming that each vulnerability is independent, each of the four possible network 
graphs realizes with probability 0.25. The payoff matrix is 
0.988095
4.44643
3.95238
10.375
0.
0.988095
0.
9.7875
6.525
3.2625
0.
2.175
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+(w) =
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
2.917 1.482 0.988 0
4.667 5.929 4.446 9.788
2.917 2.964 3.952 6.525
8.167 4.446 10.375 3.263
1.167 4.446 0 0
1.167 1.482 0.988 2.175⎠
⎟⎟
⎞
(87) 
The vector of CEs is (1.431, 5.636, 3.492, 3.137, 0.399, 0.067). The total welfare is 65.611, 
with the NCE equal to 1.822 and the NEV equal to 3.510. The NRP is thus 
Π(w) =
3.510
1.822
= 1.926. (88) 
2.7 Social Preferences and Network Risk 
Thus far, we have assumed that agents care only for their own welfare in evaluating 
lotteries. While this is a reasonable assumption for building a baseline model, some mention 
of other-regarding preferences is necessary.  
2.7.1 Literature Review 
While models of other-regarding preferences under risk are present in the literature, no 
one model has been universally accepted as the best way of modelling other-regarding 
preferences under risk. There are numerous models that consider other-regarding preferences, 
and the prominence of influence and information transmission in networks has been one of the 
most popular branches of the literature over the last decade. Several studies in the theory 
literature study the relationship between inequality aversion and risk aversion.33  
Most of the attention to other-regarding risk has been in the field of experimental 
economics. There is a large literature on social preferences in experiments. A number of these 
studies have examined the role of social preferences in experiments involving risk. Results 
 
33 For example, Chambers (2012), Chew and Sagi (2012), Fudenberg and Levine (2012), Gajdos and Weymark 
(2012), Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra (2012), Saito (2013) and Trautmann (2009).  
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have been inconclusive, with some studies arguing that participants do not change their 
behavior in group settings, and other studies arguing that they do. For example, Brennan et al 
(2008, p.261) 
show that situations with risk trigger significantly different behavior than do 
situations with no risk, but the regression results reveal no significant effect of the 
other’s risk on individual behavior, independently of whether the choice situation 
involves strategic uncertainty or not. The results also do not seem to support any 
relation between attitudes to (own) risk and other-regarding concerns.  
Gaudeul (2016, p.28) finds that ‘the majority of subjects are indifferent to the social 
context of their decision.’  
Harrison et al (2013, p.42) 
find no evidence that subjects systematically reveal different risk attitudes in a 
social setting with no prior knowledge about the risk preferences of others 
compared to when they solely bear the consequences of the decision. However, we 
also find… subjects are significantly more risk averse when they know the risk 
preferences of other group members. 
Shupp and Williams (2008) compare average group willingness to pay for the chance to 
play lotteries against average individual willingness to pay for the chance to play lotteries, and 
found that (p.258): 
the variance of risk preferences is generally smaller for groups than individuals and 
the average group is more risk averse than the average individual in high-risk 
situations, but groups tend to be less risk averse in low-risk situations. 
Experimental studies on other aspects of social preferences include Ackert et al (2009), 
who examine pro-social behavior in cases where subjects know whether they are likely to 
benefit from a less risky allocation. They find little effect from risk attitudes, but report “a 
systematic relationship between self-allocation in a dictator game and social preferences in a 
group task.” Attanasio et al (2012) find evidence that agents prefer to group assortatively34 on 
 
34 That is, agents with the same preferences prefer to group together.  
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risk attitudes. This may have implications for behavior when agents are assigned to groups 
with heterogeneous risk attitudes. 
Harrison and Johnson (2006) expand on the designs of Eckel and Grossman (1996) and 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) to ask whether (p.177-178) “the act of giving is correlated with 
the size of the pie left on the experimenter’s table… if subjects prefer that monies go toward 
other players, or charities, than be left on the table.” Eckel and Grossman (1996) conducted 
double-anonymous dictator experiments to explore the role of altruism in motivating subjects’ 
behavior. The design in Eckel and Grossman (1996) was based on Hoffman et al (1994), with 
an additional treatment in which a participant divided payoffs between themselves and the 
American Red Cross. The finding in Eckel and Grossman (1996) was that participants were 
much less likely to keep the entire amount for themselves when the other option was giving to 
a charity. Andreoni and Miller (2002) attempted to express the concepts of altruism and 
fairness in terms of a well-behaved preference ordering. They used a multiple price list 
experiment, in which a participant divided tokens between themselves and an anonymous 
partner. Tokens were worth a different number of points depending on whether they were held 
or passed, and it is the use of varying “exchange rates” between tokens sent and tokens received 
that differentiates the Generalized Dictator task.   
Harrison and Johnson (2006) built on both of these studies, using the Andreoni and Miller 
(2002) multiple price list experiment with the Eckel and Grossman (1996) treatment 
concerning whether participants were more altruistic when giving to a charity. They used 
multiple treatments. The first, labelled “Treatment O,” was a conventional Andreoni and Miller 
(2002) task. The second, labelled “Treatment C,” had points passed to a charity. 
The third treatment, labelled “Treatment O(C),” had points passed to another player, as 
in Treatment O, but added text to say (p.189) that “the experimenter [had] allocated up to a 
certain amount for each player pair, and that anything left over after the session [would] be 
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sent to a specific but unnamed charity.” Similarly, the fourth treatment, labelled “Treatment 
C(O),” followed Treatment C but added text to say (p.189) that the experimenter [had] 
allocated up to a certain amount for each player pair, and that anything left over after the session 
[would] be assigned to another player selected at random.”  
Harrison and Johnson (2006, p.196) found that “subjects, on average, rank contributions 
to a charity over contributions to the experimenter, and then rank contributions to the 
experimenter over contributions to another subject.” They concluded (p.198) “that altruism 
does indeed exist, but that it is contextual and varies considerably across a given subject pool 
and specification of residual claimant.” These results can be taken to mean that social 
preferences are not limited to other participants, and can include the experimenter.  
In the model in Section 2.7.2, we show a method of evaluating the other-regarding 
network risk premium (applicable to any kind of group) that uses only the CEs or payoffs, 
depending on the assumptions used.  
The incorporation of the conditional game theory of Stirling (2012) to Bayesian belief 
networks is novel, but the notion of individual preferences being affected by the propagation 
of social influences in a network has been extensively studied in the network economics 
literature. What follows is a brief and non-comprehensive survey of this literature.  
The study of social influences on decision-making in networks has its roots in the 
mainstream economics literature. Eisenberg and Gale (1959) appear to be the first study of 
consensus in groups. In the Eisenberg and Gale (1959, p.165) model, “[a] certain probability 
space is contemplated by a group of q individuals, each of whom endows it with his own 
subjective probability distribution.” The aim is “to form a distribution which represents, in 
some sense, a consensus of those individual distributions.” They use a variation of the pari-
mutuel method of betting on horses, where the final odds (and therefore the final payout) for 
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bets is not determined until the betting pool is closed. DeGroot (1974) also considers the 
problem of how to reach a consensus over subjective probability distributions, positing a model 
in which an individual revises her own subjective distribution based on a linear combination 
of the subjective probability distributions of the members of the group, including herself. The 
weights she places on each individual’s subjective probability distribution are chosen before 
she learns what the distributions are (p.119) “on the basis of the relative importance that she 
assigns to the opinions of the various members of the group, including herself.”  
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) introduce the notion of persuasion bias, that is, 
where agents fail to account for possible repetition in the information they receive. They show 
that persuasion bias implies two additional phenomena: social influence, where (p.909)  “one’s 
influence on depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is in the social 
network according to which communication takes place,”35  and unidimensional opinions, 
where “individuals’ opinions over a multidimensional set of issues can be represented by a 
single ‘left-right’ spectrum.”  
Golub and Jackson (2010) expand on the DeMarzo et al (2003) model, focusing on 
conditions under which beliefs of all agents converge to the truth. The main condition they find 
to lead to convergence of beliefs is that (p.134) “no group of agents (unless it is large) should 
get arbitrarily more weight than it gives back.” 
Galeotti, Ghiglino and Squintani (2013) extend the cheap talk model of Crawford and 
Sobel (1982), with the restriction that a player can only communicate with the other players to 
whom she is directly connected by the network graph. They note that whether or not truthful 
communication can be sustained in equilibrium does not only depend on the conflict of interest 
 
35 There is a parallel here to the notion of Bonacich centrality, discussed in Section 1.3.5. 
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between players, but also on the structure of the communication network and the allocation of 
players within the network. 
Jiménez-Martínez (2015) expands on the literature described above, incorporating 
Bayesian updating rules to a model of network-based dynamic belief formation. In this model 
there are two types of information transmission: each agent receives private information about 
the parameter from an external and idiosyncratic source, and agents who are connected can 
communicate about the information they are obtaining from their sources.  
2.7.2 Model 
Following the terminology of Stirling (2017), we take categorical preferences to mean 
an agent’s own risk preferences, without regard to others; and conditional preferences to mean 
risk preferences that are at least partially conditioned on the payoffs or risk preferences of 
others. We have discussed how to derive the network risk premium using categorical 
preferences. Next we discuss how to derive the network risk premium using conditional 
preferences.  
The Andreoni and Miller (2002) model uses non-stochastic payoffs for each agent as the 
inputs to a CES utility function: 
J¥ = ]Æ!O
A + (1 − Æ)!P
A^
6
A (89) 
where Æ  measures selfishness, 	!O  is one’s own payoff,  !P  is the payoff of another 
‘representative’ agent,	and B captures the convexity of preferences through the elasticity of 
substitution. The higher Æ is, the greater the weight a participant places on her own payoff. 
This measure of other-regarding utility is designed for non-risky situations. Problems 
begin to arise when risk is introduced. The Andreoni and Miller (2002) model uses non-
stochastic payoffs for each agent as the inputs to its CES utility function. Consider a situation 
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where an agent chooses between networks in a setting where all members of a group, including 
the agent, will be allocated randomly to a node in the network.  
A possible solution is to use CEs as the inputs to the Andreoni and Miller (2002) CES 
utility function: 
J¥ = ]ÆqO
A + (1 − Æ)qP
A^
6
A (90) 
where qO denotes the agent’s own CE for a lottery, and qP denotes the representative agent’s 
CE. A limitation here is that this assumes that an agent has knowledge of the risk preferences 
of the other agents, which is needed to infer the CE qP.  
In a theoretical setting, it can generally be assumed that an agent has at least some 
knowledge of the risk preferences of the other agents in the network, possibly through 
information transmission mechanisms such as that of Galeotti et al (2013). In an experiment a 
participant generally has no way of knowing what the risk preferences of her peers are. 
An elegant and widely accepted solution, employed by Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) 
and Harrison (1990), is to treat the experimental game as a Bayesian game of incomplete 
information, in the sense of Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b). In this approach, participants know the 
distribution of the risk preferences of others, but not the individual values. This approach 
depends on an assumption called the common prior assumption. This has been argued (Morris, 
1995) to be a strong assumption, though a standard one.   
The model presented in this section uses a different set of assumptions: we assume that 
participants have full knowledge of the set of payoffs, and have preferences over the inequality 
of payoffs, derived from a task such as a Generalized Dictator game. A participant derives a 
value based on her own outcome and the outcomes of others. In this model, participants are not 
assumed to have any knowledge of the risk preferences of other participants. Participants are 
assumed to care only about the payoffs of others, and the equity of the distribution of payoffs. 
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Hence, we assume a degree of paternalism amongst the participants, since other participants 
are effectively assumed to be risk neutral.  
In Section 2.5 we demonstrated a method of deriving the network risk premium using 
social welfare functions. These social welfare functions took as their input the (categorical) 
CEs of the lotteries represented by network graphs. To derive the network risk premium in a 
setting with social preferences, particularly an experimental setting, we simply use the 
conditional CEs for each participant. To do this, however, we must model conditional 
preferences. 
In the Stirling (2017) model conditional preferences are derived from a Bayesian belief 
network of influence diffusion. However, in an experimental setting we generally assume 
anonymity of preferences: a participant may have preferences concerning the general well-
being of others, but cannot be assumed to care about any one participant more or less than any 
of the others.  
For a given state of the world d  and its associated payoff vector ¶(d) =
]!6(d), … , !$(d)^, we consider agent 2. We assume that 2	has anonymous other-regarding 
preferences. That is, she cares about ‘others’ but not about any one agent more than any other. 
Her (other-regarding) conditional payoff 	!.	is given by: 
	!.0(d) = )Æ!0(d)A +
1 − Æ
% − 1
c!O(d)
A
OÜ0
,
6
A
(91) 
where Æ is a weighting parameter and B is the elasticity of substitution. So, her conditional 
payoff is a CES weighted average of her own payoff and the payoffs of others.  
With an agent’s conditional payoffs thus solved, the analysis of the CE and RP proceeds 
as normal, using the conditional payoffs to assess other-regarding EU.  
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A Worked Example 
Consider the ring graph shown in Figure 2.13:  
 
Figure 2.13 Ring Graph 
With a value function a(w) = ∑ ÇÉ¢£	§ − ih0,• , with Ç = 0.9, § = 20 and i = 10, this 
gives the allocations shown in Figure 2.14: 
 
Figure 2.14 Ring Graph with Payoffs 
Suppose that the link between Nodes 3 and 4 is vulnerable to structural risk, severing 
with probability M = 0.05. The link being severed yields the network graph in Figure 2.15: 
1
2
3 4
5
6
7
39
39
39 39
39
39
39
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Figure 2.15: Payoffs with One Link Severed 
Denote the state in which the link is not severed as State 1 and the state in which the link 
is severed as State 2. Then the payoff vectors are ¶6 = [39, 39, 39, 39, 39, 39, 39] and ¶8 =
[60, 37, 0, 0, 37, 60, 67].  
In State 1, social preferences do not apply since everyone has the same payoff. Thus, in 
evaluating conditional payoffs, we consider State 2. Let us suppose that Agent 1 has a self-
weighting parameter Æ6 = 0.9 and elasticity of substitution B = 0.5. Her payoff in State 2 is 
60. We propose that her conditional payoff is the following: 
!.6 = )Æ6!6
A +
1 − Æ6
% − 1
c!0
A
$
0;8
,
6
A
 
= ∂0.9(60)1.M +
0.1
6
(371.M + 01.M + 01.M + 371.M + 601.M + 671.M)∫
8
= 57.005 (92) 
 Suppose that Æ8 = 0.6, Æ{ = 0.8, Æ‡ = 0.7, ÆM = 0.75, Æ· = 0.6 , and ÆN = 0.5.  If we 
repeat the process of calculating conditional payoffs for the other agents, we find that the vector 
of conditional payoffs is ¶0 = [57.004, 37.133, 1.74, 3.915, 37.083, 48.480, 48.105]. To see 
the role of social preferences, consider the difference between !N (67) and !.N (48.105); Agent 
60
37
0 0
37
60
67
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7 has strong social preferences, placing half of her decision weight on the payoffs of others. 
Despite the fact that she has the highest categorical payoff, she has only the third-highest 
conditional payoff. Consider also the difference between !.{  (1.74) and !.‡  (3.915): the 
categorical payoffs are the same (0), but Agent 4 places greater weight on the payoffs of others 
than does Agent 3.  
With conditional payoffs solved, determining individual RPs and the NRP is 
straightforward. We denote the conditional CE of network graph w	 for individual 2  as 
q00(w).	The vector of conditional CEs is  
Q0 = (37.905, 36.751, 34.494, 33.600, 35.110, 34.698, 30.502) 
and the vector of conditional risk premia is  
0̨ = (2.145, 2.149, 2.556, 3.450, 3.790, 5.352, 9.898) 
To see the effect of social preferences on willingness to pay to offset risk, compare the vector 
of categorical CEs and RPs: 
Q = (40.050, 38.900, 36.578, 38.899, 39.923, 40.127) 
˛ = (0.000, 0.000, 0.472, 1.246, 0.001, 0.127, 0.273) 
The change in individual RPs is drastic when social preferences are introduced. Agent 1 
has a positive RP when using conditional payoffs, while her RP is zero under categorical 
payoffs since she is risk neutral.  
In this exercise we have assumed that risk aversion and inequality aversion (measured 
by the weight put on one’s own payoff) move in the same direction, with agent 7 being both 
the most risk-averse and the most inequality averse. An interesting exercise would be to 
examine what happens when these preferences move in opposite directions.  
 100 
2.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter we defined network risk, providing a taxonomy of the classes of risks 
faced by networks. We also defined the network risk premium, showing different methods by 
which the network risk premium could be measured. In the next chapter, we apply these 
concepts to a large-scale model of a transport network, demonstrating the network risk 
premium associated with multiple structural risks.  
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Appendix 2A: Mathematica Code 
Assignment Risk Only Example 
  
(*������� �����*)
(*�=
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
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� *)
(*����������*)
� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
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� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� (*��������� ������*)
� = ��������������[�]�
� = �����������[�]�
� = {-���� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���}� (*���� �������� ����������*)
����� = �� (*����� �� � ����������*)
� = �� (*���� �� � ����*)
(*������� ����� ��� ����������*)
�� = �������������������[�]� (*������ �� �������� ���������*)
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
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����������� �������� ��� ����������� �� ��� �������� ������
�� �� ������ ��� �������� �� �����*)
�� = ���������[�]�
����� = �*��� (*� ������ �������� ��� ���� �� ����
���������/�����������*)
�� = �����*������� (*��� ����� ��������� �� ��� �����������
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Structural Risk Only Example  
 
(*������� �����*)
(*�=
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� *)
� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
�� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
(* ��� ���� �� � �� ������� �� ��� ������ ���� ������� � ��� � *)
� = ��������������[�]�
�� = ��������������[��]�
� = ��
� = {-���� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���}�
����� = ��
� = ��
�� = �������������������[�]�
�� // �����������
��� = �������������������[��]�
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
�� = ���������[�]�
��� = ���������[��]�
����� = �*���
������ = �*����
�� = �����*�������
��� = �����*��������
����������� = �����[��� �]/��
������������ = �����[���� �]/��
�� = ����������� - ������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ���������������������[�]� (*������� �����*)
���� = ���������������������[��]�
���� = �� *���/�����[���� �]�
����� = ���*����/�����[����� �]�
������������ = �����[� → ������[������[{����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[�]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ������������� ���������� → ������
����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[��� ������������ → ��������������
���������� → ������ ����������� → ������
���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
(*������ �� ������� ��
�� ��� ��������� �������� ������� ��� ��������� �����������
�� �� �����*)
�� = (�����(� - �))/(� - �)�
��� = (������(� - �))/(� - �)�
�� = ���*�� + ���*����
�� = �� *(� - �)�(�/(� - �))
����� = �����[�� ����� �]�(�/���)
��� = �����/(��(�/���))
��� = (���*�� + ���*���)/�
��� = ���/���
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Valuation Risk Only Example 
 
(*������� �����*)
(*�=
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� *)
� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
� = ��������������[�]�
� = ��
� = {-���� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���}�
����� = ��
������ = ��
� = ��
��� = ����
�� = �������������������[�]�
�� // �����������
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
�� = ���������[�]�
����� = �*���
�� = �����*�������
��� = ������*�������
����������� = �����[��� �]�
������������ = �����[���� �]�
�� = ����������� - ������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ���������������������[�]� (*������� �����*)
���� = �� *���/�����[���� �]�
����� = ���*���/�����[���� �]�
������������ = �����[� → ������[������[{����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[�]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ������������� ���������� → ������
����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ��������������
���������� → ������ ����������� → ������
���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = (�����(� - �))/(� - �)�
��� = (������(� - �))/(� - �)�
�� = ���*�� + ���*����
�� = �� *(� - �)�(�/(� - �))
����� = �����[�� ����� �]�(�/���)�
��� = �����/(��(�/���))
��� = (���*�� + ���*���)/�
��� = ���/���
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Assignment and Structural Risk Example 
 
� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
�� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
� = ��������������[�]�
�� = ��������������[��]�
� = ��
� = {-���� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���}�
����� = ��
� = ��
� = �� (*������ �� ������ �� ��� �����*)
�� = �������������������[�]�
�� // �����������
��� = �������������������[��]�
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
������� = ������� - ��������������[�]�
�� = ���������[�]�
��� = ���������[��]�
����� = �*���
������ = �*����
�� = �����*�������
��� = �����*��������
����������� = �����[��� �]/��
������������ = �����[���� �]/��
�� = ����������� - ������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ���������������������[�]� (*������� �����*)
���� = ���������������������[��]�
���� = �� *���/�����[���� �]�
����� = ���*����/�����[����� �]�
(*�������������=�����[�→������[������[{�}�������]�������]�
{�������������[�����[�]]}]�
�������������=�����[�→������[������[{����[[�]]}������]������]�
{�������������[�����[�]]}]�
������������=�����[{�������������}�{�������������}]�*)
������������ = �����[� → ������[������[{����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[�]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
(*������[������[{���}�{������������}]�{�������������[�����[�]]}]]*)
(*������������=�����[�→������[����[[�]]�{���}������]������]*)
� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ������������� ���������� → ������
����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[��� ������������ → �������������� ���������� → ������
����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
(*����������� ���������� ��������� ��� ��������� �����������*)
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
�� = {���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���}
����� = �����[�� ����� �]�(�/���)
��� = �����/(��(�/���))
��� = (���*�� + ���*���)/�
��� = ���/���
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Valuation and Assignment Risk Example 
  
(*������� �����*)
(*�=
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� *)
(*����������*)
� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
� = ��������������[�]�
� = ��
� = {-���� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���}� (*���� �������� ����������*)
����� = ��
������ = �� (*����� �� � ����������*)
� = �� (*���� �� � ����*)
��� = ����
(*������� ����� ��� ����������*)
�� = �������������������[�]�
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
�� = ���������[�]�
����� = �*���
�� = �����*�������
��� = ������*�������
����������� = �����[��� �]/��
������������ = �����[���� �]/��
�� = ����������� - ������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ���������������������[�]� (*������� �����*)
���� = �� *���/�����[���� �]�
����� = ���*���/�����[���� �]�
������������ = �����[� → ������[������[{����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[�]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]�
{�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ������������� ���������� → ������
����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ��������������
���������� → ������ ����������� → ������
���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
(*����������� ���������� ��������� ��� ��������� �����������*)
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
��� =
(�����[�����(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/� +
�����[������(� - �[[�]])/(� - �[[�]])� �]/�)/��
��� = (���*(� - �[[�]]))�(�/(� - �[[�]]))�
�� = {���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���}
����� = �����[�� ����� �]�(�/���)
��� = �����/(��(�/���))
��� = (���*�� + ���*���)/�
��� = ���/���
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(*������� �����*)
(*�=
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� *)
� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
�� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
�� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
�� =
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � � �
�
� = ��������������[�]�
�� = ��������������[��]�
�� = ��������������[��]�
�� = ��������������[��]�
� = ��
� = {-���� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���}�
����� = ��
� = ��
��� = ����
�� = �������������������[�]�
�� // �����������
��� = �������������������[��]�
��� = �������������������[��]�
��� = �������������������[��]�
������ = ������ - ��������������[�]�
������� = ������� - ��������������[�]�
������� = ������� - ��������������[�]�
������� = ������� - ��������������[�]�
�� = ���������[�]�
��� = ���������[��]�
��� = ���������[��]�
��� = ���������[��]�
����� = �*���
������ = �*����
������ = �*����
������ = �*����
�� = �����*�������
��� = �����*��������
��� = �����*��������
��� = �����*��������
����������� = �����[��� �]/��
������������ = �����[���� �]/��
������������ = �����[���� �]/��
������������ = �����[���� �]/��
�� = ����������� - ������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ������������ - �������
��� = ���������������������[�]� (*������� �����*)
���� = ���������������������[��]�
���� = ���������������������[��]�
���� = ���������������������[��]�
���� = �� *���/�����[���� �]�
����� = ���*����/�����[����� �]�
����� = ���*����/�����[����� �]�
����� = ���*����/�����[����� �]�
������������ = �����[� → ������[������[{����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]� {�� �����������[�����[�]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]� {�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]� {�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
������������� = �����[� → ������[������[{�����[[�]]}� �����]� �����]� {�� �����������[�����[��]]}]�
� = ��������������[�� ������������ → ������������� ���������� → ������ ����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[��� ������������ → �������������� ���������� → ������ ����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[��� ������������ → �������������� ���������� → ������ ����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = ��������������[��� ������������ → �������������� ���������� → ������ ����������� → ������ ���������������� → ���������[������� ����]�
����������� → �������������������]
�� = (�����(� - �))/(� - �)�
��� = (������(� - �))/(� - �)�
��� = (������(� - �))/(� - �)�
��� = (������(� - �))/(� - �)�
�� = ����*�� + ����*��� + ����*��� + ����*����
�� = �� *(� - �)�(�/(� - �))
����� = �����[�� ����� �]�(�/���)
��� = �����/(��(�/���))
��� = (����*�� + ����*��� + ����*��� + ����*���)/�
��� = ���/���
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Chapter 3: Transport Networks 
3.1: Introduction 
Transport networks have a number of desirable properties to illustrate the application of 
the approach to the measurement of network risk proposed in this thesis.  Transport networks 
are exogenous and (mostly) fixed network graphs, and a powerful array of tools for analysis of 
these networks already exists in the computer science and transport engineering literature. 
Further, the prominence of transport networks in computer science has meant that there is a 
wide variety of well-documented real-world networks available for empirical study.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our immediate purposes, there are natural 
incidences of structural risks. On March 30th, 2017, a fire underneath an overpass of the I-85 
highway in Atlanta caused the collapse of a section of one of the busiest highways in North 
America. The collapse of the I-85 resulted in considerable traffic delays across the city of 
Atlanta, as traffic from the I-85 was diverted to other roads and congestion was increased.  
Beginning with LeBlanc et al (1975), a modified version of the town of Sioux Falls, in 
South Dakota, in the United States, shown in Figure 3.3, has been a popular setting for serious 
simulation case studies in transport science. In part this is due to the size of the network: the 
network is small enough to be tractable, but big enough not to be a ‘toy’ network. We study 
the properties of the network risk premium in the context of the Sioux Falls network.  
The network risk premium (NRP) developed in Chapter 2 can be thought of as a measure 
of the collective willingness to pay to offset a risk faced by the network. In this sense, it can be 
used to aid in the cost-benefit analysis of potential infrastructure projects.  
An important insight is the idea of additional, seemingly-redundant roads acting as a form 
of risk management closest in nature to self-insurance. In the case of the I-85 collapse, this was 
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illustrated by the rerouting of traffic onto the nearby State Road 13 (the Buford Highway), a 
road that runs parallel to the affected portion of the I-85. While the Buford Highway 
experienced major congestion as a result of the collapse, its seemingly-redundant presence 
mitigated far worse potential congestion onto surface roads such as Piedmont Road, which are 
not part of the highway network. 
In Chapter 2 we discussed methods of measuring risk and risk aversion in networks. We 
focused in particular on the network certainty equivalent (NCE) and the network risk premium 
(NRP). In this chapter we apply these concepts of risk measurement to a large-scale, realistic 
model. We study a network graph with multiple structural risks representing road closures, and 
evaluate risk management measures that would mitigate or prevent these risks. The goal is to 
provide tools for the rigorous cost-benefit analysis of risk management in networks, and an 
example of how one might use those tools. Agents in our model consider a risk management 
measure that reduces the probability of collapse to zero. Our interest is in measuring the 
network’s collective willingness to pay (CWTP) for a risk management measure. 
Section 3.2 surveys the literature on transport networks. Section 3.3 outlines the model 
of solving travel times and payoffs. Section 3.4 examines a number of comparative statics of 
CWTP using a worked example based on the Sioux Falls traffic network. Section 3.5 concludes 
and notes future research directions.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 The Braess Paradox 
A simple but well-known example of a transport network is that used in the illustration 
of the Braess Paradox (Steinberg and Zangwill (1983), Steinberg and Stone (1988)). The 
Braess Paradox concerns the comparison of total travel time between two points (1 and 2) in 
the network graphs shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Drivers wish to travel from point 1 to 
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point 2 in the minimum possible amount of time, and do so by following one of the directed 
paths through nodes 3 and 4. The paradox states that the addition of an additional link (roadway) 
in Figure 3.2 can, under certain circumstances, increase the total travel time compared to 
Figure 3.1 if the travel time on some of the links, and not on the other, depends upon the number 
of cars on the road represented by the link.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To illustrate, consider the situation where travelling from 1 to 3, and from 4 to 2, takes 
R/100 minutes, where R is the number of cars on the path, and where travelling from 1 to 4, 
and from 3 to 2, takes 45 minutes. In Figure 3.1 there are two possible paths from 1 to 2: 1 →
3 → 2, and 1 → 4 → 2. The travel time will be the same on each of these two paths, namely 
0
811
+ 45, where 2	is the total number of cars.36 If travel times were different, drivers would 
deviate to the path with a lower travel time. For all values of 2, total travel time is 
0T
811
+ 452. 
If 2 ≤ 4500, no travel-time-minimizing driver will take the path 1 → 4, since the path 1 → 3 
always has a shorter drive time. However, they will cross over from 3 to 4, since the path 4 →
 
36 Not to be confused with	R, which represents only the number of cars on a given path. 
1
2
3
4
Figure 3.1 Transport Network 
with cross-link 
 
1
2
3 4
Figure 3.2 Transport Network with 
no cross-link 
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	2 always has a shorter drive than 3 → 2. The travel time is thus 
0
611
+
0
611
=
0
M1
 for all drivers, 
so total travel time is 
0T
M1
. If 4500 < 2 ≤ 9000, then exactly 4500 drivers will take the path 
from 1 → 3, with the remainder taking 1 → 4.	Similarly, exactly 4500 drivers will take the path 
from 4 → 2, with 4500 − 26‡ drivers crossing from 3 to 4, where 26‡ is the number of drivers 
taking the path 1 → 4. The travel time is thus exactly 90 minutes for all drivers. Total travel 
time is thus 902. If 2 > 9000, no drivers will cross from 3 to 4, since doing so can only 
increase their travel time, and 
0
8
 drivers will take each of the 1 → 3 → 2	and 1 → 4 → 2 paths. 
Travel time is 45 +
0
811
. In summary, for 2 < 3000, the cross-link decreases the total travel 
time. For 3000 < 2 < 9000, the cross-link increases the total travel time. For 2 ≥ 9000, the 
total travel time is unchanged.  
Rapoport et al (2009) studied the Braess paradox in an experimental setting. They found 
that “the equilibrium solution accounts very accurately for the mean route choices [in the 
experiments]” (p.563). This is similar to the results of Mak, Gisches and Rapoport (2015), who 
studied a transport network with six origin nodes and four destination nodes, and found that 
participants’ behavior rapidly converged to the predicted equilibrium outcome.  
3.2.2 Wardopian Equilibrium and Travel Time 
The first model solving optimal travel times was Wardrop (1953), for which the term 
‘Wardropian equilibrium’ was coined. The Wardropian model, as summarized by Ferris, 
Meeraus and Rutherford (1999, p.671) “ensures that if there is a positive flow of commodity Í 
along arc {ºΩ} , then the corresponding time to deliver that commodity is minimized.” 
Subsequent studies of Wardropian equilibrium included Irwin et al. (1961), Bertsekas and 
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Gafni (1982), Marcotte and Marquis (1992), Friesz et al. (1992), Chiou (2005), Josefsson and 
Patriksson (2007), Luathep et al. (2011) and Bar-Gera et al. (2013).37   
Suwansirikul, Friesz and Tobin (1987) decomposed the Wardropian minimization 
problem into interacting subproblems, with one subproblem corresponding to one arc of the 
network. These problems were solved simultaneously using a solution framework defined by 
a one-dimensional search routine.   
One of the main applications of Wardropian models has been in the study of optimal use 
of toll roads to reduce congestion. Ban, Ferris, Tang and Lu (2013) use the Deng and Ferris 
(2009) algorithm to place strategic tolling zones in the Sioux Falls network to control emissions. 
Kaddoura and Kickhöfer (2014) attempted to calculate optimal road tolls by investigating the 
marginal congestion costs imposed by users on other users at an agent-based level, modelling 
changes in social welfare with and without congestion pricing.  
Lou, Yin and Lawphongpanich (2010) and Wu, Yin and Lawphongpanich (2011) argue 
that users do not necessarily choose the shortest or cheapest route when doing so does not 
reduce their travel times by a significant amount, meaning that conventional congestion pricing 
strategies may not work as expected, especially in the presence of alternative transportation 
methods. These studies do not offer a behavioral explanation for this claim: a possible 
explanation is that participants are risk-averse and see the route that they already know as 
having a lower variance of travel time.   
 
37 One of the more novel applications is Dell (2015), who uses a network model of trafficking routes to show that ‘victories’ 
in the drug war divert drug traffic, increasing violence along alternative drug routes. In this model, drug lords face a global 
optimization decision, choosing a path across a congested network. Dell (2015) uses a Wardropian model, but does not 
account for risk attitudes. 
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3.2.3 Supply Chain Risk Management 
Arguably the main application of transport networks in the literature is in supply chain 
risk management (SCRM). A significant literature exists addressing SCRM. Ho, Zheng, Yildiz 
and Talluri (2015, p.5035-5036) define supply chain risk as “the likelihood and impact of 
unexpected macro and/or micro level events or conditions that adversely influence any part of 
a supply chain leading to operational, tactical, or strategic level failures or irregularities” and 
SCRM as “an inter-organizational collaborative endeavour utilizing quantitative and 
qualitative risk management methodologies to identify, evaluate, mitigate, and monitor 
unexpected macro and micro level events or conditions, which might adversely impact any part 
of a supply chain.” Ho et al. (2015, p.5055) note that “it would be worthwhile to quantify the 
benefits and costs of SCRM.” This quantification would be a valuable application of the CWTP 
for risk management in transport networks.  
Most of the literature on SCRM takes a general risk management approach, either 
examining a specific problem or, as in the case of Harland, Brenchley and Walker (2003), 
taking a “holistic view” of supply chain risk assessment and management. However, several of 
these studies identify specific supply chain risks (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008), or give broad 
classes of supply chain risks (Hallikas et al., 2004; Trkman and McCormack, 2009). Others 
examine particular case studies (Norman and Jansson, 2004; Thun and Müller, 2010; Thun and 
Hoenig, 2011).  
Brewer and Plott (1996) explore the closely-related back-haul problem, in which (p.13) 
“using equipment causes its relocation, and it must be relocated before it can be used again.” 
They perform laboratory experiments, constructing a computerized procurement auction 
capable of handling back-haul and similar problems in the transportation of homogeneous 
goods when information about seller costs is limited and the number of competing sellers is 
limited. 
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3.3 Model 
3.3.1 Sioux Falls 
The traffic network of Sioux Falls is shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3: Map of Sioux Falls, SD (Google Maps) 
In our model, some links are vulnerable to collapse with some probability. Collapse 
events are assumed to be independent but may occur with different probabilities.38 These 
vulnerabilities, using structural risk, constitute a compound lottery.  
 
38 A possible future direction is the case where the risks of collapse are not independent, such as in the case of a 
natural disaster. 
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Figure 3.4: LeBlanc (1975) network map of Sioux Falls 
For illustrative purposes, we use the logically equivalent graph shown in Figure 3.5: 
 
Figure 3.5: Network Map (all links intact) 
An agent’s type is her origin-destination pair. We assume the distribution of agent types 
used by LeBlanc et al (1975, p.316). In this model there are 3604 total agents.  
In order to determine a link’s baseline traffic capacity, we use the data used by Ferris, 
Meeraus and Rutherford (1999). Their model for the time taken to traverse a particular link Æ 
is (p.673) 
 115 
iŒ(◊Œ) = SŒ + TŒ U
◊Œ
VŒ
W
‡
(93) 
where iŒ	denotes the “cost” of a link (effectively the travel time), ◊Œ	denotes the flow along arc 
Æ, VŒ is the baseline capacity of arc Æ, and SŒ and TŒ	are constants. An agent’s problem is to 
choose a path to minimize her travel time, given the choices of others.  
 Tables showing both of these sets of parameters are shown in the appendix of this chapter. 
We use the Wardropian equilibrium solution code of Ferris, Meeraus and Rutherford (1999), 
with slight modifications, to solve for individual travel time, measured in minutes.  
Individual agents are assumed to choose the route that minimizes their travel time, given 
the parameters of the network and the route choices of other agents. The GAMS code (Brooke, 
Kendrick and Meeraus, 1988) for the Ferris, Meeraus and Rutherford (1999) solution are 
shown in Appendix 3A. Matrices showing the travel time for agents of each type and each state 
are shown in Appendix 3B to this chapter.  
We then introduce structural risk into the model. We designate three links as vulnerable 
to collapse with identical39 and independent probabilities. The vulnerable links are {1,2},
{10,11},	 and {22,23}. With three vulnerable links, there are 2{ = 8 possible states of the 
world. The various states of the world, and the condition of the three links in each, are shown 
in Appendix 3B.  
3.3.2 Primitives 
We assume that each individual has a total of 480 minutes, or 8 hours, to spend at their 
destination. The time an agent spends at her destination is thus 480 minutes minus her travel 
time. Further, we assume that each minute at the destination is worth $1. This is an arbitrary 
 
39 The assumption of identical probabilities is not critical to the model, and can be relaxed.  
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amount that could be varied to reflect the opportunity cost of time to an individual, as proxied, 
for example, by their wage. So an agent’s payoff is an amount of dollars equal to the number 
of minutes she spends at her destination. For example, an agent travelling from Node 1 to Node 
7 has a travel time of 42.87 minutes. Her time spent at her destination is 480 − 42.87 =
437.13 minutes, and her payoff is therefore $437.13. 
We assume that the probability of collapse for each of the vulnerable links is 0.05. 
We assume that all agents have EUT preferences with CRRA, of the form 
J0(!) =
!6y=¢
1 − D0
	 (94) 
where D0	is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We assume that D0 is drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 1. This assumption means that we ignore the possibility of risk-
loving individuals. More importantly, we ignore the possibility of individuals with non-EUT 
preferences such as RDU. Incorporation of these risk attitudes would be an important extension, 
but the exclusive use of EUT preferences is sufficient for the purpose of illustrating the CWTP.  
3.4 Results 
In this section we examine the CWTP for the compound lottery associated with the 
vulnerable links, along with the set of individual risk premia, using a variety of measures. We 
first show different methods of measuring CWTP: 
1. Aggregate Individual WTP 
2. Measures Based on Voting 
3. Measured Based on Social Welfare Functions 
We then explore some comparative statics on CWTP: 
1. What happens when risk management is only partial? 
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2. What happens when risk management occurs in the form of an additional link? 
3.4.1 The ‘Baseline’ Case: Aggregate WTP 
The simplest method of finding the CWTP is simply to sum up the individual WTPs for 
the risk management measure. Here we are contemplating a risk management measure that will 
reduce the probability of collapse for all vulnerable links to zero, making the network w non-
risky. We denote this non-risky network as w.. Individual WTP is given by the equivalent 
allocation, described in Section 2.6.3, comparing w and w..	For example, consider agent 42, 
who has origin node 1 and destination node 10. Her payoff vector is  
¶‡8 = ($449.13, $446.77, $413.49, $441.33, $409.64, $438.24, $385.45, $375.18) . 
Her coefficient of relative risk aversion, D = 0.0734, implying relatively low risk aversion. 
Her EU is 308.53, yielding a CE of $446.78. Her WTP for the risk management measure is 
thus $449.13 − $446.78 = $2.35. While this may seem like a relatively small WTP, the 
probabilities of collapse are small, and this is effectively WTP per day for the risk management 
measure. If Rome was not build in a day, we would not expect the collapse of travel routes in 
Sioux Falls to be repaired in a day.  
We refer to the sum of individual equivalent allocations as the aggregate equivalent 
allocation. 
Formally, the aggregate equivalent allocation Γ(w, w.) is given by the sum of individual 
equivalent allocations ⁄0(w, w.): 
Γ(w) = c⁄0(
$
0;6
w, w.) = c]q0(w.) − q0(w)^
$
0;6
(95) 
Since w.  is a non-risky network, the CE for individual 2  is equal to her payoff 
!0(w.).	Hence, we substitute !0(w.) into (90): 
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c]!0(w.) − q0(w)^ ≡ %fi(w.) −cq0(w)
$
0;6
$
0;6
(96) 
In our example, Γ(w, w.) = $3439.81. This can be interpreted as follows: collectively, 
the members of the network w would be willing to pay $3439.81.42 to guarantee that the 
vulnerable links remain intact for one day. 
This measure of CWTP is similar to the network risk premium (denoted Π(w)) discussed 
in Chapter 2, substituting the NEV of w. for the NEV of w, and using the sum of individual CEs 
as the NCE q(w). It can also be viewed as the sum of the NRP and the difference in NEVs: 
X‚Rs = Π(w) + ]fi(w.) − fi(w)^ = ]fi(w) − q(w)^ + ]fi(w.) − fi(w)^ = fi(w.) − q(w)(97) 
Since w. is non-risky, fi(w.) = q(w.), and so (92) becomes 
X‚Rs = q(w.) − q(w) (98)
Hence aggregate equivalent allocation is equal to the difference in NCEs when one of the 
networks being compared is non-risky.  
3.4.2 Voting-Based Measures 
In this approach to finding CWTP we assume that a price for the risk management 
measure is proposed, along with a distribution of the cost paid by each member of the network. 
The method by which this distribution is determined is called the contribution scheme. If the 
price an agent would be required to pay is less than their WTP, then they vote “Yes,” if not, 
they vote “No.” We say that a price is accepted if a majority of agents vote “Yes.” The CWTP 
is the highest acceptable price.  
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All Pay Equally 
In this contribution scheme all agents pay the same price. Letting i denote the cost of the 
risk management measure, this means that each agent pays 
Õ
$
. The CWTP should then be the 
WTP for the median agent in terms of individual WTP.  
With our specifications the median individual WTP is $0.62. Our predicted CWTP is 
$0.62 × 3604 = $2222.55. Given the All Pay Equally contribution scheme, this price indeed 
splits the vote 1802-1802. Decreasing the price of the measure by $1 to $2221.55 gives a vote 
margin of 1803-1801.  
Pay Proportionally to Benefit 
Before determining how much each individual has to pay under a Pay Proportionally to 
Benefit contribution scheme, one must define exactly what constitutes a “benefit.” We examine 
four different categories of benefit: percentage gain in EV, percentage gain in CE, absolute 
gain in EV, and absolute gain in CE. Under each of these categories, agent º ’s required 
contribution is  
PO =
ØO
∑ Ø0
$
0;6
(Π) (99) 
where ØO is the benefit that individual º receives from the risk management measure, and Π is 
the price of the risk management measure.  
For example, consider agent 42. Her CE of the lottery is $446.78, while under the risk 
management measure her certain payoff is $449.13. Using the “absolute gain in CE” metric, 
her benefit Ø‡8 = 1.00527. Her required contribution is  
P‡8 =
1.00527
∑ Ø0
$
0;6
(Π) =
1.00527
3611.743
(Π) = 0.000278Π (100) 
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Agent 42 will vote in favor of any risk management measure where her required contribution 
is less than her WTP: $449.13 − $446.78 = $2.35. That is, she will vote in favor of a risk 
management measure if its price is less than Π‡8
∗ =
$8.{M
1.1118Nfl
= $8443.1222.  
The CWTP for each category is the Π such that a simple majority of agents will vote in 
favor of it. The CWTPs for each category are shown in Table 3.1. The CWTP based on 
percentage gains in CE and EV are the same, and the CWTP based on absolute gain from CE 
is equal to the baseline.  
Table 3.1: CWTP by Benefit Category 
Benefit Category CWTP 
Percentage gain from EV $2224.30 
Percentage gain from CE $2224.30 
Absolute gain from EV $3423.70 
Absolute gain from CE $3489.80 
A possible third contribution mechanism is a toll road, where agents pay if and only if 
they use the link in question. Toll roads have been extensively studied in the transport literature, 
as shown in Section 3.2.2, but these studies do not cover risk preferences. The study of the 
change in CWTP from toll-funded contribution schemes would be a particularly interesting 
extension to this thesis.  
3.4.3 Welfare-Based Measures 
Next, we measure CWTP using a variety of social welfare functions. A social welfare 
function is used to determine the NCE for the risky network w	and for the riskless network w.. 
The CWTP is the difference between NCEs, multiplied by 3604, that is, the number of agents. 
In each case, the inputs to the social welfare function are individual CEs.  
Utilitarian Welfare 
The NCE using a utilitarian social welfare function is simply the sum of individual CEs: 
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q(w) = ;(w) =
1
%
cq0(w)
$
0;6
(101) 
In our model q(w) = $453.65  and q(w.) = $454.60 . The CWTP is 3604 × ($454.60 −
453.65) = 3604($0.95) = $3439.81. This is equal to the baseline measure of WTP, that is, 
the sum of individual WTPs.  
Rawlsian Welfare 
The NCE using a Rawlsian welfare function is evaluated by finding the minimum CE for 
the network. For w, this is q(w) = $420.75, the CE of agent 1776, who has origin 13 and 
destination 19, with coefficient of relative risk aversion D = 0.8067. For w., this is q(w.) =
$422.90, which once again is the CE of agent 1776, as well as agents 1775 and 1777, who 
have the same payoff as agent 1776 in the riskless state. The CWTP is 3604($422.90 −
$420.75) = 3604($2.16) = $7776.92.  
CES Welfare 
The NCE using a CES social welfare function is evaluated as follows: 
q(w) = )
1
%
c]q0(w)^
A
	
$
0;6
,
6
A
(102) 
where B measures the elasticity of substitution of individual CEs. The greater B is, the more 
interchangeable individual CEs are. Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between B and CWTP:40  
 
40 CES social welfare functions cannot have B = 0, so we evaluate B = ±0.00000001 to approximate the value 
of 0.  
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Figure 3.6: CWTP by elasticity of substitution of individual WTP 
The graph shown in Figure 3.6 appears to be linear, but is in fact slightly concave. The 
difference in CWTP going from B = −5 to −4.8 is -$14.25, while the difference in CWTP 
going from B = 4.8 to 5 is -$12.23.  
Not shown on the graph are “extreme” values of B = ±100. When B = −100,	CWTP is 
$7652.77 – approaching the maximum CWTP as found by basing CWTP on a Rawlsian 
welfare function. When B = 100, CWTP is $867.07. 
When B = 1, the CWTP is, as expected, the same as the baseline measure: $3439.81.  
3.4.4 Partial Risk Management 
Next we consider what happens to CWTP in cases where the risk management measure 
does not reduce the probability of collapse for all links to 0. The cases we consider are:  
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1. What if the risk management measure can cover only one link? 
2. What if the risk management measure does not reduce the probability of collapse 
to 0, but some non-zero, but still reduced, probability? 
3. What if the risk management measure does not reduce the probability of collapse 
at all, but the collapse is merely to half-capacity rather than complete? 
Cases (2) and (3) reflect measures of loss prevention and loss control, respectively.  
Risk Management for a Single Link 
To evaluate WTP to protect a single link 2 from collapse, we compare the NCEs for the 
lotteries where M0 = 0 and where M0 = 0.05.	We assume that the probability of collapse for 
the other two links remains as 0.05. The baseline NCE is, as before, $453.65.  
If the probability of collapse for {1,2} is reduced to 0, the NCE for the new graph is 
$453.74. The CWTP is thus ($453.74 − $453.65)(3604) = $333.89 . This should be 
interpreted to mean that the members of the network would collectively be willing to pay 
$333.89 to reduce the probability of collapse of link {1,2} to 0.  
The NCE for the graph where the probability of collapse for {10,11} is reduced to 0 is 
$454.32. The CWTP is thus ($454.32 − $453.65)(3604) = $2429.22. The NCE for the 
graph where the probability of collapse for {22,23} is reduced to 0 is $453.87. The CWTP is 
thus ($453.87 − $453.65)(3604) = $807.43. 
The sum of these three CWTPs is $3570.53. This exceeds the baseline measure of CWTP 
to reduce the probability of collapse for all three links to 0, that is, $3439.81.  
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Reduction of Probability to Non-Zero Positive Amount 
We evaluate WTP by difference in NCEs using CES welfare with B = 1 (i.e. perfect 
substitutes). The CWTP to reduce the risk of link collapses to 0 in this measure is the baseline 
level of $3439.81. The results are shown in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: CWTP by Probability Reduction 
Reduced Probability of Collapse Collective Willingness to Pay 
0.01 $2772.27 
0.005 $3137.30 
0.001 $3373.51 
0.0001 $3433.18 
0.00001 $3439.15 
0 $3439.81 
We do not see in Table 3.2 a significant jump in CWTP moving from a very low 
probability to zero probability. Testing whether this absence of a ‘certainty premium’ occurs 
in an experimental laboratory setting would be an interesting expansion to this work. 
Reduction of Capacity to Half with Certainty 
We consider a risk management measure that, instead of reducing the risk of collapse to 
zero, reduces road capacity to half with certainty. That is, in the Ferris, Meeraus and Rutherford 
(1999) model, we reduce V to Z
8
	. This could be thought of as performing maintenance on half 
the roadway by closing the other half.  
With M = 0.05 , this risk management measure has a negative CWTP. This is not 
surprising, given the relatively low probability of collapse. An agent with extra congestion 
from road maintenance may well think that they would be willing to pay to get rid of the 
roadwork and clear the path.  
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A logical question is at what probability of collapse does the network’s CWTP become 
positive. The answer is around M = 0.24 for all vulnerable links.41  
3.4.5 Risk Management by Additional Link 
Suppose now that we consider risk management in the form of an additional link. 
Specifically, we suppose that a tunnel between Nodes 1 and 24 is added to the traffic network, 
connecting two of the opposing corners. To do this, we make several strong parametric 
assumptions, intended to be sufficient for illustrative purposes rather than for their realism.   
We assume that the link between 1 and 24 has the following parametric values: S{6,8‡} =
5, T{6,8‡} = 100,V{6,8‡} = 20.	Applying these values in the Ferris, Meeraus and Rutherford 
(1999) Wardropian equilibrium solution calculation, we find that in State 1, the state where no 
links collapse, average travel time is reduced by 2.86 minutes. The distribution of reductions 
in travel time is shown in Figure 3.7.  
 
41 A possible extension would be to use different probabilities for each vulnerable link.  
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Figure 3.7: Reduction in Travel Time due to Tunnel (no collapses) 
Figure 3.7 shows that a significant number of agents (654, over 1/6 of the total agents) 
are barely affected one way or the other by the tunnel, with travel time being reduced by less 
than one minute.42 There are some outliers who have their travel time reduced significantly, by 
as much as 27.5 minutes.  
A drastically different outcome is shown when comparing reduction in travel time in 
State 8, the state where all vulnerable links collapse. The average change resulting from the 
 
42 Specifically, between an increase of 0.34	minutes (20 seconds) and a decrease of 0.62 minutes (37.2 seconds) 
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tunnel in this state of the world is an increase in travel time of 32.15 minutes.43 The distribution 
of reductions in travel time is shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8: Reduction of Travel Time due to Tunnel (All Vulnerable Links Collapse) 
Despite the fact that the tunnel increases the average travel time in State 8, and that a 
significant number of drivers experience an increase in travel time of over an hour in this state, 
the CWTP for the tunnel is $4277. However, 1690 people, slightly less than half the population, 
have a negative WTP and thus are made worse off by the introduction of the tunnel.  
The characteristics of which types are on average winners or losers as a result of the 
tunnel is an area that requires further study. An interesting case comes from observing agents 
of type {10,11}. Some of these agents have negative WTP while others have positive WTP, 
 
43 In this state of the world, an additional link has the effect of increasing total travel time, as it does in the Braess 
Paradox.  
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but all have the same travel time. The only difference between them is risk aversion. Further 
examination of the winners and losers from the addition of a tunnel would be an important 
extension.  
3.5 Conclusions and Future Directions 
In this chapter we demonstrated various methods of measuring CWTP for risk 
management in a transport network. In the comparative statics we found that the total CWTP 
to reduce the risk of collapse for all three vulnerable links to 0 was less than the sum of the 
CWTP to reduce the risk of collapse for each link. In considering partial loss prevention 
measures, in which the probability of collapse was reduced to a smaller but non-zero amount, 
we did not find evidence of a “certainty premium,” though this appears to be a situation in 
which behavior in an experimental setting may differ from theoretical predictions. When 
considering loss control measures, where link capacity was reduced to half with certainty, we 
found that the probability of collapse would need to increase from 0.05 to 0.24 for the CWTP 
to become non-negative.  
An obvious extension is the incorporation of social preferences. However, doing so 
requires a number of parametric assumptions concerning the structure of agents’ social 
preferences. Another extension is to examine the case where risk-averse drivers make route 
choices ex ante rather than ex post. A third extension would be to apply the measures of CWTP 
to specific questions of supply chain risk management (SCRM), quantifying the benefits and 
costs of various SCRM measures. A fourth extension would be further examining the winners 
and losers from an additional link such as a tunnel.  
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Appendix 3A: GAMS Code  
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Appendix 3B: Parameters and Result Tables 
Trips Matrix (LeBlanc et al., 1975) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 0 1 1 5 2 3 5 8 5 13 5 2 5 3 5 5 4 1 3 3 1 4 3 1
2 1 0 1 2 1 4 2 4 2 6 2 1 3 1 1 4 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
3 1 1 0 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
4 5 2 2 0 5 4 4 7 7 12 14 6 6 5 5 8 5 1 2 3 2 4 5 2
5 2 1 1 5 0 2 2 5 8 10 5 2 2 1 2 5 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 0
6 3 4 3 4 2 0 4 8 4 8 4 2 2 1 2 9 5 1 2 3 1 2 1 1
7 5 2 1 4 2 4 0 10 6 19 5 7 4 2 5 14 10 2 4 5 2 5 2 1
8 8 4 2 7 5 8 10 0 8 16 8 6 6 4 6 22 14 3 7 9 4 5 3 2
9 5 2 1 7 8 4 6 8 0 28 14 6 6 6 9 14 9 2 4 6 3 7 5 2
10 13 6 3 12 10 8 19 16 28 0 40 20 19 21 40 44 39 7 18 25 12 26 18 8
11 5 2 3 14 5 4 5 8 14 39 0 14 10 16 14 14 10 1 4 6 4 11 13 6
12 2 1 2 6 2 2 7 6 6 20 14 0 13 7 7 7 6 2 3 4 3 7 7 5
13 5 3 1 6 2 2 4 6 6 19 10 13 0 6 7 6 5 1 3 6 6 13 8 8
14 3 1 1 5 1 1 2 4 6 21 16 7 6 0 13 7 7 1 3 5 4 12 11 4
15 5 1 1 5 2 2 5 6 9 40 14 7 7 13 0 12 15 2 8 11 8 26 10 4
16 5 4 2 8 5 9 14 22 14 44 14 7 6 7 12 0 28 5 13 16 6 12 5 3
17 4 2 1 5 2 5 10 14 9 39 10 6 5 7 15 28 0 6 17 17 6 17 6 3
18 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 3 2 7 2 2 1 1 2 5 6 0 3 4 1 3 1 0
19 3 1 0 2 1 2 4 7 4 18 4 3 3 3 8 13 17 3 0 12 4 12 3 1
20 3 1 0 3 1 3 5 9 6 25 6 5 6 5 11 16 17 4 12 0 12 24 7 4
21 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 3 12 4 3 6 4 8 6 6 1 4 12 0 18 7 5
22 4 1 1 4 2 2 5 5 7 26 11 7 13 12 26 12 17 3 12 24 18 0 21 11
23 3 0 1 5 1 1 2 3 5 18 13 7 8 11 10 5 6 1 3 7 7 21 0 7
24 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 2 8 6 5 7 4 4 3 3 0 1 4 5 11 7 0
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Link Capacities (Ferris, Meeraus and Rutherford, 1999) 
  
Link Capacity
1,2 25.9
1,3 23.4
2,6 4.95
3,4 17.11
3,12 23.4
4,5 17.78
4,11 4.91
5,6 4.94
5,9 10
6,8 4.89
7,8 7.84
7,18 23.4
8,9 5.05
8,16 5.05
9,10 13.92
10,11 10
10,15 13.51
10,16 5.13
10,17 4.99
11,12 4.91
11,14 4.88
12,13 25.9
13,24 5.09
14,15 5.13
14,23 4.92
15,19 15.65
15,22 10.32
16,17 5.23
16,18 19.68
17,19 4.82
18,20 23.4
19,20 5
20,21 5.06
20,22 5.08
21,22 5.23
21,24 4.89
22,23 5
23,24 5
 133 
 
States of the World 
State of the World Link 1-2 Link 10-11 Link 22-23
1 Intact Intact Intact
2 Severed Intact Intact
3 Intact Severed Intact
4 Intact Intact Severed
5 Severed Severed Intact
6 Severed Intact Severed
7 Intact Severed Severed
8 Severed Severed Severed
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State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 
State 5 State 6 State 7 State 8 
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Travel Times (State 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 6.00 4.02 8.55 11.14 13.12 42.87 35.23 23.88 30.87 16.21 8.06 11.11 33.73 48.38 48.40 51.03 44.99 54.03 49.50 46.95 51.30 36.18 32.00
2 6.00 10.02 14.56 17.14 7.12 36.87 29.23 29.88 36.87 22.21 14.07 17.11 39.73 54.38 42.39 54.00 38.98 55.11 43.50 40.94 52.47 41.92 38.00
3 4.02 10.02 4.53 7.12 17.14 46.89 39.25 19.86 26.85 12.19 4.04 7.09 29.71 44.36 52.42 47.01 49.01 50.01 45.48 42.93 47.28 32.16 27.98
4 8.55 14.56 4.53 2.58 12.61 42.36 34.72 15.32 22.31 7.66 8.57 11.62 25.17 39.83 47.88 42.48 44.47 45.48 48.99 47.46 51.08 36.43 32.51
5 11.14 17.14 7.12 2.58 10.02 39.78 32.14 12.74 19.73 10.24 11.16 14.20 27.76 37.24 45.30 39.89 41.89 42.89 46.41 50.04 48.50 39.01 35.10
6 13.12 7.12 17.14 12.61 10.02 29.75 22.11 22.76 29.75 20.27 21.18 24.22 37.78 47.27 35.28 46.88 31.87 47.99 36.38 46.03 45.36 49.04 45.12
7 42.87 36.87 46.89 42.36 39.78 29.75 7.64 27.04 32.37 47.48 50.94 52.12 39.00 23.89 5.52 17.13 2.11 18.24 6.63 16.28 15.60 30.71 31.22
8 35.23 29.23 39.25 34.72 32.14 22.11 7.64 19.40 26.39 41.50 43.30 46.34 46.64 31.53 13.16 24.77 9.75 25.88 14.27 23.92 23.24 38.35 38.86
9 23.88 29.88 19.86 15.32 12.74 22.76 27.04 19.40 6.99 22.10 23.90 26.94 39.62 24.50 32.56 27.15 29.15 30.16 33.67 40.11 35.76 50.87 47.84
10 30.87 36.87 26.85 22.31 19.73 29.75 32.37 26.39 6.99 15.11 30.89 33.93 32.63 17.51 26.85 20.16 30.26 23.17 34.77 33.12 28.77 43.88 48.06
11 16.21 22.21 12.19 7.66 10.24 20.27 47.48 41.50 22.10 15.11 15.77 18.82 17.51 32.63 41.96 35.28 45.37 38.28 49.89 47.90 43.88 28.77 32.95
12 8.06 14.07 4.04 8.57 11.16 21.18 50.94 43.30 23.90 30.89 15.77 3.04 33.29 48.40 56.46 51.05 53.05 54.05 48.53 38.88 43.23 28.12 23.94
13 11.11 17.11 7.09 11.62 14.20 24.22 52.12 46.34 26.94 33.93 18.82 3.04 36.33 51.45 53.41 54.09 50.01 57.10 45.49 35.84 40.19 25.08 20.90
14 33.73 39.73 29.71 25.17 27.76 37.78 39.00 46.64 39.62 32.63 17.51 33.29 36.33 15.11 40.30 28.69 36.89 20.76 32.37 30.38 26.37 11.26 15.44
15 48.38 54.38 44.36 39.83 37.24 47.27 23.89 31.53 24.50 17.51 32.63 48.40 51.45 15.11 25.18 13.58 21.77 5.65 17.26 15.60 11.26 26.37 30.55
16 48.40 42.39 52.42 47.88 45.30 35.28 5.52 13.16 32.56 26.85 41.96 56.46 53.41 40.30 25.18 11.61 3.41 19.53 7.92 17.57 16.90 32.01 32.52
17 51.03 54.00 47.01 42.48 39.89 46.88 17.13 24.77 27.15 20.16 35.28 51.05 54.09 28.69 13.58 11.61 15.02 7.92 19.53 29.18 24.83 39.94 44.12
18 44.99 38.98 49.01 44.47 41.89 31.87 2.11 9.75 29.15 30.26 45.37 53.05 50.01 36.89 21.77 3.41 15.02 16.12 4.52 14.16 13.49 28.60 29.11
19 54.03 55.11 39.08 45.48 42.89 47.99 18.24 25.88 30.16 23.17 38.28 54.05 57.10 20.76 5.65 19.53 7.92 16.12 11.61 21.26 16.91 32.02 36.20
20 49.50 43.50 44.49 48.99 46.41 36.38 6.63 14.27 33.67 34.77 49.89 48.53 45.49 32.37 17.26 7.92 19.53 4.52 11.61 9.65 8.97 24.09 24.59
21 46.95 48.12 42.93 47.46 50.04 46.03 16.28 23.92 40.11 33.12 47.90 38.88 35.84 30.38 15.60 17.57 29.18 14.16 21.26 9.65 4.35 19.13 14.94
22 51.30 52.47 47.28 51.08 48.50 45.36 15.60 23.24 35.76 28.77 43.88 43.23 40.19 26.37 11.26 16.90 24.83 13.49 16.91 8.97 4.35 15.11 19.29
23 36.18 37.36 32.16 36.43 39.01 49.04 30.71 38.35 50.87 43.88 28.77 28.12 25.08 11.26 26.37 32.01 39.94 28.60 32.02 24.09 19.13 15.11 4.18
24 32.00 33.18 27.98 32.51 35.10 45.12 31.22 38.86 47.84 48.06 32.95 23.94 20.90 15.44 30.55 32.52 44.12 29.11 36.20 24.59 14.94 19.29 4.18
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Travel Times (State 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 41.15 4.02 8.95 11.96 35.68 56.44 49.80 26.08 33.23 16.96 8.06 11.13 35.23 51.50 61.87 53.40 58.53 57.57 61.91 50.53 54.72 38.44 34.25
2 41.15 37.13 32.20 29.19 5.47 26.22 19.59 43.31 50.46 40.21 41.17 44.24 58.47 51.13 31.65 42.69 17.38 45.06 32.87 33.32 42.07 47.42 49.59
3 4.02 37.13 4.93 7.94 31.66 52.42 45.78 22.06 29.22 12.94 4.04 7.11 31.21 47.48 57.85 49.38 54.51 53.55 57.89 46.51 50.70 34.43 30.24
4 8.95 32.20 4.93 3.01 26.73 47.49 40.85 17.13 24.29 8.01 8.97 12.04 26.28 42.55 52.92 44.45 49.58 48.62 54.14 51.44 53.55 37.28 35.17
5 11.96 29.19 7.94 3.01 23.72 44.48 37.84 14.12 21.27 11.02 11.98 15.05 29.29 39.54 49.91 41.44 46.57 45.61 51.12 54.45 50.54 40.29 38.18
6 35.68 5.47 31.66 26.73 23.72 20.76 14.12 37.84 44.99 34.74 35.70 38.77 53.01 45.67 26.19 37.23 22.85 39.59 27.40 38.78 36.61 52.88 55.06
7 56.44 26.22 52.42 47.49 44.48 20.76 6.63 30.35 34.07 50.34 56.46 57.43 41.18 24.91 5.43 16.47 2.09 18.84 6.65 18.03 15.85 32.13 34.30
8 49.80 19.59 45.78 40.85 37.84 14.12 6.63 23.72 30.87 47.15 49.82 52.89 47.82 31.55 12.07 23.11 8.73 25.47 13.28 24.66 22.49 38.76 40.93
9 26.08 43.31 22.06 17.13 14.12 37.84 30.35 23.72 7.15 23.43 26.10 29.17 41.69 25.42 35.79 27.32 32.45 31.49 37.00 40.61 36.42 52.69 52.30
10 33.23 50.46 29.22 24.29 21.27 44.99 34.07 30.87 7.15 16.27 33.26 36.33 34.54 18.27 28.63 20.16 31.97 24.34 36.53 33.46 29.27 45.54 49.73
11 16.96 40.21 12.94 8.01 11.02 34.74 50.34 47.15 23.43 16.27 16.98 20.05 18.27 34.54 44.91 36.44 48.25 40.61 52.80 49.73 45.54 29.27 33.46
12 8.06 41.17 4.04 8.97 11.98 35.70 56.46 49.82 26.10 33.26 16.98 3.07 35.25 51.52 61.74 53.42 58.40 57.59 53.85 42.47 46.66 30.39 26.20
13 11.13 44.24 7.11 12.04 15.05 38.77 57.43 52.89 29.17 36.33 20.05 3.07 38.32 54.59 58.67 56.49 55.33 60.66 50.78 39.40 43.59 27.32 23.13
14 35.23 58.47 31.21 26.28 29.29 53.01 41.18 47.82 41.69 34.54 18.27 35.25 38.32 16.27 42.43 31.39 39.09 22.35 34.54 31.47 27.27 11.00 15.19
15 51.50 51.13 47.48 42.55 39.54 45.67 24.91 31.55 25.42 18.27 34.54 51.52 54.59 16.27 26.16 15.12 22.82 6.07 18.26 15.19 11.00 27.27 31.47
16 61.87 31.65 57.85 52.92 49.91 26.19 5.43 12.07 35.79 28.63 44.91 61.74 58.67 42.43 26.16 11.04 3.34 20.08 7.89 19.27 17.10 33.37 35.55
17 53.40 42.69 49.38 44.45 41.44 37.23 16.47 23.11 27.32 20.16 36.44 53.42 56.49 31.39 15.12 11.04 14.38 9.05 18.93 30.31 26.12 42.39 46.58
18 58.53 28.31 54.51 49.58 46.57 22.85 2.09 8.73 32.45 31.97 48.25 58.40 55.33 39.09 22.82 3.34 14.38 16.74 4.55 15.93 13.76 30.03 32.21
19 57.57 45.06 41.41 48.62 45.61 39.59 18.84 25.47 31.49 24.34 40.61 57.59 60.66 22.35 6.07 20.08 9.05 16.74 12.19 21.26 17.07 33.35 37.54
20 61.91 32.87 49.96 54.14 51.12 27.40 6.65 13.28 37.00 36.53 52.80 53.85 50.78 34.54 18.26 7.89 18.93 4.55 12.19 11.38 9.20 25.48 27.65
21 50.53 37.88 46.51 51.44 54.45 38.78 18.03 24.66 40.61 33.46 49.73 42.47 39.40 31.47 15.19 19.27 30.31 15.93 21.26 11.38 4.19 20.46 16.27
22 54.72 42.07 50.70 53.55 50.54 36.61 15.85 22.49 36.42 29.27 45.54 46.66 43.59 27.27 11.00 17.10 26.12 13.76 17.07 9.20 4.19 16.27 20.46
23 38.44 47.47 34.43 37.28 40.29 52.88 32.13 38.76 52.69 45.54 29.27 30.39 27.32 11.00 27.27 33.37 42.39 30.03 33.35 25.48 20.46 16.27 4.19
24 34.25 43.28 30.24 35.17 38.18 55.06 34.30 40.93 52.30 49.73 33.46 26.20 23.13 15.19 31.47 35.55 46.58 32.21 37.54 27.65 16.27 20.46 4.19
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Travel Times (State 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 6.01 4.05 9.03 13.59 16.84 70.33 61.10 54.62 66.51 19.03 8.36 11.41 54.09 79.18 76.05 81.69 72.44 84.97 77.32 74.34 80.75 49.29 45.66
2 6.01 10.06 15.04 19.60 10.83 64.32 55.09 60.63 72.52 25.04 14.37 17.42 60.10 85.19 70.04 81.95 66.43 83.34 71.31 68.33 82.11 55.30 51.67
3 4.05 10.06 4.98 9.55 20.89 74.38 65.15 50.57 62.46 14.98 4.31 7.36 50.04 75.13 80.10 77.64 76.49 80.92 73.37 70.30 76.70 45.24 41.62
4 9.03 15.04 4.98 4.57 15.91 69.40 60.17 45.60 57.48 19.96 9.29 12.34 55.02 70.15 75.12 72.66 71.51 75.94 76.39 75.27 81.68 50.22 46.59
5 13.59 19.60 9.55 4.57 11.35 64.84 55.60 41.03 52.91 24.53 13.86 16.91 59.59 65.58 70.55 68.09 66.95 71.37 71.82 79.84 77.12 54.79 51.16
6 16.84 10.83 20.89 15.91 11.35 53.49 44.25 52.38 64.26 35.87 25.21 28.25 70.93 76.93 59.20 71.11 55.60 72.51 60.48 72.18 71.27 66.13 62.51
7 70.33 64.32 74.38 69.40 64.84 53.49 9.23 23.81 23.59 89.36 78.69 81.63 58.53 24.81 5.72 17.62 2.11 19.02 6.99 18.69 17.79 49.25 47.37
8 61.10 55.09 65.15 60.17 55.60 44.25 9.23 14.57 26.46 80.13 69.46 72.51 67.76 34.04 14.95 26.86 11.35 28.25 16.22 27.93 27.02 58.48 56.61
9 54.62 60.63 50.57 45.60 41.03 52.38 23.81 14.57 11.89 65.56 54.89 57.94 58.27 24.55 29.52 27.07 25.92 30.34 30.80 42.50 36.09 67.55 71.18
10 66.51 72.52 62.46 57.48 52.91 64.26 23.59 26.46 11.89 77.44 66.77 69.82 46.39 12.67 17.88 15.18 21.48 18.46 26.36 30.61 24.20 55.66 59.29
11 19.03 25.04 14.98 19.96 24.53 35.87 89.36 80.13 65.56 77.44 10.67 13.71 35.06 68.78 95.08 83.17 91.47 74.57 86.60 76.65 75.80 44.34 47.97
12 8.36 14.37 4.31 9.29 13.86 25.21 78.69 69.46 54.89 66.77 10.67 3.05 45.73 79.44 84.41 81.95 80.81 85.23 77.68 65.98 72.39 40.93 37.30
13 11.41 17.42 7.36 12.34 16.91 28.25 81.63 72.51 57.94 69.82 13.71 3.05 47.16 80.88 83.12 85.00 79.51 86.67 74.64 62.93 69.34 37.88 34.25
14 54.09 60.10 50.04 55.02 59.59 70.93 58.53 67.76 58.27 46.39 35.06 45.73 47.16 33.72 60.02 48.11 56.41 39.51 51.54 41.59 40.74 9.28 12.91
15 79.18 85.19 75.13 70.15 65.58 76.93 24.81 34.04 24.55 12.67 68.78 79.44 80.88 33.72 26.30 14.39 22.70 5.79 17.82 17.94 11.53 43.00 46.62
16 76.05 70.04 80.10 75.12 70.55 59.20 5.72 14.95 29.52 17.88 95.08 84.41 83.12 60.02 26.30 11.91 3.60 20.51 8.48 20.18 19.28 50.74 48.86
17 81.69 81.95 77.64 72.66 68.09 71.11 17.62 26.86 27.07 15.18 83.17 81.95 85.00 48.11 14.39 11.91 15.51 8.60 20.39 32.09 25.92 57.39 60.77
18 72.44 66.43 76.49 71.51 66.95 55.60 2.11 11.35 25.92 21.48 91.47 80.81 79.51 56.41 22.70 3.60 15.51 16.91 4.88 16.58 15.67 47.13 45.26
19 84.97 83.34 69.34 75.94 71.37 72.51 19.02 28.25 30.34 18.46 74.57 85.23 86.67 39.51 5.79 20.51 8.60 16.91 12.03 23.73 17.32 48.78 52.41
20 77.32 71.31 71.62 76.39 71.82 60.48 6.99 16.22 30.80 26.36 86.60 77.68 74.64 51.54 17.82 8.48 20.39 4.88 12.03 11.70 10.80 42.26 40.38
21 74.34 75.70 70.30 75.27 79.84 72.18 18.69 27.93 42.50 30.61 76.65 65.98 62.93 41.59 17.94 20.18 32.09 16.58 23.73 11.70 6.41 32.31 28.68
22 80.75 82.11 76.70 81.68 77.12 71.27 17.79 27.02 36.09 24.20 75.80 72.39 69.34 40.74 11.53 19.28 25.92 15.67 17.32 10.80 6.41 31.46 35.09
23 49.29 50.82 45.24 50.22 54.79 66.13 49.25 58.48 67.55 55.66 44.34 40.93 37.88 9.28 43.00 50.74 57.39 47.13 48.78 42.26 32.31 31.46 3.63
24 45.66 47.19 41.62 46.59 51.16 62.51 47.37 56.61 71.18 59.29 47.97 37.30 34.25 12.91 46.62 48.86 60.77 45.26 52.41 40.38 28.68 35.09 3.63
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Travel Times (State 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 6.00 4.02 9.03 12.06 14.05 50.89 42.29 31.12 38.67 17.15 8.11 11.18 34.36 55.89 56.36 58.84 52.99 61.49 57.48 56.77 64.79 36.72 29.17
2 6.00 10.03 15.03 18.07 8.04 44.88 36.28 37.12 44.68 23.15 14.11 17.19 40.37 61.89 50.36 61.13 46.99 62.25 51.48 50.76 58.78 42.73 35.18
3 4.02 10.03 5.01 8.04 18.07 54.91 46.31 27.10 34.65 13.13 4.09 7.16 30.34 51.87 60.38 54.81 57.01 57.47 57.44 52.75 60.94 32.70 25.15
4 9.03 15.03 5.01 3.04 13.06 49.90 41.30 22.09 29.64 8.12 9.09 12.17 25.33 46.86 55.38 49.81 52.01 52.47 56.50 57.75 55.93 37.71 30.16
5 12.06 18.07 8.04 3.04 10.03 46.86 38.26 19.05 26.61 11.15 12.13 15.21 28.37 43.82 52.34 46.77 48.97 49.43 53.46 60.79 52.89 40.75 33.19
6 14.05 8.04 18.07 13.06 10.03 36.84 28.24 29.08 36.63 21.18 22.16 25.23 38.40 53.85 42.31 53.08 38.95 54.20 43.44 56.30 50.74 50.77 43.22
7 50.89 44.88 54.91 49.90 46.86 36.84 8.60 27.81 31.21 53.86 58.99 62.07 45.63 22.97 5.48 16.24 2.11 17.37 6.60 19.46 13.90 54.61 47.06
8 42.29 36.28 46.31 41.30 38.26 28.24 8.60 19.21 26.76 49.42 50.39 53.47 54.23 31.57 14.08 24.84 10.71 25.97 15.20 28.06 22.50 63.21 55.66
9 31.12 37.12 27.10 22.09 19.05 29.08 27.81 19.21 7.55 30.21 31.18 34.26 47.42 24.77 33.29 27.72 29.92 30.38 34.41 42.79 33.84 59.80 52.25
10 38.67 44.68 34.65 29.64 26.61 36.63 31.21 26.76 7.55 22.65 38.74 41.81 39.87 17.22 25.73 20.16 29.10 22.82 33.59 35.24 26.29 52.25 59.80
11 17.15 23.15 13.13 8.12 11.15 21.18 53.86 49.42 30.21 22.65 16.08 19.16 17.22 39.87 48.39 42.82 51.75 45.48 56.25 57.89 48.94 29.59 37.15
12 8.11 14.11 4.09 9.09 12.13 22.16 58.99 50.39 31.18 38.74 16.08 3.08 33.30 55.95 64.47 58.90 61.10 61.56 61.52 48.66 57.61 28.62 21.06
13 11.18 17.19 7.16 12.17 15.21 25.23 62.07 53.47 34.26 41.81 19.16 3.08 36.38 59.03 66.30 61.98 62.93 64.64 58.44 45.58 54.53 25.54 17.99
14 34.36 40.37 30.34 25.33 28.37 38.40 45.63 54.23 47.42 39.87 17.22 33.30 36.38 22.65 46.89 36.12 43.52 28.26 39.03 40.68 31.73 12.38 19.93
15 55.89 61.89 51.87 46.86 43.82 53.85 22.97 31.57 24.77 17.22 39.87 55.95 59.03 22.65 24.23 13.47 20.86 5.61 16.37 18.02 9.07 35.03 42.58
16 56.36 50.36 60.38 55.38 52.34 42.31 5.48 14.08 33.29 25.73 48.39 64.47 66.30 46.89 24.23 10.77 3.37 18.63 7.86 20.72 15.16 55.87 48.32
17 58.84 61.13 54.81 49.81 46.77 53.08 16.24 24.84 27.72 20.16 42.82 58.90 61.98 36.12 13.47 10.77 14.14 7.86 18.63 31.49 22.54 48.50 56.05
18 52.99 46.99 57.01 52.01 48.97 38.95 2.11 10.71 29.92 29.10 51.75 61.10 62.93 43.52 20.86 3.37 14.14 15.26 4.49 17.35 11.79 52.50 44.95
19 61.49 62.25 46.96 52.47 49.43 54.20 17.37 25.97 30.38 22.82 45.48 61.56 64.64 28.26 5.61 18.63 7.86 15.26 10.77 23.63 14.68 40.64 48.19
20 57.48 51.48 53.63 56.50 53.46 43.44 6.60 15.20 34.41 33.59 56.25 61.52 58.44 39.03 16.37 7.86 18.63 4.49 10.77 12.86 7.30 48.01 40.46
21 56.77 49.83 51.99 57.75 60.79 56.30 19.46 28.06 42.79 35.24 57.89 48.66 45.58 40.68 18.02 20.72 31.49 17.35 23.63 12.86 8.95 35.15 27.60
22 64.79 58.78 60.94 55.93 52.89 50.74 13.90 22.50 33.84 26.29 48.94 57.61 54.53 31.73 9.07 15.16 22.54 11.79 14.68 7.30 8.95 44.10 36.55
23 36.72 28.00 32.70 37.71 40.75 50.77 54.61 63.21 59.80 52.25 29.59 28.62 25.54 12.38 35.03 55.87 48.50 52.50 40.64 48.01 35.15 44.10 7.55
24 29.17 22.23 25.15 30.16 33.19 43.22 47.06 55.66 52.25 59.80 37.15 21.06 17.99 19.93 42.58 48.32 56.05 44.95 48.19 40.46 27.60 36.55 7.55
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Travel Times (State 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 47.89 4.02 10.14 17.04 42.42 88.32 80.93 57.23 70.36 18.39 8.27 11.34 56.68 84.47 94.06 85.54 90.40 90.55 93.52 80.28 86.64 53.15 49.64
2 47.89 43.87 37.74 30.85 5.47 51.36 43.97 67.67 80.80 58.24 48.12 51.19 96.53 76.86 57.11 69.12 42.52 70.78 58.43 60.75 69.99 82.07 78.56
3 4.02 43.87 6.13 13.02 38.40 84.30 76.91 53.21 66.34 14.37 4.25 7.32 52.67 80.46 90.04 81.52 86.39 86.54 89.51 76.26 82.62 49.13 45.62
4 10.14 37.74 6.13 6.89 32.28 78.17 70.78 47.08 60.22 20.50 10.38 13.45 58.79 74.33 83.92 75.40 80.26 80.41 85.24 82.39 86.81 55.26 51.75
5 17.04 30.85 13.02 6.89 25.39 71.28 63.89 40.19 53.33 27.39 17.27 20.34 65.68 67.44 77.03 68.51 73.37 73.52 78.35 86.29 79.92 62.15 58.64
6 42.42 5.47 38.40 32.28 25.39 45.90 38.51 62.20 75.34 52.77 42.66 45.73 91.07 71.40 51.64 63.66 47.98 65.32 52.97 66.21 64.53 87.53 84.02
7 88.32 51.36 84.30 78.17 71.28 45.90 7.39 31.09 29.44 98.67 88.55 89.25 61.80 25.50 5.74 17.76 2.08 19.42 7.07 20.32 18.63 52.12 50.95
8 80.93 43.97 76.91 70.78 63.89 38.51 7.39 23.70 36.83 91.28 81.16 84.23 69.19 32.89 13.13 25.15 9.48 26.81 14.46 27.71 26.02 59.51 58.35
9 57.23 67.67 53.21 47.08 40.19 62.20 31.09 23.70 13.13 67.58 57.46 60.53 63.54 27.25 36.83 28.32 33.18 33.33 38.16 46.09 39.73 73.22 76.73
10 70.36 80.80 66.34 60.22 53.33 75.34 29.44 36.83 13.13 80.71 70.60 73.67 50.41 14.11 23.70 15.18 27.36 20.19 32.34 32.96 26.60 60.09 63.60
11 18.39 58.24 14.37 20.50 27.39 52.77 98.67 91.28 67.58 80.71 10.12 13.19 38.30 74.59 101.67 89.65 98.01 80.67 93.03 82.12 81.46 47.97 51.48
12 8.27 48.12 4.25 10.38 17.27 42.66 88.55 81.16 57.46 70.60 10.12 3.07 48.41 84.71 93.89 85.78 90.24 90.79 85.25 72.01 78.37 44.88 41.37
13 11.34 51.19 7.32 13.45 20.34 45.73 89.25 84.23 60.53 73.67 13.19 3.07 51.48 87.78 90.82 88.85 87.17 93.86 82.18 68.93 75.30 41.81 38.30
14 56.68 96.53 52.67 58.79 65.68 91.07 61.80 69.19 63.54 50.41 38.30 48.41 51.48 36.30 63.37 51.35 59.71 42.38 54.73 43.83 43.17 9.68 13.19
15 84.47 76.86 80.46 74.33 67.44 71.40 25.50 32.89 27.25 14.11 74.59 84.71 87.78 36.30 27.07 15.06 23.42 6.08 18.43 18.85 12.48 45.97 49.49
16 94.06 57.11 90.04 83.92 77.03 51.64 5.74 13.13 36.83 23.70 101.67 93.89 90.82 63.37 27.07 12.02 3.66 20.99 8.64 21.89 20.20 53.69 52.53
17 85.54 69.12 81.52 75.40 68.51 63.66 17.76 25.15 28.32 15.18 89.65 85.78 88.85 51.35 15.06 12.02 15.67 8.98 20.66 33.90 27.54 61.03 64.54
18 90.40 53.45 86.39 80.26 73.37 47.98 2.08 9.48 33.18 27.36 98.01 90.24 87.17 59.71 23.42 3.66 15.67 17.34 4.98 18.23 16.54 50.03 48.87
19 90.55 70.78 74.38 80.41 73.52 65.32 19.42 26.81 33.33 20.19 80.67 90.79 93.86 42.38 6.08 20.99 8.98 17.34 12.35 24.93 18.56 52.05 55.57
20 93.52 58.43 81.40 85.24 78.35 52.97 7.07 14.46 38.16 32.34 93.03 85.25 82.18 54.73 18.43 8.64 20.66 4.98 12.35 13.25 11.56 45.05 43.89
21 80.28 63.63 76.26 82.39 86.29 66.21 20.32 27.71 46.09 32.96 82.12 72.01 68.93 43.83 18.85 21.89 33.90 18.23 24.93 13.25 6.36 34.15 30.64
22 86.64 69.99 82.62 86.81 79.92 64.53 18.63 26.02 39.73 26.60 81.46 78.37 75.30 43.17 12.48 20.20 27.54 16.54 18.56 11.56 6.36 33.49 37.00
23 53.15 86.86 49.13 55.26 62.15 87.53 52.12 59.51 73.22 60.09 47.97 44.88 41.81 9.68 45.97 53.69 61.03 50.03 52.05 45.05 34.15 33.49 3.51
24 49.64 83.35 45.62 51.75 58.64 84.02 50.95 58.35 76.73 63.60 51.48 41.37 38.30 13.19 49.49 52.53 64.54 48.87 55.57 43.89 30.64 37.00 3.51
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Travel Times (State 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 44.73 4.02 9.76 13.66 39.26 66.16 59.30 33.70 41.76 17.94 8.10 11.19 36.74 60.55 71.11 61.92 68.24 66.38 72.61 61.05 70.70 38.93 30.87
2 44.73 40.71 34.97 31.06 5.47 32.36 25.50 51.10 59.16 43.16 44.80 47.88 61.95 56.96 37.31 49.47 23.51 51.12 38.82 41.20 46.81 64.69 56.63
3 4.02 40.71 5.74 9.65 35.24 62.14 55.28 29.68 37.74 13.93 4.09 7.17 32.72 56.53 67.09 57.90 64.22 62.37 68.60 57.03 66.68 34.91 26.85
4 9.76 34.97 5.74 3.91 29.51 56.40 49.54 23.94 32.00 8.19 9.83 12.91 26.98 50.80 61.35 52.16 58.48 56.63 62.86 62.77 60.94 40.65 32.59
5 13.66 31.06 9.65 3.91 25.60 52.49 45.63 20.04 28.09 12.09 13.73 16.82 30.89 46.89 57.44 48.26 54.57 52.72 58.95 66.68 57.03 44.56 36.50
6 39.26 5.47 35.24 29.51 25.60 26.90 20.04 45.63 53.69 37.69 39.33 42.41 56.49 51.49 31.85 44.00 28.98 45.66 33.35 46.67 41.35 70.15 62.10
7 66.16 32.36 62.14 56.40 52.49 26.90 6.86 32.46 34.64 58.71 66.23 69.31 48.67 24.60 5.29 17.45 2.08 18.76 6.46 19.77 14.45 58.01 49.95
8 59.30 25.50 55.28 49.54 45.63 20.04 6.86 25.60 33.66 57.73 59.37 62.45 55.53 31.46 11.81 23.97 8.94 25.62 13.32 26.63 21.31 64.87 56.81
9 33.70 51.10 29.68 23.94 20.04 45.63 32.46 25.60 8.06 32.13 33.77 36.85 50.92 26.85 37.41 28.22 34.54 32.68 38.92 46.64 37.00 64.59 56.53
10 41.76 59.16 37.74 32.00 28.09 53.69 34.64 33.66 8.06 24.07 41.82 44.91 42.87 18.80 29.35 20.16 32.56 24.63 36.94 38.59 28.94 56.53 64.59
11 17.94 43.16 13.93 8.19 12.09 37.69 58.71 57.73 32.13 24.07 17.75 20.84 18.80 42.87 53.42 44.24 56.63 48.70 61.01 62.66 53.01 32.46 40.52
12 8.10 44.80 4.09 9.83 13.73 39.33 66.23 59.37 33.77 41.82 17.75 3.08 36.55 60.62 71.18 61.99 68.31 66.45 66.26 52.95 62.59 30.82 22.77
13 11.19 47.88 7.17 12.91 16.82 42.41 69.31 62.45 36.85 44.91 20.84 3.08 39.63 63.70 70.76 65.07 67.55 69.54 63.18 49.86 59.51 27.74 19.68
14 36.74 61.95 32.72 26.98 30.89 56.49 48.67 55.53 50.92 42.87 18.80 36.55 39.63 24.07 49.79 37.64 46.59 29.90 42.21 43.86 34.22 13.67 21.72
15 60.55 56.96 56.53 50.80 46.89 51.49 24.60 31.46 26.85 18.80 42.87 60.62 63.70 24.07 25.72 13.56 22.52 5.83 18.14 19.79 10.14 37.74 45.80
16 71.11 37.31 67.09 61.35 57.44 31.85 5.29 11.81 37.41 29.35 53.42 71.18 70.76 49.79 25.72 12.16 3.21 19.89 7.58 20.90 15.58 59.13 51.08
17 61.92 49.47 57.90 52.16 48.26 44.00 17.45 23.97 28.22 20.16 44.24 61.99 65.07 37.64 13.56 12.16 15.36 7.73 19.74 33.06 23.71 51.30 59.36
18 68.24 34.44 63.88 58.48 54.57 28.98 2.08 8.94 34.54 32.56 56.63 68.31 67.55 46.59 22.52 3.21 15.36 16.68 4.38 17.69 12.37 55.93 47.87
19 66.38 51.12 50.70 56.63 52.72 45.66 18.76 25.62 32.68 24.63 48.70 66.45 69.54 29.90 5.83 19.89 7.73 16.68 12.31 25.62 15.98 43.57 51.63
20 72.61 38.82 59.51 62.86 58.95 33.35 6.46 13.32 38.92 36.94 61.01 66.26 63.18 42.21 18.14 7.58 19.74 4.38 12.31 13.32 7.99 51.55 43.50
21 61.05 37.17 57.03 62.77 66.68 46.67 19.77 26.63 46.64 38.59 62.66 52.95 49.86 43.86 19.79 20.90 33.06 17.69 25.62 13.32 9.65 38.24 30.18
22 70.70 46.81 66.68 60.94 57.03 41.35 14.45 21.31 37.00 28.94 53.01 62.59 59.51 34.22 10.14 15.58 23.71 12.37 15.98 7.99 9.65 47.88 39.83
23 38.93 48.29 34.91 40.65 44.56 70.15 58.01 64.87 64.59 56.53 32.46 30.82 27.74 13.67 37.74 59.13 51.30 55.93 43.57 51.55 38.24 47.88 8.06
24 30.87 40.23 26.85 32.59 36.50 62.10 49.95 56.81 56.53 64.59 40.52 22.77 19.68 21.72 45.80 51.08 59.36 47.87 51.63 43.50 30.18 39.83 8.06
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Travel Times (State 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 6.02 4.05 9.76 16.14 20.61 99.23 87.40 80.83 94.55 23.52 8.61 11.71 45.03 108.90 104.90 109.73 101.35 114.44 106.04 103.45 112.66 43.18 34.03
2 6.02 10.07 15.78 22.16 14.60 93.21 81.38 86.85 100.56 29.54 14.63 17.73 51.05 114.92 98.88 108.54 95.34 109.68 100.02 97.43 106.65 49.19 40.04
3 4.05 10.07 5.71 12.09 24.67 103.28 91.45 76.78 90.49 19.47 4.56 7.66 40.98 104.85 108.95 105.68 105.41 110.38 106.92 99.40 111.15 39.13 29.97
4 9.76 15.78 5.71 6.38 18.96 97.57 85.74 71.07 84.78 25.18 10.27 13.37 46.69 99.14 103.24 99.97 99.70 104.67 104.38 105.11 108.16 44.84 35.68
5 16.14 22.16 12.09 6.38 12.58 91.19 79.36 64.69 78.41 31.56 16.65 19.75 53.07 92.76 96.86 93.59 93.32 98.30 98.00 111.49 101.78 51.21 42.06
6 20.61 14.60 24.67 18.96 12.58 78.61 66.79 77.27 90.98 44.14 29.23 32.32 65.64 100.62 84.29 93.95 80.74 95.08 85.42 102.06 92.05 63.79 54.64
7 99.23 93.21 103.28 97.57 91.19 78.61 11.83 26.50 24.13 122.75 107.84 110.94 111.69 22.00 5.67 15.33 2.13 16.47 6.81 23.45 13.43 102.03 92.88
8 87.40 81.38 91.45 85.74 79.36 66.79 11.83 14.67 28.39 110.92 96.02 99.11 123.52 33.83 17.50 27.16 13.95 28.30 18.63 35.28 25.26 113.86 104.70
9 80.83 86.85 76.78 71.07 64.69 77.27 26.50 14.67 13.72 96.25 81.34 84.44 117.76 28.07 32.17 28.90 28.63 33.61 33.31 48.84 37.09 115.90 106.75
10 94.55 100.56 90.49 84.78 78.41 90.98 24.13 28.39 13.72 109.97 95.06 98.15 104.04 14.36 18.46 15.18 22.00 19.89 26.68 35.12 23.38 113.70 104.55
11 23.52 29.54 19.47 25.18 31.56 44.14 122.75 110.92 96.25 109.97 14.91 18.00 21.51 111.19 128.42 124.95 124.88 116.73 126.39 109.75 120.22 31.17 40.32
12 8.61 14.63 4.56 10.27 16.65 29.23 107.84 96.02 81.34 95.06 14.91 3.10 36.42 109.41 113.51 110.24 109.97 114.95 111.48 94.84 106.58 34.56 25.41
13 11.71 17.73 7.66 13.37 19.75 32.32 110.94 99.11 84.44 98.15 18.00 3.10 39.51 112.51 116.61 113.33 113.06 118.04 108.38 91.74 103.49 31.47 22.31
14 45.03 51.05 40.98 46.69 53.07 65.64 111.69 123.52 117.76 104.04 21.51 36.42 39.51 89.69 113.11 103.45 109.56 95.22 104.88 88.24 98.71 9.66 18.81
15 108.90 114.92 104.85 99.14 92.76 100.62 22.00 33.83 28.07 14.36 111.19 109.41 112.51 89.69 23.42 13.76 19.88 5.53 15.20 20.77 9.02 99.35 90.19
16 104.90 98.88 108.95 103.24 96.86 84.29 5.67 17.50 32.17 18.46 128.42 113.51 116.61 113.11 23.42 9.66 3.54 17.89 8.23 24.87 14.85 103.45 94.30
17 109.73 108.54 105.68 99.97 93.59 93.95 15.33 27.16 28.90 15.18 124.95 110.24 113.33 103.45 13.76 9.66 13.21 8.23 17.89 34.53 22.78 113.11 103.96
18 101.35 95.34 105.41 99.70 93.32 80.74 2.13 13.95 28.63 22.00 124.88 109.97 113.06 109.56 19.88 3.54 13.21 14.34 4.68 21.32 11.31 99.90 90.75
19 114.44 109.68 99.32 104.67 98.30 95.08 16.47 28.30 33.61 19.89 116.73 114.95 118.04 95.22 5.53 17.89 8.23 14.34 9.66 26.30 14.56 104.88 95.73
20 106.04 100.02 104.52 104.38 98.00 85.42 6.81 18.63 33.31 26.68 126.39 111.48 108.38 104.88 15.20 8.23 17.89 4.68 9.66 16.64 6.63 95.22 86.07
21 103.45 94.90 99.40 105.11 111.49 102.06 23.45 35.28 48.84 35.12 109.75 94.84 91.74 88.24 20.77 24.87 34.53 21.32 26.30 16.64 11.75 78.58 69.43
22 112.66 106.65 111.15 108.16 101.78 92.05 13.43 25.26 37.09 23.38 120.22 106.58 103.49 98.71 9.02 14.85 22.78 11.31 14.56 6.63 11.75 90.32 81.17
23 43.18 41.39 39.13 44.84 51.21 63.79 102.03 113.86 115.90 113.70 31.17 34.56 31.47 9.66 99.35 103.45 113.11 99.90 104.88 95.22 78.58 90.32 9.15
24 34.03 32.23 29.97 35.68 42.06 54.64 92.88 104.70 106.75 104.55 40.32 25.41 22.31 18.81 90.19 94.30 103.96 90.75 95.73 86.07 69.43 81.17 9.15
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Travel Times (State 8) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1 66.42 4.02 12.35 22.98 60.96 124.21 114.72 89.80 104.82 21.99 8.56 11.64 45.74 120.96 129.74 120.11 126.33 126.77 130.92 114.02 127.01 46.35 37.41
2 66.42 62.41 54.07 43.45 5.47 68.72 59.23 84.15 99.17 80.38 66.94 70.03 104.13 92.21 74.25 85.06 59.90 86.41 75.43 82.47 82.38 93.80 84.87
3 4.02 62.41 8.34 18.96 56.94 120.19 110.70 85.78 100.80 17.97 4.54 7.62 41.72 116.94 125.72 116.09 122.31 122.75 126.90 110.00 123.00 42.33 33.39
4 12.35 54.07 8.34 10.62 48.60 111.85 102.36 77.44 92.46 26.31 12.88 15.96 50.06 108.61 117.38 107.75 113.97 114.41 118.57 118.34 118.44 50.66 41.73
5 22.98 43.45 18.96 10.62 37.98 101.23 91.74 66.82 81.84 36.93 23.50 26.58 60.68 97.98 106.76 97.13 103.35 103.79 107.94 120.81 107.82 61.29 52.35
6 60.96 5.47 56.94 48.60 37.98 63.25 53.76 78.68 93.70 74.91 61.48 64.57 98.66 86.75 68.78 79.60 65.37 80.94 69.96 87.94 76.91 99.27 90.33
7 124.21 68.72 120.19 111.85 101.23 63.25 9.49 34.41 30.45 138.16 124.73 127.06 119.83 23.50 5.53 16.35 2.12 17.69 6.71 24.69 13.66 110.24 101.30
8 114.72 59.23 110.70 102.36 91.74 53.76 9.49 24.92 39.94 128.67 115.24 118.33 129.32 32.99 15.02 25.84 11.61 27.18 16.20 34.18 23.15 119.73 110.79
9 89.80 84.15 85.78 77.44 66.82 78.68 34.41 24.92 15.02 103.75 90.32 93.40 127.50 31.16 39.94 30.31 36.53 36.97 41.12 53.99 41.00 128.11 119.17
10 104.82 99.17 100.80 92.46 81.84 93.70 30.45 39.94 15.02 118.77 105.34 108.42 112.48 16.14 24.92 15.29 28.34 21.95 32.93 38.97 25.98 122.08 115.58
11 21.99 80.38 17.97 26.31 36.93 74.91 138.16 128.67 103.75 118.77 13.43 16.52 23.75 120.09 143.69 134.06 140.28 125.89 136.87 118.90 129.92 33.35 42.28
12 8.56 66.94 4.54 12.88 23.50 61.48 124.73 115.24 90.32 105.34 13.43 3.09 37.18 121.48 130.26 120.63 126.85 127.29 123.44 105.46 118.46 37.79 28.85
13 11.64 70.03 7.62 15.96 26.58 64.57 127.06 118.33 93.40 108.42 16.52 3.09 40.27 124.57 128.36 123.71 124.95 130.37 120.35 102.38 115.37 34.70 25.77
14 45.74 104.13 41.72 50.06 60.68 98.66 119.83 129.32 127.50 112.48 23.75 37.18 40.27 96.34 121.13 110.31 117.72 102.14 113.12 95.15 106.17 9.60 18.53
15 120.96 92.21 116.94 108.61 97.98 86.75 23.50 32.99 31.16 16.14 120.09 121.48 124.57 96.34 24.79 13.97 21.38 5.81 16.79 22.83 9.83 105.93 99.44
16 129.74 74.25 125.72 117.38 106.76 68.78 5.53 15.02 39.94 24.92 143.69 130.26 128.36 121.13 24.79 10.82 3.41 18.99 8.01 25.98 14.96 111.53 102.60
17 120.11 85.06 116.09 107.75 97.13 79.60 16.35 25.84 30.31 15.29 134.06 120.63 123.71 110.31 13.97 10.82 14.23 8.17 18.83 36.80 23.81 119.91 113.41
18 126.33 70.83 122.31 113.97 103.35 65.37 2.12 11.61 36.53 28.34 140.28 126.85 124.95 117.72 21.38 3.41 14.23 15.57 4.59 22.57 11.55 108.12 99.18
19 126.77 86.41 111.14 114.41 103.79 80.94 17.69 27.18 36.97 21.95 125.89 127.29 130.37 102.14 5.81 18.99 8.17 15.57 10.98 28.63 15.64 111.74 105.24
20 130.92 75.43 117.71 118.57 107.94 69.96 6.71 16.20 41.12 32.93 136.87 123.44 120.35 113.12 16.79 8.01 18.83 4.59 10.98 17.98 6.95 103.53 94.59
21 114.02 69.39 110.00 118.34 120.81 87.94 24.69 34.18 53.99 38.97 118.90 105.46 102.38 95.15 22.83 25.98 36.80 22.57 28.63 17.98 12.99 85.55 76.61
22 127.01 82.38 123.00 118.44 107.82 76.91 13.66 23.15 41.00 25.98 129.92 118.46 115.37 106.17 9.83 14.96 23.81 11.55 15.64 6.95 12.99 98.54 89.60
23 46.35 94.53 42.33 50.66 61.29 99.27 110.24 119.73 128.11 122.08 33.35 37.79 34.70 9.60 105.93 111.53 119.91 108.12 111.74 103.53 85.55 98.54 8.94
24 37.41 85.59 33.39 41.73 52.35 90.33 101.30 110.79 119.17 115.58 42.28 28.85 25.77 18.53 99.44 102.60 113.41 99.18 105.24 94.59 76.61 89.60 8.94
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
In this thesis we set out to define network risk in a way that was applicable to any system 
with a network structure, has generality regarding the risk attitudes of the agents in the network, 
takes account of the network structure in calculating risk premia, and evaluates risk to the 
individual and to the network using concepts familiar to economists. One insight was critical 
to this: the idea that networks can be used to represent lotteries.  
In Chapter 2 we used the notion of lotteries represented as networks to define the payoff 
space of a lottery using the existing network-theoretic notions of value functions and allocation 
rules. Given the structure of the network, an exogenous value function and allocation rule 
determined the payoff at each node. An agent’s payoff depended on which node they were 
assigned to. We defined three forms of network risk: assignment risk, in which an agent making 
decisions over networks did not know which node she would be assigned to; structural risk, in 
which the structure of the network graph was subject to change, thus affecting the value of the 
network and the allocation of the value; and valuation risk, in which the parameters of the value 
function were state-contingent. We showed that any lottery can be represented as a network 
graph using assignment risk. A key contribution was the definition of the network certainty 
equivalent (NCE) of graph !	as a non-risky and symmetric network graph #(!)	such that 
!~#(!). The network risk premium was defined as the NCE minus the expected payoff for 
graph !,	called the network expected value (NEV). Three classes of methods for estimating the 
NCE were described: social welfare functions derived from axiomatic requirements, voting 
procedures such as the Condorcet-Young method, and aggregating the willingness to pay of 
agents derived from observation of their risk preferences. A preliminary model of social 
preferences in networks was described.  
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In Chapter 3 we illustrated the measurement of risk in a large-scale, realistic network 
model, based on the traffic network of Sioux Falls, South Dakota. We incorporated structural 
risk to the model in the form of three links, representing roads, that were vulnerable to collapse. 
The collective risk aversion of the network was measured by estimating the network’s 
collective willingness to pay (CWTP) for risk management measures that would partially or 
completely offset these structural risks. Numerous methods of measuring CWTP were 
demonstrated, based on aggregation of individual WTP, voting, and social welfare functions.  
An immediate extension to the work in this thesis would be to experimentally test the 
predictions made in Chapter 2 in a controlled laboratory setting. Insights from Chapter 3 could 
be used in designing the experimental tasks. For example, participants might be put into a 
traffic network and told that some links are vulnerable to collapse, thus affecting their payoffs. 
Individual WTP for a risk management measure could then be used by taking votes over 
whether or not to implement the measure at a given price.  
Another extension would be to improve the model of social preferences proposed in 
Section 2.7, particularly to include rank-dependent payoff weighting in the formation of 
conditional preferences. Another expansion in this section would be to have conditional 
payoffs decided by a nested CES function, so that agents with social preferences form their 
conditional payoffs based on a CES function of their own payoff, and a CES aggregation of 
the payoffs of other agents. This would allow for different elasticity between one’s own payoff 
and the payoffs of others collectively, and between the payoffs of others separately.  
Four extensions are possible in Chapter 3. One is to solve Wardropian equilibrium when 
agents make ex ante rather than ex post decisions on route choice, and compare differences in 
(simulated) behavior. Another extension is to apply the models developed in this thesis to 
supply chain risk management (SCRM), addressing the statement of Ho et al. (2015) that the 
quantification of benefits and costs in SCRM would be a worthwhile contribution to that 
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literature. The third extension is to consider the effect of social preferences on CWTP. The 
fourth is to further examine the winners and losers from the introduction of an additional link. 
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